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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 24

JAN-JUNE 1929

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXIV

JANUARY TO JUNE 1929

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXIV.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 6173/6947/91]

No. 1.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 922.)

Rome, December 27, 1928.

Sir,

IN continuation of my telegram No. 195 of the 22nd December, on the subject of the recent incident at Jedda, involving a summons to a British subject to appear before the Sharia court, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a *note-verbale* which I have now received from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject.

2. The official in charge of the competent department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Commendatore Tuozi, with whom the matter was discussed personally by a member of my staff on the lines of your instructions, explained that the question of the subjection of Italian Christian subjects to Koranic law in the Near East was one that had been occasioning the Italian Government concern for some time. His Britannic Majesty's Government were better aware than Italy of the barbarities which King Hussein used to perpetrate in virtue of the Koranic code; and the Wahhabis, over whom Ibn Saud's control was at times doubtful, were undoubtedly more fanatical than their predecessors in the Hejaz. It seemed to the Italian Government impossible to admit so inadequate and inelastic a code as that of the Koran, which prescribed, for example, the lopping off of limbs for minor thefts, could, even in principle and far less in practice, be applied to Christians resident in the countries where it was in force. As stated in the *note-verbale*, such an admission would be damaging to the prestige of the white races; and in any case the Koran did not allow its provisions to be applied to infidels. The Italian Government were confronted with the same problem in the Yemen, and pending some arrangement with the Imam Italian subjects would continue to be sent for trial to Eritrea.

3. The Italian Government, Commendatore Tuozi continued, fully realised that it was out of the question to insist on capitulatory privilege in Hejaz to-day, if only because, in an oriental country, a claim that could not be enforced was considerably worse than useless to the claimant; but between capitulatory privilege and the Koranic law there was room for, and, indeed, it was essential, to find a compromise—for example, the creation of a special foreigners' court by the Hejaz Government.

4. Commendatore Tuozi said, in conclusion, that the Italian Government would like to know the views of His Majesty's Government on this aspect of the question as soon as possible, in order that they might establish a common line of

action with us. It would no doubt be easily possible for the consulates at Jedda to settle the present case without raising the general issue. But the latter would inevitably come up before long.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM

Enclosure in No. 1.

Note verbale.

(Translation.)

IN reply to the aide-mémoire of the 20th instant, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that the Royal Government, in order to meet the lively desire of the British Government, have sent telegraphic instructions to the Royal consul in Jedda to proceed, in agreement with his British colleague, to the nomination of a native to represent the agent of the Italian Steamship Company (a British subject), who has been summoned to appear before the Sharia court, a solution which would enable the agent to avoid appearing before the above-mentioned court, and which the British Government have declared to be quite acceptable.

With reference to the last part of the above-mentioned aide-mémoire, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to observe to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that in the case in point it is not a question of a claim based on capitulatory rights, but of upholding the principle of the incompetence of the purely religious Sharia court to judge European non-Mussulman subjects, both on grounds of prestige and because of the fact that, by the law of the Koran, its application to a person of a religion other than Mussulman is not admissible.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be glad to know the views of the British Government on this subject, so that in future, in analogous cases, a common line of conduct can eventually be pursued towards the Wahabite authorities.

Rome, December 22, 1928.

[E 35/3/91]

No. 2.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to the Foreign Office, January 1, 1929.)

(No. 632.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, December 30, 1928.

GLUBB had received during the past fortnight seemingly trustworthy reports from Arabs coming from Nejd that sections of Mutair, under the notorious raider Ashwan, were preparing raids against Dahamhah section of Aueze camped between Shabicha and Bir Lusuf. He received definite news on the 28th December that the raid had started, and that raiders would cross the frontier near Jumaimah, south of Salman. He was authorised to reconnoitre with aeroplanes and to bomb raiders if identified within Iraq territory, but in no circumstances to cross the border. On the morning of the 29th, aeroplane with Glubb found at Thulaimah, close to frontier, about 14 miles north of Jumaimah, a body of 130 raiders. Iraq shepherd tribe, who had encamped at this place up to the 28th December and had evidently been the first objective of the raiders, had fled during the night, having received warning from Glubb. When the raiders saw the aeroplanes they opened fire on them and were bombed, with the result that twelve camels and three men were left on the ground and the remainder of the raiders fled south across the border. Aeroplanes did not cross the border. I trust that this will have the good result of reinforcing Ibn Saud's efforts to restrain his tribes, and will satisfy him that we wish to co-operate with him in every way to this end.

(Repeated to Jedda, Bushire, No. 171 S.)

[E 63/63/91]

No. 3.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 4, 1929.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs protests against following raids and asks that loot shall be returned, blood money paid and criminals punished:—

1. By Howeitat on Rualla at Muatadel near Jauf on 4th October. Five groups taken.
2. By Eletna on 17th October, against people of Shash. Two groups taken.
3. By Faiz-bin-Jazi on Shafar. Unspecified plunder.
4. Howeitat on Shararat near Jauf.
5. Beni Atiya from Kerak on Shararat. Two groups taken.
6. By Abu Nueiran the Sakhr on Hamad-bin-Birak and others. More than twenty head of camels, she-camels and riding camels taken.
7. Manawir-al-Maiq plundered Rualla and returned to Shabbal.
8. Howeitat raided two groups from Shararat of Jauf and killed their men.

Raids numbered as above 3 to 8 occurred during the month of Jamadi Awal (October-November last).

In acknowledging letter I have taken the opportunity to remark that Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet informed me of disposal of heavy loot of Rualla raid on Beni Sakhr last spring and to add reminder that if Auda Eletna is now intended he is not Transjordanian subject.

[E 41/3/91]

No. 4.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jedda).

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1929.

BAGDAD telegram to Colonial Office No. 3 of 2nd January, repeated to you: Report of impending raid.

You should inform Ibn Saud that rumours have reached His Majesty's Government to the effect that certain Nejd tribes profess to have been accorded permission to raid into Iraq territory, and that a raid upon a large scale upon the Anaizah tribe in Iraq is in contemplation. His Majesty's Government are confident that no such permission can have been given, and that, if there is any foundation whatever for the rumour of an intended raid, Ibn Saud will take immediate steps to ensure that the Iraq-Nejd frontier is not infringed by his tribes.

As regards point raised in your telegram No. 105 in connexion with article 6 of Bahra Agreement, attitude of His Majesty's Government remains as stated in paragraph 6 of note to Ibn Saud enclosed in my despatch No. 215. You should satisfy yourself that Hejaz Government understand this.

[E 35/3/91]

No. 5.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jedda).

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1929.

BAGDAD telegram to Colonial Office No. 632 of 30th December: Mutair raid into Iraq.

You should inform Hejaz Government of facts reported by Sir H. Dobbs and lodge a protest against the infringement of the frontier by Nejd tribesmen, expressing the confident hope of His Majesty's Government that the guilty tribesmen will be punished.

No 6

(No 11.)

Bagdad, January 4, 1929

January

Folli

2 Telegram No. 1294 was received from Resident at Bushire on the 7th December stating that Ibn Saud was detained in Nejd. This meant that Ibn Saud was experiencing difficulty in enforcing his orders.

4 Small raiding or reconnoitring parties of Mutair were reported in neutral zone and neighbourhood during the second week of December

[illegible]

8. Political, Kuwait, telegraphed on the 30th December report, subsequently confirmed, received by Sheikh of Kuwait that Ajman tribesmen were concentrating at Ajman south of Kuwait and that they were about to leave Ajman, that they were being joined by Dawish with a force of Mutair.

8 On the 1st January Znyad tribesmen were attacked by raiding party of thirty M... .. Znyad tribesmen...

9 On the 2nd January shepherd tribesmen reported that he had seen 1,000 camels on 30 miles north-east of Jumaimah in Iraq territory. An aerial

10. On the 3rd January Anjala scout arrived from Gaisuma, 45 miles within Noid Territory, south-west of Jumaama, and was interviewed by Glubb. He

11 All evidence points to possible raid on large scale in the near future in which Mulatt, Shammar, Harb, Atatabah and Alman tribes may participate.

which Mutair, Shammar, Harb, Ataiyah and Ajman tribes may participate. Immediate threat is against Iraq, Ansaiza in Wadian area, but concentration at

(Repeated to Delhi, and Jodda, No. 3 S.)

No. 7

八五

Jedda, January 6, 1929

MY telegram No. 113.
Revised telegram No.

In further communication the Minister for Education

King Feisal must have known that visiting, addressing and meeting the tribes would cause unrest and hamper the negotiations now proceeding. The Minister for

Minister for Foreign Affairs, who awaits expression of His Majesty's Government's views.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 3)

No. 8

Sir Austin Chamberlain to Mr Sakine (Jedda)

1

Foreign Office, January 7, 1929

A spokesman said he would pass a communication to Ibn Saud and local authorities.

No. 9

Mr. Jaking to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 8, 1920.)

No. 214.)

Lodges December 30, 1924

2. Ibn Saud is reported to have faced the tribes boldly, telling them that they were weak and that he would make them strong.

* Not printed.

[20485]

25

were directed against his Royal person, and the ulema, whose word would be his law, would judge between them. He would answer for all his actions, with the exception of certain matters which he reserved for private and not general discussion.

3. The ulema are then reported to have intimated that they found relief from the heavy burden of responsibility laid upon them in the irreproachable personal conduct of the King.

4. I understand from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that discussion on the reserved points, which presumably are those of the most political interest, was limited to some fifty representative tribesmen. No report of these proceedings will be published.

5. The special number of the "Um-el-Qura" contains, in addition, the address to Ibn Saud of the chosen spokesmen of the tribes. I regret that owing to the limited time available, and the pressure of other matters, I have not been able to have a complete translation of the report prepared. I hope to forward what remains at an early opportunity.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS

[E 140/3/91]

No. 10.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 8, 1929.)

(No. 215)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 20, 1928.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 105, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the original letter addressed to me by Ibn Saud on the decision made by His Majesty's Government as a result of the report rendered by Sir Gilbert Clayton on his negotiations.

2. His Majesty acknowledges the assurances given by His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government that the customary rights of the Nejd tribes in Iraq will not be impeded; he, however, seeks to defend his interpretation of the third clause of the Protocol of Uqair by reviving his claim to the southern territories of Iraq, which, he asserts, he only ceded for fear of a complete rupture with His Majesty's Government and in order to secure a promise given by the representative of His Majesty's Government that no fortifications—such as he maintains the present posts to be—would be erected on the frontier.

3. In His Majesty's Government's acceptance of article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra as applying to British forces provided that the position on the frontier never menaces the security of Iraq, Ibn Saud sees an attempt to place a reservation to the existing agreement. He therefore begs His Majesty's Government to amend the text as it stands.

4. He also asks His Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision with regard to the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol, and finally states that if his arguments do not prevail he is prepared to resort to arbitration. He accordingly requests that His Majesty's Government should give consideration to his views that—

- (1) The arbitrators should be chosen by Iraq and Nejd
- (2) His Majesty's Government should remain neutral
- (3) That the arbitrators should be impartial and have adequate knowledge of the local conditions.
- (4) That they should examine the origin of the position and study the incidents which have arisen subsequently
- (5) That His Majesty's Government should undertake to enforce in Iraq any decision reached
- (6) That after the arbitration consideration should be given to avoid any consequent harm.
- (7.) That the matter should be treated with the utmost expedition.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure 1. No. 10.

Ibn Saud to Mr. Jakins.

(Translation.)

WE have received your letter dated the 16th November, 1928, which his Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, directed me to convey to me. We beg your Excellency to send to His Britannic Majesty's Government our following reply to that letter:

1. We have taken note of what was brought to the knowledge of the British Government as a result of the negotiations that took place between us and their representative, Sir Gilbert Clayton, and that they do not agree to our interpretation of the third clause of the First Protocol of Uqair.

2. Our regret is very great, as this reply from the British Government not only destroys all our hopes for a settlement of the dispute, but it is an arrow directed towards our confidence in the conversations we had with the British representative at Uqair and has affected our confidence in all the covenants and engagements we have concluded, and shall conclude, with Britain. This result made the worst impression in the whole of Nejd.

3. We have gathered the people of Nejd and presented to them, from all aspects, the result of the situation arrived at, but the explanation increased their insistence that they were right and their determination to resist the injustice to their country.

4. The only plea put forward by the British Government on their own behalf and on behalf of Iraq with regard to our objection to the building on the borders of the frontiers is that our request for the prohibition of building restricts the principle of the liberty of the right of every Government to take administrative measures within its territory. The British Government will realise, as they acknowledged in their letter, that such right was limited by written agreements.

5. The lands against the building on which we protested do not belong to Iraq but are the property of Nejd and the tribes of Nejd formerly and latterly. It was the Amirs of Nejd who governed those deserts, as all who know Iraq and Nejd from the earliest times until to-day bear witness.

6. We maintained our right to those lands at the time of the meeting of Uqair and insisted on this because they belong to us, our people and our subjects, and we refused the Treaty of Mohammerah for this reason. But the British representative insisted most strongly and threatened us to yield them to Iraq, and we were obliged to accept so that the dispute might not be the cause of the outbreak of war between us and the British Government.

7. The British representative offered us, as a price for that concession, a promise that no fortification or stronghold menacing to Nejd or its people would be built on the borders of the frontiers. This was the statement which describes the borders of the frontiers and does not limit them by mile or metre. The verbal declarations of the British representative convinced us that Britain would preserve that. Unfortunately, we have had no result from those declarations.

8. The British Government will thus see that our object and claim in these lands at that time was for the following reasons:

- (a.) To conserve the right of Nejd to its territories as they formerly were and as they have continued from the earliest time.
- (b.) That these territories are dwelling places for the people of Nejd and pasture lands for them.
- (c.) That these places are the door of Nejd, and Nejd can only be assured of her independence and life if these territories are under her constraint and suzerainty, as she was unable in former times to protect herself in her country except when the deserts of those regions were under her constraint and suzerainty.

The claim of Nejd for those territories was the claim of one to preserve his life and soul. When we were thus compelled at Uqair, we asked for the preservation of the rights of our subjects and for the preservation of the rights of Nejd and her independence and an assurance to preclude what might be taken at some hour as a base for aggression against her. When we were granted our request in this respect, the great calamity in abandoning that part of the territories which is, in fact, the true castle of defence to Nejd was slightly lessened.

[20485]

scope of the article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra and article 10 of the Treaty of Hadda, but the condition mentioned in that paragraph is contradictory to the article itself, for the text of article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra is as follows.—

This text contains no condition or stipulation. Do the British Government wish to make bare room for disagreement so as to justify the action of the aviators who crossed our territories and then desire to refer the interpretation to a committee of arbitration too? This condition is new to the discussion. So we beg the British Government to reconsider this view in correcting it and to leave the article in its reality, because the door of interpretation will leave no value in the treaties.

16. In any case, we thank the British Government for the desire they have expressed to investigate the matter and we hope to receive their early reply to our letter as the position is still critical and requires most speedy settlement.

(Sealed) Respects,
IBN SAUD.

No. 11

Foreign Office, January 9, 1920.

2. The Secretary of State will be glad to receive your early observations on the question of the competence of local Moslem tribunals to try British subjects, and in particular on the suggestion of the Italian Government regarding the possible creation of a special foreigners' court.

No. 12

Foreign Office, January 14, 1920

in an early Ailing Mien letter through which it is clear you should explain that in present times there was in any case no just foundation for the

14. We have taken note of what is mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the letter of the British Government regarding the inclusion of British forces within the

allegations made against King Faisal, whose visit, as you have already stated, was important to the Government of Iraq. The King had no discussions with tribesmen and made no speeches during the tour. You should also point out that Nejd refugees referred to in your telegram No. 5 had left Iraq before visit and their presence could not therefore have prompted the King's journey.

[E 142 63 91]

No. 13

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Stanshew-Bird (Jedda).

(No 10)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, January 15, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 108 of 23rd December and your despatch No. 217 of 20th December: Crossing of Nejd frontier by British aircraft.

From detailed reports now received it appears that on the occasion referred to frontier was accidentally crossed by a flight of three aeroplanes, and not by a single machine as stated in the original telegraphic report received by His Majesty's Government.

You should so inform Ibn Saud, again expressing regret of His Majesty's Government for incident and for subsequent misunderstanding as to the exact nature of the occurrence.

[E 378, 378/91]

No. 14.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 22, 1929)

(No. 220).

Sir,

Jedda, December 22, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that I to-day received a visit from Dr. Cesano on his resuming his duties as Italian consul at Jedda.

2. He told me that he had spent a considerable portion of his leave in Rome in the discussion of questions concerning the Arabian Peninsula. The fact had had to be faced that, owing to British policy with regard to the Aden Protectorate, Italian predominance in the Yemen had been entirely lost. The Imam believed that the Italians acquiesced in the recent British action and the effect had been to throw him into the arms of the Bolsheviks, who were now fairly established in his territories. Dr. Cesano expressed with considerable feeling his regret that his work in the Red Sea had met this result. When the Governor of Eritrea had reproached the Imam for concluding a treaty with the Bolsheviks without informing him, the Imam retorted that he was master in his own house.

3. My Italian colleague stated that he had accordingly been most outspoken in Rome and had asked what his Government hoped to gain in pursuing their present policy. He said that the Government of Rome had been a long time in coming to ask themselves what profit there was in supporting one Arab ruler against another. Was it conceivable that a single Italian soldier would be landed in the defence of Asir?

4. Proceeding to the question of the Italian recognition of Ibn Saud, Dr. Cesano said that he was now armed with two formulas which he hoped would prove effective. First, the League of Nations and its dependencies would be recognized irrespective of any territorial disputes between rivals in Arabia, and, second, the League of Nations would not take cognizance of treaties or disputes with the League of Nations. He admitted that the second alternative, which had been observed has already once been rejected by the League, but he expressed the hope that the League of Nations would be more lenient in its attitude towards the League of Nations. He also mentioned the fact that it is not intended to include any reference to the question of Capitulations.

5. Dr. Cesano referred to the excellent relations he had always maintained with the agency and said that, as a strong admirer of the British, he had always pressed for the closest co-operation between the two Governments, and reminded me of the attitude adopted last spring when the question of the Italian recognition of Ibn Saud might have been an embarrassment to His Majesty's Government.

6. Reverting to the question of Capitulations, he said that we had, in practice, largely abandoned the former position with regard to native subjects of our respective Governments and that although it had so far been possible to reach an amicable settlement in the local difficulties which arose in respect of other subjects, the moment might come, as, for instance, with a change of regime, when it would be imperative to make a stand against a serious menace to the interests here of foreign nationals. In that case he personally hoped to see the British, Italian, French and Dutch representatives in Jedda acting in concert. It was because he was known to you, Sir, and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Rome for his devotion to the cause of Anglo-Italian amity that he had been chosen to return to Jedda.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 387/3/91]

No. 15.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 22, 1929)

(No. 231)

Sir,

Jedda, December 31, 1928.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 214 of the 20th December I have the honour to transmit herewith a further translation of the report* of the meeting of Ibn Saud with the Nejd tribes at Riyadh. This extract comprises the complaints of the tribal spokesmen and the replies of the ulama and of the King.

2. The tribes are reported as acknowledging that their enlightenment came from Ibn Saud and from God. They begged His Majesty that he would ensure that all his subjects received the spiritual guidance he had provided for themselves. They asked that the Government should not allow a further argument, questioned the wisdom of allowing the frontier to be fixed in their country. Finally, with an apt reference to the Uqair Protocol, they said that they would leave the frontier posts standing and refrain from a jihad on a ruling from the ulama, that they would thereby be open to no reproach from the Almighty and on an assurance from the King that there was no menace there to their spiritual or material interests.

3. The ulama then gave a ruling that telegraphs were not unlawful, and His Majesty declared that he was arranging for all of his subjects to be provided with religious teachers. Ibn Saud then seems to have told the tribes that they were responsible for the attack and massacre at Busaiya. Thus they admitted, adding that they would not have been sheltered in Iraq and that the posts would be demolished. The ulama supported this plea for the removal of the posts, but the King declined to do so. He then explained to the tribes that he would explain everything. He then brought the meeting to an end with a finely confused reference to peace and war, upon which the assembly burst into tears, and having paid homage, retired for refreshment.

4. As I have already had the honour to report, no details of the proceedings at the private meeting have been published.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 370/3/91]

No. 16

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Stanshew-Bird (Jedda).

(No. 11)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, January 24, 1929.

YOUR despatch No. 215 of 20th December: Proposed arbitration on points in dispute between Iraq and Nejd.

It appears from your report of the meeting of Ibn Saud and the British representatives at Riyadh (1) and (2) in paragraph 12 of Ibn Saud's note that he contemplates selection of arbitrators by Governments of Iraq and Nejd.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 19

Jeddah Report for Period December 1 to 31, 1928

THE first news of the meeting of Ibn Saud with his tribes at Riyadh came from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs when he informed me that it had been decided to appoint the Saudi monarch a representative to the League of Nations to maintain peaceful relations with Iraq and Transjordan. The sovereign rights of the King as control policy were confirmed and some tribal reorganization was contemplated. Fuad Hamza corrected his former statement by admitting that Ibn Humaid bin-Bijad was not present at Riyadh. Faisal-ed-Dowesh, he said, was living quietly in retreat, having been displaced in the leadership of the Mutair by his son, Ahmad bin-Faisal. The Saudi monarch's representative to the League of Nations was said to be a member of the Saudi family, and was to be appointed within a few days. The Saudi monarch was said to be a member of the Saudi family, and was to be appointed within a few days. The Saudi monarch was said to be a member of the Saudi family, and was to be appointed within a few days.

[illegible]

No 17

Foreign Office, January 24 1920

(Telegraphic) R
{ O.R. telegram No. 106 of 20th December. Flight of British aircraft over
Nair-Turanian frontier

You should inform Ibn Saud that there is no question at present of delimiting this frontier, and that the proposal of His Majesty's Government is merely to mark a track for aircraft to follow on Transjordanian and Iraqi territory.

No 15

Foreign Office, January 29, 1920

(Telegraphic) R

(Telegraphic) R. Foreign Office, January 28, 1948
YOUR telegram No. 109 of 23rd December, paragraph 2: Transjordan raids
on Nejd

You should inform Ibn Saud, in reply to his enquiry as to attitude of His Majesty's Government, that pending receipt of further details of incidents referred to, His Majesty's Government cannot say whether explanation suggested by Amir of Isfahar is correct. You should add that Ibn Saud can rest assured that if, on receipt of further evidence it was found that the raiding parties were guilty as charged, and as thus falling within the scope of article 5 of Hadda Agreement, all possible steps will be taken by Amir to punish offenders and restore any loot taken

No. 12

Mr. Jaking to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 1.)

Jeddah, January 1, 1929

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the
Hainz for the period the 1st to 31st December, 1928

2 Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

7. In the same way, the author has also pointed out a number of the "other" factors that in the long run of history have been considered the "other" factors were more minor remedies. He has also referred to the question of the crossing of the frontier by

the continuance of the present régime

11. If Jeddah is the gem of the Red Sea, then this jewel has recovered its sparkle in the return of Dr. Cesana. My Italian colleague is immensely pleased with himself for having been the first to detect the Italian in time. He feels that by denouncing them after the ratification of the Italian treaty with the Imam he saved the Italian reputation there after the meeting of the Imam with the recently repudiated British Resident at their receiving the treaty on the flow of the recently repudiated British treaty with the Imam. Dr. Cesana is now armed with firmness for the Italian resuscitation of this so-called Jew, he does not seem to overestimate the difficulty of taming a horn of a wild ox which will not work on the Italian poster with the Imam by recognising Ibn Saud's suzerainty over the Asir.

2. The Italian Government desired the attention of His Majesty's Government to be drawn to the conclusion of the commercial treaty between the Soviet and the Imam of the Yemen. This new development would inevitably be a cause of embarrassment to Italy and Great Britain, and would render difficult the full execution of the Clayton Agreement of February 1927, whereby Italy undertook to exercise a restraining

influence on the imam, while His Majesty's Government accepted a similar responsibility in the case of Ibn Saud. It would now be open to the Bolsheviks to incite the imam against both Italy and Great Britain. In order to reduce this possibility, the Italian Government suggested that His Majesty's Government should henceforth diminish, or even abstain from, the military pressure which they are at present applying on the imam in connexion with the Aden Protectorate, and thereby deprive the Bolsheviks of one strong argument.

3. When Count Rogeri was asked what guarantee His Majesty's Government could expect that if they withdrew this pressure on the imam the latter would not menace the Aden Protectorate or prove more difficult to deal with in connexion with that territory, he explained that the Italian Government would continue, as in the past, to exercise on the imam such restraining influence as lay in their power, but that they could do no more than this.

I am, &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 696 3/91]

No. 22

Mr. Stanshew Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 7)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 6, 1929.

MY telegram No. 16.

In letter now received, Ibn Saud explains his conditions (1) and (2) as meaning that, if Iraq and Nejd are each to choose an arbitrator, His Majesty's Government should not also choose one, as Nejd nominee would then be faced with both an Iraq and a British arbitrator. As it is clear that Ibn Saud does not fully understand proposals of His Majesty's Government with regard to arbitration, I have addressed to him a further communication based on your telegram No. 11, and have again urged Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain matters fully to His Majesty.

As regards condition (4), Ibn Saud states that he ceded to Iraq, under article 1 of the 1925 Agreement, a certain tract of land on which he had intended to build that no buildings should be erected thereon. Had he not been convinced that article 3 could bear no other interpretation, he would not have agreed to frontier as laid down. In these circumstances arbitration on meaning of article 3 necessarily involves reconsideration of article 1.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 16.)

E 758 3/91]

No. 23

Mr. Stanshew Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 11)

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 10, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 2, last paragraph.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that Sir G. Clayton gave Ibn Saud an unconditional assurance that His Majesty's Government would respect article 6 of Bahra Agreement and that British forces in Iraq were covered by its provisions. He maintains that the first mention of a condition attaching to inclusion of British troops is contained in Mr. Jakins's note of 16th November (Jeddah despatch No. 207).

Ibn Saud's reply to note of 15th November (Jeddah despatch No. 13) asks His Majesty's Government to reconsider their attitude, as he must regard crossing of his frontiers under any circumstances as an act of aggression and a breach of agreement.

Enclosed for Mr. Stanshew Bird are a copy of my conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs leaves by bag to-day.

E 757 3/91]

No. 24

Mr. Stanshew Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 11)

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 10, 1929.

AMIR OF HAIL has reported to Ibn Saud receipt of a letter from Captain Clayton informing him that he had sent a message to Ibn Ashwan to the effect that his tribe do not go away they will be forcibly expelled.

Hejaz Government protest against this action as a violation of agreement respect the rights of free pasturage confirmed by His Majesty's Government in their note to him of 16th November* (Jeddah despatch No. 207 of 19th November). (Repeated to Bagdad, No. 18.)

E 686 381 91]

No. 25

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 19)

(No. 100.)

Sir,

Cairo, February 8, 1929.

YOU will recall that in the closing paragraphs of his letter enclosed in my despatch No. 39 of the 14th January, 1928, Ibn Saud raised the question of Soviet economic influence in Arabia, with the implicit suggestion that his resistance to Bolshevik penetration should be acknowledged in some practical manner by His Majesty's Government. In the reply then returned to him (see your telegram No. 87 of 23rd January, 1928) I was not specific. I said that during the Jeddah conversations of last summer, I understood that His Majesty mentioned the subject to Sir Gilbert Clayton. More urgent matters, however, then pressed for settlement, and the reference was, I gather, no more than casual. Ibn Saud has now returned to the charge, in a letter translation of which I have the honour to enclose. This letter was delivered by Sheikh Hafez Wahba, who has been living for some months in Cairo.

2. It will be observed that Ibn Saud enquires what return His Majesty's Government are prepared to set against a commercial treaty with him as against Soviet Russia. It is difficult to see how any commercial treaty could be concluded with His Majesty in this sense without arousing considerable hostility among the powers of the East. It is not clear, however, how His Majesty's Government could appear as the sponsor of so unusual an arrangement.

3. It is, however, probable that, behind this letter, lies more than a desire for commercial recognition. Sheikh Hafez Wahba, when His Majesty would appear to have written at some length, confirmed this impression, and suggested that Ibn Saud resented what he represents as the attitude and provisions laid down from Transjordan and other manifestations of shereefian hostility, both there and in Iraq, deserves some tangible expression of British sympathy and support in the shape of a subsidy, the supply of arms and munitions, more effective restraint of shereefian activities at Amman and Bagdad, or otherwise. While disposed to credit His Majesty's Government with goodwill, and to appreciate their frequent expressions of friendliness, Ibn Saud would yet seem to be anxious for some solid proof of the reality of these sentiments. It is possible, therefore, that from the receipt accorded to his present rather vague proposals he will estimate the possibilities of some more comprehensive entente.

4. In conversation with Sheikh Hafez Wahba on the 3rd January, I confined myself to a statement of the obvious difficulties in the way of any uniquely discriminating commercial agreement and to a request that the sheikh should endeavour to ascertain rather more precisely what was in His Majesty's mind. I added that my own note suggested that Ibn Saud would be well advised to put for consideration in London. I also suggested that any Bolshevik activity in Arabia was perhaps a matter of more concern to Ibn Saud than to ourselves.

5. Sheikh Hafez Wahba undertook to communicate with Ibn Saud on these lines, but on the morrow of his visit he fell ill and was compelled to undergo an

* The text of this note is given in Part XXIII, No. 38.

operation. He has since been confined to his bed, and further developments must await his convalescence. Meanwhile, I have thought it advisable not to delay any longer in bringing Ibn Saud's letter to your notice.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's agent and consul, Bah.

I have &c
(In the absence of the High Commissioner),
R. H. HOARE

Enclosure in No. 27

Ibn Saud to Lord Lloyd

*The Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd
and their Dependencies.
Gamud 1200, 1347, of the H.*

(Translation)
Excellency,

We avail ourselves of the opportunity to congratulate you on your safe return to Egypt, and to wish you every success in your work there.

The friendly relations which exist between us and our knowledge of your desire to consolidate these relations between our kingdom and His Britannic Majesty's Government encourage us to lay before you such matters of interest to both countries as have existed in the past, in the hope that you would be the best intermediary to explain the exact situation to His Britannic Majesty's Government, with a view to facilitating the solution of the present difficulties which both parties desire to achieve.

We have been informed that His Britannic Majesty's Government have the question of the ill-omened fortresses in Iraq referred to a commission of arbitration, but we hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government will themselves find a solution to this question, in order to avoid the delays involved in having it referred to arbitrators or the like. We are awaiting their reply on this subject.

We are faced to-day with a question of great importance, to which we have been asked to draw the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government. His Britannic Majesty's Government is showing any interest in it, and we therefore request you to draw the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to its importance and to lay it before them in detail so that, in case His Britannic Majesty's Government is interested in the matter, we might be informed of its views in regard to it. Many foreign Powers are actively occupied in the Hejaz in ousting British trade and securing our market, the most active among these Powers are the Soviets. As we have already informed you last year, we have tried to defeat their activities and prevent them from attaining their object, in the hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government might obtain certain advantages in exchange for their resistance to the Soviet activities, but His Britannic Majesty's Government has given no heed to the matter and has not entered into any consultation with us. This year the Soviets have returned to the charge, and their object is merely to oust British goods not only in the Hejaz, but also in the Yemen, and perhaps even beyond that, and we have so far resisted them. We would therefore like to know quite frankly what His Britannic Majesty's Government is prepared to concede to us in exchange for our protection of British trade in our country and for our obstruction to other countries' trade and more particularly to that of the Soviets. If, therefore, His Britannic Majesty's Government is interested in this matter, we would request that they might give it their attention, and open negotiations with us through their commissioner when we return to the Hejaz. And if the matter does not interest them much, we do not wish to worry His Britannic Majesty's Government about anything unless there is an interest for them.

We have therefore informed your Excellency of these facts in this letter and we are always anxious that perfect agreement should exist in our communication.

We have, &c

(Seal)

E 993 3 911

No. 26

Acting High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received Colonial Office, February 21)

(Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

February 21 1929

Following summary of recent reports of Akhwan movements indicate probability of big raid in the near future on Iraq tribal encampment, s) in Southern Desert —

1 On 12th February political agent at Koweit reported that Dawish, having composed quarrel with Ataiyah tribes, had unfurled his standard at Jarab, 55 miles to east of Buraida and had summoned all the Akhwan for big raid.

2 On 14th February Glubb received similar report, which added that Ibn Humaid was concentrating Ataiyah at Jaala 30 miles from Buraida, for a jihad.

3 On 15th February political agent at Koweit reported that two large raiding parties of Akhwan were on the move. The first, under Dawish, was moving towards Iraq tribes in North Koweit on the 16th, the second under Dawish which was advancing towards the neutral zone.

(Note: It has since been reported that Ibn Hithlam's party reached Southern Koweit border, but, learning that aeroplane patrol were out, postponed the raid and are near Safa awaiting a more favourable opportunity.)

4 In the meanwhile, Mutair, Shammar and Dhaif sections, grazing within and to the south of the neutral zone, moved rapidly away to the south-east and south west.

5 On 17th February Glubb learned that Mutair shepherds had received warning that Dawish and Ibn Humaid were in Bushuk area and were moving to attack Iraq tribes at Abriyyah about 20th February.

Reports from different sources as to Ibn Saud's attitude to the proposed raids are conflicting, but indicate that he has temporarily lost control of the situation. The Akhwan, under Mutair and Dhaif, are now moving towards the neutral zone, with strong intention of attacking Iraq tribes, and are already attacking.

Koweit now reports that Ibn Saud has persuaded these concentrations to disperse until the end of Ramazan, but I consider it would be advisable to inform Ibn Saud at once of our information, and say that His Majesty's Government are confident that he will issue instructions for the concentrations to disperse and for threat of raid on Iraq to cease. If he has actually taken such step already no harm will be done, and if raids eventuate we shall be in the strong position of having warned him of the situation and asked him to fulfil his treaty obligations.

(Addressed to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 77 Repeated to Jeddah Koweit and Bushuk, No. 75)

E 993 3 911

No. 27

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Stothower-Bird (Jeddah)

(No. 19)

Telegram

February 21 1929

BAGDAD telegram No. 77 to Colonial Office of 21st February, repeated to you: Movements of Nejd tribes in region of Iraq frontier.

You should inform the Hejaz Government of the above suggested action. High Commissioner in last paragraph of his telegram. You should, of course, make no reference to reports as to Ibn Saud's own attitude.

Mr. Stophewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26)

No. 48
S. F.

Jeddah, February 1, 1929

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st January, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem, (2) Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine, and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, K. through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloop.

I have &c

F. H. W. STONEHOWER BIRD

Enclosure 1 to No. 48

Jeddah Report for the Period January 1 to 31, 1929

THE King is still in Riyadh. There now seems to be little likelihood of his returning to the Hejaz to observe the Ramadan fast at Mecca. He is at present in even less close touch with the Hejaz than usual owing to the breakdown of the Chevrolet cars which he has been using for the courier service between Riyadh and Mecca. The latest communication received by the Hejaz Ministry for Internal Affairs is a telegram transmitted via Bahrain, and which took eight days to reach Mecca, in which His Majesty commands the immediate despatch of all available spare parts and tyres to Riyadh.

2. As a result of this breakdown of the courier service, many matters of importance are left in suspense, chief among them that of arbitration on the dispute between Nejd and Iraq. As pointed out in paragraph 4 of the report on the dispute between Nejd and Iraq, the King's intention was to arbitrate, but laid down certain conditions. As the King's intentions do not clearly appear from his note, a further communication was addressed to him asking for an elucidation of the obscure points. In the meantime, as it seemed probable from the wording of his note that his proposal was for the selection by Nejd and Iraq of one or more arbitrators of each party with no provision for a neutral umpire, and as arbitration on these conditions must necessarily be doomed to failure, the question was reopened with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs pending Ibn Saud's explanation. Fuad Hamza, speaking unofficially, stated his view to be that Nejd and Iraq should each select one or more neutral arbitrators, and that they should then agree to appoint an additional arbitrator acceptable to both parties. The arbitrators appointed by Nejd and Iraq separately should be neutrals well versed in Arabian affairs who could be trusted to act impartially between the two parties. Fuad Hamza further agreed that each party must bind itself in advance to accept the decision of the arbitrators. He is personally in favour of the conclusion by Nejd and Iraq of a special arbitration agreement whereby the question in dispute and the scope of the powers of the arbitrators will be clearly defined. Fuad hopes that his views will prevail with the King.

3. Another important question which awaits the King's decision is that of the visit of an air officer to Jeddah. Ibn Saud last September agreed in principle to the engagement of British aviators for service in the Hejaz. It was clearly impossible, however, for the air service to enter upon its duties until expert opinion had been offered on the state of the planes and material at present existing in the Hejaz. It was therefore decided to send an officer and one or two mechanics to study the problem on the spot. Although the visit of an air officer in these circumstances was not only unobjectionable but indispensable, if Ibn Saud's desires were to be carried out the Acting Foreign Minister refused to take the responsibility of granting permission on his own authority and referred the question to the King.

4. As regards the situation on the frontier, the events of the month under review have been so alarmist that Bagdad appears to have been reduced to a state of panic in the anticipation of a raid on a gigantic scale. The vast incursion of hostile tribes anticipated seems to have reduced itself to a party of 130 Mutair tribesmen. This party was bombed, with the result that three men and twelve camels were killed and the remainder of the tribesmen fled back across the frontier. The Hejaz Government deny that the tribesmen entered Iraq for the purpose of raiding, they were merely exercising their time honoured right of grazing. As against the contention of the Hejaz Government that the tribesmen were merely peaceful shepherds must be set Hafiz Wahba's reported statement that the Mutair in question were to be regarded as in the category of raiders who had taken refuge in Iraq to escape punishment of Ibn Saud. A letter from the Hejaz Government to the British Consul at Bagdad, dated 1st February, stated that his counsellor, Hafiz Wahba. If, as Hafiz Wahba implies, the tribesmen were fugitives from Ibn Saud's justice, Iraq was bound, in virtue of the undertaking given in February last, not to afford them sanctuary.

5. The "Ud-el Kura," which had in past months been more restrained in its tone, sought in a recent article to make much capital out of the bombing incident referred to above. The writer seeks to show that, while Ibn Saud has never slackened his efforts to ensure peace, a long chain of incidents show that similar efforts have been made by his northern neighbours. The article instances first the crossing of the frontier by aeroplanes at the time of the first Jeddah negotiations in May last. The second incident quoted is Nuri Pasha's inflammatory speech in Parliament in August. King Faisal's recent visit to the frontier and ex King Ali's intemperate remarks regarding the possibility of a revolt in the Hejaz are next commuted upon, and at the last an exaggerated account is given of the recent bombing of the Mutair. Feeling has undoubtedly been much embittered by King Faisal's visit to the frontier, and by King Ali's utterances. The explanation in the first case that the visit was impromptu and had no ulterior motives does not remove from the minds of the Nejd the feeling that King Faisal must have known that a visit to the frontier posts at this juncture could not fail to arouse resentment, and that in the interests of a good understanding he would have been better advised not to take it. King Ali also it is felt, though he did not expect his remarks to be reported in the press, would have been better advised in the present state of feeling not to make pronouncements on the internal situation of the Hejaz.

6. The Hejaz is quiet and is settling down to the all absorbing question of extracting revenue from the pilgrims. The financial situation at the moment is far from satisfactory. The King has been drawing very heavily on the meagre resources of the Hejaz for his needs in Nejd, and considerable dissatisfaction is felt if not expressed by the Hejaz Government, to refuse further credit.

7. Fuad Hamza appears to have collected in his own hands the reins of government. A much larger measure of independent power has, he states, now been given by the King to the Amir Faisal. This means that as Faisal takes no step without consulting Fuad, the latter is virtual ruler of the Hejaz, in the King's absence. A remarkable record for an out-of-work schoolmaster, who arrived, aged 27, in the Hejaz two years ago to devil for his countryman, Yusef Yusein. Fuad is taking himself seriously. He now has a well-appointed Foreign Office in Jeddah, where he is able to receive foreign representatives rather than himself visit them. He has given a series of official dinner parties and receptions.

8. He and the Amir paid a week's visit to Jeddah at the end of the month, chiefly, Fuad told me, in order to discuss with the local authorities problems connected with the pilgrimage. The results of these deliberations will, as in the case with most of Fuad's laws, be admirable in intention but will break down in execution when put into practice by the Hejaz's competent and honest officials. An endeavour is to be made to register every pilgrim on arrival, together with the name of his guide, the guide will be responsible for the pilgrim's welfare throughout the pilgrimage. A further excellent innovation proposed will be the inclusion of pilgrims from Mecca to travel from Mecca to Medina on foot in isolated groups—a party so travelling must consist of at least twenty persons under a leader.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34

Regulations concerning Employees

- (Translation)

A HIGH Order has been issued sanctioning the following regulations -

Attended Directors of Departments, Chiefs, Amirs, Kadia, Chief Administrators.

C M... ..
.....

$$f(t) = M(t) e^{-\lambda(t)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda(t)^i}{i!} P_i(t) = e^{-\lambda(t)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda(t)^i}{i!} P_i(t) = e^{-\lambda(t)} e^{\lambda(t)} = 1$$

Art. 2 All employees other than those mentioned in the preceding article will

Art. 3 Directors of Departments and Administrative Governors in Medina and Jeddah will appoint those employees whose salaries do not exceed 400 girahs a month, provided they notify the office of the Viceroy accordingly. The large and transfers from one administration to another will only be effected with the sanction of the Viceroy.

Directors of Departments and Administrative Governors in Medina and elsewhere will nominate employees whom they require to be appointed either before or after the approval of the Viceroy to the candidature and the issue of the official order of appointment.

Art. 4. No person will be appointed to any Government post unless he fulfils

- (1) Is a subject of His Majesty the King
- (2) Has fitness and ability
- (3) Is of good moral conduct and character
- (4) Complies with the Sharia civil laws

Art. 5 People who are not subjects of His Majesty and whose employment in

Art. 6 A new post of registrar will be created in the office of the Vice-Chancellor.

Art 7 Registration certificates will be printed on the specimen form attached. The cost of each will be \$ 50.00.

Art 8 Every employee will forward an application accompanied by school certificate to the Registrar and the Registrar may be referred to the Viewroy and duly registered by the registrar and a career certificate issued.

Art 9. All statements not supported by official documents will not be accepted or acted on.

Art. 10. All departments will each year forward to the Viceroy for endorsement in the register of employees in the department concerned, a list of all employees

[illegible]

Art. 12. The above-mentioned regulations are to be followed in all Government Departments.

(1) Moslems travelling from countries where no visa facilities exist may land without previous permission. As regards travellers from the north, this regulation applies only to pilgrims travelling by direct ship to Jeddah. Moslem visitors to the Hejaz who break this journey in Egypt must obtain a visa.

transmitted herewith. The chief interest in this regulation lies in the stipulation that all permanent officials must be Hejazi subjects and that foreigners will only be employed under contract for limited periods. The matter will probably be of no practical importance, though the result will be that a vast number of Government officials, Fuad Humei (a Palestinian) among them, will have dual nationality, as, when assuming Hejazi nationality for the purpose of serving Ibn Saud, they are unlikely to divest themselves of their nationality of origin.

11 Jeddah has had two visitors of interest during the last month. Mme Gaulis, a French traveller and publicist, and Mr F Richards, an author of distinction. So much trouble did the Hejaz Government take over the entertainment of Mme Gaulis, who arrived armed with a recommendation from M. Poincaré, that rumours were rife in the "souk" that some political importance was to be attached to her visit. It is quite clear, however, that she belongs to the ever-increasing band of women who wander about the Near East in search of colour and sensation denied to them in Europe and commit their impressions to paper. She is apparently an authority on Turkey: Arabia, its politics, language and geography being virgin soil to her. She early succumbed to the climate, and remained only five days; her impressions were most favourable, and she never tired of expatiating to a somewhat unappreciative audience on the charms of Jeddah.

12 The House of Commons has lost a very important and useful member, the death of Dr. Cesana, the Italian consul, a very severe loss. Politically he passed with honour through an extremely trying period, and it was entirely due to his tactful handling of the Sardinian question that relations between Naples and Italy remained unstrained. He was wholeheartedly pro-British, and on many occasions, both in public and private, had proved the value of His Majesty's Government against the attacks of Philby. To his colleagues, and especially to those among us who were his friends, the loss is very great. He was a man of wide reading, and very keen intelligence. He had, moreover, an inexhaustible stock of good humour on which we could all draw. He was also an excellent doctor, to whose skill all his colleagues and almost every member of the European colony owe their speedy recovery from the various disorders which at frequent intervals assailed them.

E 1032 63,91]

No. 29

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 43)
Jeddah, February 10, 1929.
Sir,
With reference to Jeddah printed despatch No. 9 of the 4th January, I have the honour to report that I have been informed by the High Commissioner for Transjordan that details of seven further raids alleged to have been perpetrated on Nejd by Transjordanian tribes during the months of October and November last. A list of these raids which, for convenience of reference, I have tabulated, is transmitted herewith. I have also been informed by the High Commissioner for Transjordan that the Government is either planning these raids or is unable to prevent them. In view of the fact that the Government of Transjordan must find assets, bear the responsibility and suffer the results.

3. I have addressed a copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Raids by Transjordan Tribes.

Date	Name	Location	With	Remarks
1st	Near Jeddah	Mothet-bis-Nelren	with Shararat	71 camels, 2 men killed
2nd	Qariat - el-Moth	Awad Salem of Beni Sakhr with twenty camelmen	Aqilat	10 camels, 1 man killed
14th	West of Jeddah	Waleed Fahad-bis-Zabn of the Beni Sakhr	Aqilat	11 camels
17th	Near Jeddah	Party of Hajjah under Ibn Nafi of Mur of Beni Sakhr	Shararat	10 camels
20th	Near Jeddah	Awad Waleed Adnan-bis-Jam with 250 camelmen	Party of Rualla Kawakim, Murad	100 camels, 5 killed
30th	Near Aqmatia at Hamed	Beni Sakhr and Howaitat, 400 camelmen, 150 horsemen, under Ghadub-bis-Zahid, Fahad Tassad, Khuraysh, Mur Waleed-bis-Fahd, Fahad-bis-Dahabim, and Waleed-bis-Jam and others	Shararat	100 camels
Unknown	Motad	Arabs of Nimir Abd.		5 camels

E 1032 63,91]

No. 30.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 43)
Jeddah, February 7, 1929.
Sir,
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter from Ibn Saud of the 1st of February, 1929, in which he complains of the recent bombing of Nejd subjects in Iraq and the rumour of a Nejd incursion on a large scale.

2. Ibn Saud writes that he would have preferred that the information contained in Mr. Jervis's notes of the 5th January, of which copies were transmitted under printed despatches Nos. 11 and 12 of the 8th January, had emanated from His Majesty's Government, who verify the information they receive, rather than from Captain Glubb, who, he cannot help feeling, acts on the frontier in a manner contrary to the interests and desires of His Majesty's Government, thus disturbing the good relations of the two countries and increasing the difficulties of the situation. The report of a raid by Ibn Ashwan appears. Ibn Saud continues, to have been untrue. Captain Glubb based his unjustifiable aggression on Nejd subjects, who were proceeding to pasture their animals in the desert on unreliable reports from Bedouins. Three men and twelve camels were killed on this occasion. Ibn Saud protests and demands compensation.

3. The King traces the report that he had sanctioned the perpetration of a raid into Iraq on a large scale to Captain Glubb, who, by spreading such rumours on the frontier and reporting them to His Majesty's Government, succeeds by the resultant increased movement of forces on the frontier in inflaming the passions of the Nejd subjects and thus disturbing the peace.

4. When negotiations with Sir Gilbert Clayton were broken off the situation in Nejd itself and on the frontier was, Ibn Saud states most critically, he had indeed the gravest doubts of his ability to maintain the direction of affairs. Nevertheless, he did not relax his endeavours to maintain peace throughout the frontier area. He spent considerable sums of money with this object. As the result of his efforts no incidents have occurred in which his subjects have been involved. He assembled in conference the Amirs, and they agreed that the situation was such that the Government of Iraq should be informed of the efforts which he was making to maintain peace. He also informed Sir Gilbert Clayton that he could not accept responsibility for the results of the breakdown of the negotiations nor of Iraq's insistence on maintaining the status quo.

5. The King's letter is, in face of the provocation of which he feels himself to be the victim by King Faisal's untimely excursion to the frontier and the action which resulted on Captain Glubb's apparently unfounded report of an incursion by Nejd subjects into Iraq, a most timely and just. He also writes against King Faisal and Captain Glubb as seek to convince His Majesty's Government that a repetition of the incidents complained of will result in his inability to curb as he has hitherto been able to do, the passions of his subjects and that the responsibility for what may consequently occur should not be borne by him. The letter is also interesting in that it supplies what is without doubt an authentic version of the proceedings of the Rivadh Conference. The King does not pretend, as did the writer of the "United Kingdom" report, that the King of Iraq has not been able to convince that a policy of patience and deliberation is in the best interests of Nejd.

7. I have addressed a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD

Enclosure in No. 30

Ibn Saud to Mr. Stonchewer Bird

We have received your letters dated 24.7.1947 (5th January 1929) and we beg you to convey to the British Government our reply to the two letters as follows —

1. It would have interested us to receive the news your Excellency related concerning Mr. Glubb from the British Government, who, we believe, test the information which reaches them instead of from Mr. Glubb, who, so far as we believe, acts on the frontiers against the wishes and contrary to the interests of the British Government thus disturbing the clear relations between the two countries and the difficulties of the situation.

2. As reported to have been made by the Ashwan is apparently not true. Mr. Glubb on those Arabs of the subjects who were proceeding desert was an unjustifiable aggression, and was based on the lies in whose statements no reliance can be placed. As stated in the letter the result was that three men were killed and twelve camels destroyed. We protest against this action and claim the necessary compensation.

3. As to the rumour reported to the British Government to the effect that we have all-weed some of the tribes to make a raid on a large scale against Iraq, this, we believe, is one of the reports which Mr. Glubb spreads at the frontiers in order to kindle the fire on both sides. For, on the one hand, he excites the people of Nejd by his move ments and assemblies, and, on the other, sends disturbing news to the British Government about the Nejd people in order that they [His Majesty's Government] may make increased movements and preparations, consequently

bloody events inevitable. This action, as the British Government will realise is one of the most dangerous and repulsive measures to peace on the frontier.

4. It is beyond dispute that when the negotiations between us and his Excellency General Clayton were broken off owing to a failure to arrive at any agreement the position in Nejd and at the frontiers was dangerous to the last degree, and it was to our belief almost impossible that we should succeed maintaining the direction of affairs, but we pursued the matter and exerted our best endeavours to maintain peace throughout the vicinity of the frontier. We spent very considerable sums of money in this way until we prevented the occurrence of any incident. In spite

of the frontier after the breakdown of the negotiations. We gathered the Amirs of Nejd, its people and chiefs, and the thoughtful people there, and all completely

understand that there could be no content while they remained, and that duty dictated that whatever was possible should be done to remove them. They found that they were of the greatest dangers threatening not only Nejd and its people but also the Nejd realm.

We did our best in conference to convince the people of the necessity for patience and deliberation in the matter and for the continuation of peaceful endeavours to remove those posts. Some of them were guided by our views, others considered that to remain patient concerning them would increase the danger to Nejd. These people are those we are seeking to persuade to be patient and deliberate although we believe as the British Government know, that they in their instance are right to consider the building of those inauspicious posts unlawful.

5. This is the position in Nejd, and at the time when we are exerting our best endeavours to maintain peace and security we see the King of Iraq come to the vicinity of the frontier and work to rouse the tribes and to assemble them, and we see the disturbing movements of Mr. Glubb the result of which we inform the British Government is highly dangerous.

6. We therefore say that if the endeavours we are making do not result in preventing a movement against Iraq pending settlement of matters in a peaceful manner, the cause of this will be not the people of Nejd, but (1) the King of Iraq, by his last journey (2) Mr. Glubb by his grave movements, and (3) the people of Transjordan who have made the Jauf area a field for plunder all along the line and at all times.

7. We wish the British Government to know that we made these endeavours to keep peace in the time past and we informed General Clayton that we are not

responsible for the results consequent on the breaking up of the negotiations and the insistence of the Iraq Government in breaking their agreement concerning the building the guard posts. This is what we beg you to communicate to the British Government.

Respects.)

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

1181347 (January 22 1929)

E 1034 8 91)

No. 31

Mr. Stonchewer Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received February 26)

No. 44)

Jeddah February 9, 1929

WITH reference to my telegram No. 17 of to day's date I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter received from King Ibn Saud in answer to Mr. Jakins's communication of the 29th December (Jeddah despatch No. 230) and a copy of the reply I have addressed to His Majesty.

2. On the receipt of this letter I immediately telephoned to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asking him whether, as the result of this communication, he now understood the King's proposals for the appointment of arbitrators. Fuad Hamza admitted that the position had not been made any clearer. I therefore informed Fuad that I was addressing a further communication to the King on the lines of my recent conversation with him (as reported in my despatch No. 30 of the 2nd instant) and would be grateful if he would himself when forwarding this letter explain clearly the various points and impress their importance on His Majesty. This Fuad promised to do.

In his communication under reference Ibn Saud explains his conditions 1 to 6, to mean that if Iraq is to appoint one arbitrator His Majesty's Government should not also appoint one, as the Nejd nominee would then be faced with both an

not yet fully grasped the meaning of the arbitrators' proposal.

4. The King makes no mention in his letter of condition 6 of which Mr. Jakins also requested an explanation, and I have therefore again approached him on this point. Fuad Hamza, speaking unofficially, takes the King's meaning to be that if a decision is given in favour of Nejd, Iraq's feelings should as far as possible be spared e.g. an immediate demolition of the offending posts should not be demanded but they should be vacated and allowed to disintegrate by natural processes. Similarly if a decision is given in favour of Iraq, Iraq shall not immediately proceed to build more posts, nor shall Ibn Saud reply by building a chain of posts on his side of the frontier. The underlying feeling in Ibn Saud's mind is, Fuad thinks, that every effort should be made in giving effect to the decision of the arbitrators not to aggravate ill feeling between the two countries, but as far as possible to soften the blow to the party against whom the decision is given.

5. The King explains the intention of his condition 4 at some length. He states that the object of the arbitration is to arrive at a decision on the points of disagreement which have arisen between the two parties. He maintains that he only consented at Uqair to cede to Iraq territories claimed by Nejd on the express understanding (article 3) that no buildings should be erected on those territories. His Majesty's Government have refused to accept this interpretation of the article, thus as his acceptance of article 1 was conditional on the acceptance of article 3 as interpreted by him, his cession of the territories to Iraq becomes ineffective—thus the dispute between Iraq and Nejd centres not on article 3 alone, but on articles 1 and 3.

6. Ibn Saud therefore requests that the arbitrators should be approached by both parties with a view to their considering the question of the frontiers in addition to the question of article 3, which, as it arose out of article 1, cannot be considered alone.

7. I have addressed a copy of this despatch with its enclosures, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have &c

F. H. W. STONCHEWER BIRD

Enclosure 1 in No. 31

Ibn Saud to Mr. Stonehewer Bird

(Translation)

After compliments

We have received your letter of the 10th November, 1928, regarding the arbitration. We are glad to acquaint the British Government of the following explanations:—

1. The object of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the twelfth clause of our letter is that we oppose our representatives. So that if Iraq is going to select the arbitrators the British Government will be neutral in the Commission of Arbitration, and will not delegate anyone on their behalf.

2. We explain the object of paragraph 4 of the twelfth clause of our letter referred to as follows: The purpose of the Commission of Arbitration will be to look into the disagreement which has fallen between the two parties with a view to giving a judgment on it. And as on the day of Uquair we did not consent to give our territories which have been annexed to Iraq, except under overwhelming force, we have no building on the lands which we had ceded, and as the British Government has refused to accept this as the meaning of the third clause of the Protocol of Uquair (as mentioned in your Excellency's letter of the 10th November, 1928) our yielding those lands conditional on the meaning of the third clause will be without effect. The dispute will consequently be not about the third clause of the Protocol of Uquair alone but about the first and third clauses.

We are now considering the question of the frontiers and the question of the third clause, which arose out of the first clause.

With respects

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

Enclosure 2 in No. 31

Mr. Stonehewer Bird to Ibn Saud

After respectful compliments.)

Your Majesty,

Jeddah, February 5, 1929

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's letter of the 12th December, 1928, regarding arbitration.

conditions 1 and 2 under paragraph 12 of your Majesty's letter of the 12th December.

3. It is, I gather, your Majesty's proposal that arbitrators should be chosen in equal numbers by Nejd and Iraq. I venture to point out that arbitration in these conditions could have no hope of success. Provision must, if Nejd and Iraq are to choose one or more arbitrators each, be made for the selection of a neutral arbitrator, as otherwise a majority vote could not be assured. The usual practice is for the Governments concerned to arrange the appointment by agreement of an additional or neutral arbitrator. The parties to the dispute should, moreover, agree

1. I am authorised to suggest as an alternative course for your Majesty's agreement between the parties to the dispute.

5. I should be grateful if your Majesty would be good enough to explain the precise meaning of condition 6 in paragraph 12 of letter No. 31/12.

Respects

F. H. W. STONEHEWER BIRD

E 1035 281 91

Mr. Stonehewer Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received February 20)

(No. 45.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 9, 1929

I HAVE the honour to report that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs sought an interview with me to-day to discuss the question of Soviet activities with regard to this country.

2. Fuad Hamza informed me that he was instructed by the King to explain the policy adopted by him towards the Soviet Government and the reasons which had inspired that policy.

3. The King fully realised that the Hejaz might easily be made a centre of the minds of Indian pilgrims. His Government had therefore received very strict instructions to watch the movements of agents and to ensure that no propaganda was carried on against Great Britain. I replied that though I did not wish in any way to detract from the value of this proof of the King's friendship, the prevention of the spread of Bolshevik doctrines in the Hejaz was a matter of almost equal moment in the interests of the Hejaz itself, as, were that country known to be a centre of propaganda both the British Indian and the Dutch pilgrimage could not fail to decline.

4. Fuad Hamza admitted that it was to the interests both of His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz that Soviet activity in the Hejaz should be carefully watched. He assured me that there was nothing to fear on that score. The Soviet Government had, however, evolved a more insidious scheme for gaining favour with the people and pilgrims in the Hejaz and undermining British interests, namely, by sending to the Hejaz consignments of produce, sugar, flour, &c., for sale at much

The King had so far placed every obstacle in the way of unloading and selling of Soviet goods in the Hejaz. The latest instance was that of the Soviet ship "Kommunist," which had arrived four days before in Jeddah with a considerable cargo. She had sailed without being permitted to unload a single bale. The King was acting in his own view, against the commercial interests of the country in prohibiting the import

who were asked to pay higher prices for Indian produce. His sole object in pursuing this policy was his desire to do nothing which might in any way harm British interests. At the same time he could not reconcile it to his conscience that by so doing he was causing material loss to his people.

5. I replied that, while I felt justified in saying that His Majesty's Government would fully appreciate this mark of His Majesty's loyalty and friendship, I desired to make two observations:—one, that the attempt of the Soviet to cut British Indian trade would meet with strong opposition from the leading merchants, most of whom had been for years in business relations with India, and neither could

heap goods were, as he himself realised, merely propaganda whereby the Soviet Government sought to bring about a fall in the price of the goods for sale would reach a normal level. As regards my first point, Fuad assured me that but for the Government prohibition, many of the leading merchants were quite prepared to take up the Soviet goods as a considerable profit was to be made thereon.

6. Fuad wished to assure me that no considerations had weighed with the King but his desire to be loyal to his old time friendship with Great Britain. If he was to continue in this course he would ask for some mark of appreciation from His Majesty's Government to compensate for the material loss which his policy was causing to the country. I asked Fuad what form he considered this mark of appreciation should take. He replied that the King left this to the generosity of His Majesty's Government. He wished to avoid any appearance of bargaining, but he wished His Majesty's Government to be fully aware that his present policy pursued in the interests of Great Britain was causing gain to the latter and loss to him, and he felt sure His Majesty's Government would see the justice of his request that the balance should be adjusted in one or two ways. He said that his people that some benefit had accrued to them from this latest mark of his friendship. Preserved

further. Find Hazzi thought that the conclusion of a commercial agreement with the balance of benefits on the side of the Hejaz would meet the case but that the King wished the suggestion to come from His Majesty's Government. I promised to lay His Majesty's view before you for consideration.

I have &

F H W STONHEWER BIRD

E 1037 210 91

Mr. Stonhewer Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received February 20)

N 47)

Jeddah, February 10 1929

I HAVE the honour to report that I have carefully studied Sir Ronald Graham's despatch No. 922 of the 27th December last, a copy of which accompanied your despatch No. 5 of the 9th ultimo.

2 I presume, though the fact does not clearly appear, that the proposal of the Italian Government is for the creation of a court for non Moslems as opposed to Moslems, and not for foreigners as opposed to Hejazi subjects. While the number of non Moslems in the Hejaz, exclusive of foreign representatives and their staffs, does not far exceed twenty, the number of Moslems who can claim foreign nationality or protection probably amounts to at least 70 per cent. of the total urban population of the Hejaz. As capitulatory rights have been in practice waived, there is no hope of obtaining special treatment for non Hejazi Moslems, nor, in my opinion, is there any special justification for it. The Hejaz is by its nature a purely Moslem State, and since the accession of Ibn Saud every endeavour has been made to conduct it on purely religious lines. No objection can, in the absence of capitulatory rights, be made to the application of the Koran law to Moslems, whether Dutch or British subjects or protégés, though in a case of miscarriage of justice or unduly harsh punishment the consul of the foreign national concerned may, and does often, intervene with the desired result.

3 The King, though a strict Wahabi, is neither a fanatic himself nor are his present advisers fanatics. His counsellors are for the most part men who have been in close contact with Western ideas. Since his accession the number of occasions on which barbarous penalties have been inflicted is infinitesimal. The knowledge that the provisions of the Koran will be strictly adhered to has resulted in an almost complete eradication of petty crime in the Hejaz. Ibn Saud is dependent for his prosperity not only on the good opinion of the Moslem world but also of the

opinion by barbarous treatment of a Christian. There is moreover, little likelihood of any member of the carefully chosen Christian community in the Hejaz committing an offence punishable by the lopping off of a limb.

4 In the case of a serious criminal charge, e.g., of murder, the position would be difficult. If, as is perhaps conceivable, the Hejaz Government might prefer to hand over to this Agency an Englishman convicted of murder rather than execute him in the Hejaz, no one of His Majesty's courts at home or abroad would be competent to deal with him, and I do not clearly understand in virtue of what powers an Italian who has committed a crime in the Yemen can be sent for trial to Britain. The likelihood of the perpetration of a serious crime by a member of the small and well behaved colony is, I hope, remote, though with the introduction of motor cars into the country there is always the risk of accidental homicide.

5 As regards civil offences, unless a situation is grossly mishandled, as was the case with the Italian, a Christian will be called upon to appear before a local court. By adopting an intransigent attitude, M. Fares forced the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs into a declaration of policy, and, but for the prompt and efficient action taken by Mr. Jakins, there is no doubt that M. Gantes would have had to appear before the Sharim Court and a most undesirable precedent have been set.

6 In the conditions at present obtaining, I do not feel that there is any urgent necessity for the creation of a special court. The question would be very difficult of approach. The Hejaz Government would not fail to regard a request for the

special treatment of Christians as an attempt to reintroduce a capitulatory régime. If, however, it is considered that the risk to which Christians, if subject to Koran law, might be exposed in the event of a complete change of policy in the future justifies a present attempt to secure special treatment, the only argument at the disposal of His Majesty's Government would appear to be that, in the absence of a court of justice other than a purely religious court, the Hejaz Government are bound to carry out the stipulations of article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah which provides for the treatment of British subjects in the Hejaz in accordance with the principles of international law. This argument could not, in my opinion, be used with much hope of success. Moreover, the statement quoted by His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome from the Italian note *verbale* that the Koran does not apply to infidels raises very intricate questions of interpretation. It is true that it is the practice of the Wahabis to call all — even other Moslems — who are not of their own particular sect by the name of "infidel" but I think that there is little doubt that a Wahabi *Jema* would support the claim which Sale finds in the fifth sura of the Koran that the revelation of the Prophet is more full and explicit than the law of Moses or the Gospel, and therefore acts aside those laws by which until his advent Jews and Christians were judged. The point is one on which an authoritative Wahabi opinion, which it would be indiscreet for me to attempt to seek in Jeddah, is essential.

7 To raise in any form the question of a special court for Christians must, it appears to me, necessarily result in an open abandonment of capitulatory rights by all Powers. Capitulations have, I believe, in practice been abandoned by all foreign Powers. Every contract drawn up by the Hejaz Government for signature by a foreign firm contains the stipulation that disputes arising thereunder shall be referred to the local courts. Thus, while all Governments whose nationals are in commercial relations with the Hejaz may have been tacitly committed to the abolition of Capitulations, I gather that no Government has made an open declaration to this effect as by so doing they would definitely have closed the door to the resumption of capitulatory privileges in the Hejaz. The expediency, the result of forcing all Governments to this course, is doubtful.

8 While I do not consider that the creation of a special court is necessary at the present juncture, nor that a proposal to the Hejaz Government for its establishment would meet with a satisfactory response, I feel that an appropriate moment might be chosen for raising the question of the re-establishment of the Mejlis at Tujar, which functioned until last year for the hearing of purely commercial cases. The Koran makes no provision for the type of case which is likely to arise at the present day, a case, for example, involving bills of exchange, payment against documents and similar modern commercial instruments. A request, therefore, for the reconstitution of the Mejlis at Tujar on grounds of commercial expediency and as being as much in the interests of Hejazis as of foreigners might, perhaps, reasonably be made. The re-establishment of this court would have the effect of withdrawing European firms and individuals from the jurisdiction of the Sharim Court in commercial matters, and the fact that they were so withdrawn might, in the rare event of a Christian being accused of a criminal offence, be used as an argument in favour of his trial by a special court, as the Government could not then argue that the only justice administered in the country is that laid down in the Koran.

9 The question would, I feel, best be broached privately with the King if and when suitable opportunity offers.

I have, &c

F H W STONHEWER BIRD

Mr. Stonchewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—Received February 26

(No. 48)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10 1926

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter received from King Ibn Saud on the subject of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement. Ibn Saud asks whether the condition attached to this clause by His Majesty's Government in their communication of the 16th November last, confirmed in Mr. Jakins's note of the 5th January (Jedda despatch No. 13 of the 6th January) is to be regarded by him as having been imposed by force or whether it is an interpretation of article 6. If the latter Ibn Saud asks how His Majesty's Government's interpretation can be read into the wording of the article.

2. Ibn Saud did not ask for a declaration to the effect that British troops, were to be included in the meaning of Iraq troops in any doubt that they included, but merely that the declaration should confirm the justice of his protest against the crossing of his territory by British aeroplanes and cars. It was agreed at Bahra that, though circumstances might occur to necessitate the pursuit of the raiders by the raided, it was not right that the frontiers should be crossed. In the case of all raids which may occur the raiders alone should be punished and not the innocent inhabitants of the territories from which they came.

3. As the condition recently attached is in contradiction with the text of the clause Ibn Saud requests His Majesty's Government to withdraw it. If in the meantime any attack is made on his territories for any reason whatever he must regard it as a breach of agreement and an act of aggression.

4. On my return from leave Fuad Hamza took an early opportunity of intended by the statement that the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra remained as was stated in paragraph 6 of the communication addressed to His Majesty on the 16th November but could not admit the right of His Majesty's Government to attach a condition to the clause of an agreement already signed. I replied that I thought he had perhaps slightly missed

itself but had attached a condition to the inclusion of British troops under its scope. His Majesty's Government had ceded a point to Ibn Saud, but had ceded it conditionally. Fuad replied that Ibn Saud did not regard the matter in this light. Justice demanded that British troops in Iraq should be regarded as the forces of Iraq and Ibn Saud never had any doubt in his mind that they were so regarded by His Majesty's Government. Therefore any condition attached to their inclusion in the scope of article 6 had the effect of nullifying the article.

5. I replied that article 6 contemplated raids and the pursuit of r. the frontier. It did not contemplate incursions on a vast scale amounting to armed attacks. His Majesty's Government was not limiting the scope of article 6, but was providing against two eventualities which were not contemplated under that article: (1) An organised attack in force which His Majesty was unwilling to prevent, i.e. an aggression amounting in fact to an act of war; and (2) an incursion which His Majesty was unable to prevent, i.e., an aggression resulting in a revolt against His Majesty's authority. It was in these special circumstances only that His Majesty's Government reserved the right of pursuit over the frontier. Fuad said that in the event of war it was obvious that agreements would not be binding: this fact was understood and there was no necessity to tack on to article 6 a provision to this effect which, whatever its intention, had the effect of nullifying the article. Fuad further asked who was to decide whether Ibn Saud had if Ibn Saud accepted the condition, be at the mercy of Captain Glubb, whose alarmist reports, based on Bedouin rumours, might at any time result in the crossing of the frontier.

6. The outcome of Captain Glubb's recent report of a probable attack sanctioned by Ibn Saud had been the despatch of a note (Mr. Jakins's note of the 5th January) reminding His Majesty that British forces had the right to cross the frontier in certain circumstances. This amounted almost to a threat. I assured Fuad that His Majesty's Government and not Captain Glubb was the responsible authority. As regards the supposed threat, he had misunderstood the intention of

His Majesty's Government, which was to give His Majesty early warning of an alleged intention of Nejd tribes to raid Iraq in order that His Majesty might himself take such measures as would render recourse to action by British forces unnecessary.

7. I expressed surprise that, if as I supposed the condition attached to the inclusion of British troops under article 6 had, when Sir Gilbert Clayton drew attention to it, been accepted by His Majesty objection should be raised to its inclusion in a communication from His Majesty's Government. Fuad Hamza

the uncorrected record of proceedings (a copy of which Sir Gilbert Clayton left me made this point clear at the first meeting of the resumed negotiations in August last. Fuad said that he would prefer, before discussing the matter further, to consult his own records. He had taken down the statements of Sir Gilbert Clayton almost verbatim, and he was convinced that he could not have missed so important a passage. He duly consulted his minutes, and confirmed his statement that there was no record of any mention of a provision. According to his notes, Sir Gilbert Clayton had merely stated that he was able to assure His Majesty that His Majesty's Government intended to observe article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, and recognised that His Majesty's forces in Iraq were covered by its provisions. I could not help feeling that

how could a statement of that nature, touching as it did, the sovereignty of Nejd have been allowed to pass uncommented upon by His Majesty. I replied that, in the face of this grave misunderstanding, we could do nothing but refer the matter to His Majesty's Government.

8. I have addressed a copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c

F H W STONCHEWER BIRD

Enclosure in No. 34

Ibn Saud to Mr. Stonchewer Bird

After Compliments.

Jedda, January 29, 1926

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 5th January, we wish to know the opinion of the British Government regarding the question of the condition they make in respect of the sixth clause, whether it is a condition dictated by power only, or is it one dictated by the agreed clause. If this condition is to be found in the clause, we beg the British Government to show us the term from which this meaning can be understood.

2. We did not ask the British Government whether this clause includes British forces in Iraq and Transjordan because we thought it does not include them, for we are sure that it does include them, even if the last declaration had not been received. Our intention in this reminder of their inclusion is that it may support the contention in our protest against the unlawful act committed by British aeroplanes and motor cars in our territories, and nothing else.

3. The treaty in which the sixth clause is mentioned considered that raids might perhaps take place, and thus decided on certain fixed measures for them, such as pursuit of the raiders and the capture of the criminals. It also foresaw that the necessity might arise to compel the raided to pursue the criminal in the territories of the other country. The negotiators considered that this was not permissible, and they therefore laid down the sixth clause. This was the proposal to us by Sir Gilbert Clayton at Bahra to which we agreed.

4. We are doing our utmost to prevent raids, and we expect the two Governments to do their best to prevent them. If any raids are committed after this, it is the guilty who should be punished, and not the neighbouring territories or peaceful inhabitants who have committed no offence according to the text of the treaty.

5. As the clause clearly forbids the pursuit of criminals in the territories of the other Government, we consider that the latest condition recently made by the British Government contrary to the text of the clause, and if ever it occurs it will be counted an infraction of it. We therefore request the British Government to

reconsider their reply in the knowledge that if any attack is made on our territories for any reason whatever, it cannot be interpreted except as an infraction of the agreement and obvious aggression which can have no justification.

This is what we beg you to communicate to the British Government and inform us of their reply.

With respects

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

E 1173 54 91

No 35

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 5,

No 34)

Telegraphic)

Cairo, March 4, 1920

UNDER SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs states that Imam Vahid has written to King Fuad asking latter in general terms to assist Yemenis in Egypt.

King Fuad is sending a complimentary answer by a certain Hussein Hosni, formerly Egyptian consul at Naples. Under Secretary of State said choice of routes and that Egyptian Government preferred to have to us to facilitate envoy's journey from Aden to the Yemen, and would be glad if I could give him a letter of introduction to Governor of Aden for that purpose. He is leaving for Suez to-morrow.

Under Secretary of State said that Hussein Hosni would make a report on the situation of Yemenis, chiefly from the commercial point of view, and that Ministers

Under Secretary of State intimated confidentially that the King's first impulse on receipt of Imam's letter had been to appoint an Egyptian consul in the Yemen, but that His Majesty had since been dissuaded by the argument as to lack of Egyptian interests there.

Oriental secretary, to whom communication was verbally made, expressed some surprise at sudden despatch of this envoy.

Egyptian mission in the Yemen at this moment might be interpreted as an British and an anti Ibn Saud gesture. King Fuad's desire to play a part in

I propose, therefore, merely to refrain from giving letter of recommendation asked for and to let Minister for Foreign Affairs know that I regard this precipitate mission with misgiving in that it may be interpreted as Egyptian interference in Arabian affairs. I should be grateful for your views by telegraph.

You will doubtless telegraph the necessary instructions to Aden direct regarding question of facilities for journey of Egyptian envoy.

Repeated to Aden 4th March)

E 1133 3 91

No 36

Letting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, March 5)

(No 32)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, March 3, 1920

OF R to five hundred Akhwan raiders attacked Iraq shepherd tribe Beni Malik, near Koweit this morning. Aeroplanes followed up raiders and came in

low operator, and were bombed and machine-gunned with good results. This is the fourth raid on Iraq tribes within six weeks, as it now appears that, as well as raiding

the 25th February there was a raid on Iraq Shammar at Gaisuma in Nejd on the 19th February. Ibn Saud was, according to information sent by him in letter to Sheikh of Koweit, to leave Riyadh for Qasim with all his forces on the 25th February. Object of movement was not stated but most likely object seems to be attempt to secure control of tribes. It is, therefore, the most desirable that strong protest against these repeated attacks on Iraq tribes may be made to him at once.

E 1133 3 91

No 37

Sir R. Lindsay (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Stunchever-Bird (Jedda)

(No 33)

MY telegram No 23 of 5th March Akhwan raids on Iraqi tribes in Koweit. You should immediately inform Hejazi Government of facts respecting raid of 3rd March and make strong protest against this attack on Iraqi tribesmen.

You should at the same time lodge protest in respect of raid on Iraqi tribes in Koweit territory on 21st January, referred to in Bagdad telegram No 58 to Colonial Office of 6th February, and express the confident expectation of His Majesty's Government that the Hejazi Government will take immediate steps to put a stop to this raiding of Iraqi tribesmen. (End of R)

Although these raids took place in Koweit territory it is not at present desired to protest on behalf of Sheikh of Koweit, and your representations should be made simply on the ground of the attacks on Iraqi subjects.

E 1156 8 91

No 38

Sir R. Lindsay (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Jakins (Jedda)

(No 26)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office March 8, 1920

MY telegram No 23 of 5th March Akhwan raids on Iraqi tribes in Koweit. You should address to Hejazi Government further strong protest against attack on Iraqi Zayyad tribe in Nejd territory on 19th February, reported in Bagdad telegram No 87 to Colonial Office of 25th February, repeated to you as No 218.

You should add that His Majesty's Government must ask for punishment of raiders responsible for this attack and for those in Koweit territory on 21st January and 3rd March, and for adequate compensation for losses suffered by Iraqi tribes in each case.

E 1272 3 91

No 39

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10)

(No 29)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, March 10, 1920

MY despatch No. 16 of 8th January

I have to-day received letter dated 1st March from Ibn Saud, in which he admits that a raid may have occurred or will occur.

He attributes the fact that some of his subjects have been led to disobey his orders (thus forcing him to take strong measures in spite of his conviction that Iraq scores the tribes) to (1) concentrations and military demonstrations on frontier, (2) rumour spread of secession of Feisal-ed Dawish to Iraq (3) Iraq money paid by (Shubb to spies sent to tell Nejd that Ibn Saud had a working agreement with His Majesty's Government against his own subjects.

King announces his departure on 1st March for Qasim at the head of a force to look into incidents which have occurred with Iraq, and to punish all those guilty of attack.

Ibn Saud regrets present dangerous situation, and calls His Majesty's Government to take steps to prevent further attacks on Iraq tribes.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jerusalem, No 31)

E 1245 543/91]

No 40

M Bordonaro to Sir R. Lindsay.—(Received March 11.)

Italian Embassy, London,
March 1, 1929.

My dear Sir Ronald,

REFERRING to the conversation I had the pleasure of having with you the other day on the political relations between Soviet Russia and the Yemen, I beg to enclose herewith a resume of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce recently concluded at Sanaa.

The information concerning the treaty are based only on an official communiqué of the Soviet Government published in Moscow, whose contents were brought to the knowledge of the Italian Government by our Embassy in Russia. No official communication has been given till now by the Imam of the Yemen to the Italian Government.

I remain, &c
A. BORDONARO

Enclosure in No. 40.

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Yemen.

ITALY.

THE treaty contemplates the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries and the development of trade.

It comprises a preamble, five articles and a concluding section.

It is stated in the introduction that normal and official relations are established between the two countries and are to be of a friendly character.

The treaty shall mark the commencement of economic ties between the two countries.

The introductory statement finally contemplates further negotiations for the development and extension of economic relations.

Article 1 develops the subject mentioned in the introduction as regards the resumption of official relations. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognises the complete and absolute independence of the Yemen. The Yemen Government, on their part, emphasises how much they appreciate the attitude of the Soviet Government, not only as regards themselves, but also towards the other peoples of the East. The exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two States will only take place when the Yemen admits such representatives generally.

Article 2 deals with commercial questions. The citizens of the contracting parties shall have the right to pursue commercial activities in the territory of the two States, carefully observing the local laws. The citizens of the parties shall, in virtue of the principle of complete equality strictly observed in the Eastern policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, be accorded the same facilities as are accorded to the respective citizens in their commercial pursuits the facilities prescribed by the local laws.

Article 3 is of a formal character, and concerns the entering into force of the treaty. It states that the treaty enters into force when both the Soviet Government and the Yemen Government have ratified the treaty, and the Yemen ratification takes place by means of the affixing of the Royal seal.

Article 4 deals with the duration of the treaty, which is concluded for ten years.

Article 5 and the concluding parts are entirely of a formal character and concern the signature.

The treaty was signed at Sanaa on the 1st November, 1928, by M. Astachoff, representing the Soviet Government, and by the Cadi Mohammed Rahib, representing the Imam of the Yemen.

In accordance with article 3 of the treaty, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ratified it on the 23rd January, 1929.

E 1473 3 91]

No 41

Mr Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10.)

No 41

(Telegraphic) R

MY despatch No. 44

I have received the following letter from Ibn Saud —

"Your letter of 5th February in which you enquire about the difficulty His Majesty's Government see in making the number of arbitrators equal for both sides.

"We do not believe difficulties will arise to prevent agreement in solution of this problem in a manner which will remove these fears if British and Iraq Governments agree to terms we laid down for arbitration. When we receive reply of His Majesty's Government on this we will be able to consider the question of arbitrators and their number.

"The intention of paragraph 6, clause 12, of our letter No. 31/12 is, as we indicated in the same paragraph, that any difficulty which would cause harm to either party should be considered."

Jedda, March 19, 1929

E 1474 3 91

No 42

Mr Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 19.)

(Nos. 33 and 34.)

(Telegraphic) R

MY telegram No. 22

I have been in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an explanation of the King's letter. What did Ibn Saud imagine our notes to be if not the replies of His Majesty's Government? The King had pressed for early solution, yet here we were back in the position from which we started last December. The unfortunate impression would be created that the King wished to temporise. Minister for Foreign Affairs was distressed. On 11th March, 1929, the King's letter was received. It was referred to His Majesty's Government to find a solution.

Jedda, March 19, 1929

(R) It is possible that Ibn Saud wishes His Majesty's Government to state which of his conditions are accepted as they stand—that, for instance, if No. 4 in King's letter 31/12 of 10th December is accepted he will concur in His Majesty's Government's views about No. 1. This is what may be intended by the reference to receiving a reply from His Majesty's Government.

Alternative, which has been in the mind of Minister for Foreign Affairs, is that His Majesty's Government should forward their counter-proposals. He hankers after an agreement similar to that between United States and Holland of 23rd January, 1925, about the Island of Palmas.

If Ibn Saud returns to Jeddah (through Medina as last year) it would be possible for me to see him personally on the matter. (End of R.)

E 1458 3 91

No 43

Mr Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic) R

'M IL QI RA' states that, reverting to his former practice, Ibn Saud has ordered Royal review and inspection of all Nejd troops. It adds that there is nothing to necessitate mobilisation or fighting at present.

Same newspaper continues its acrid comments on Glubb, and adds "Nejd has not decided to fight Iraq, but Nejd is not bound to Iraq by any obligation or agreement. She is making up her mind and when the opportunity presents itself will not hesitate to attain her desires. This statement is in the nature of a communiqué made to avoid trouble and is in the interests of peace and not war."

Jedda, March 19, 1929.

No. 44

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 19)

(No 104)

(Telegraphio.)

Cairo, March 19, 1926

TELEGRAMS. - The Egyptian Government has refused to recognize Ibn Saud as the official representative of the Hejaz in Egypt. The latter retaliated by refusing to admit the official status of Egyptian consul, especially in connexion with service of judicial documents, unless Egypt would accord similar status to the Hejaz agent in Cairo, whom Egyptian Government ignore. Finally Hafez Wahba proposed question of formal status should be left in abeyance until atmosphere became clearer but that meanwhile Egyptian consul in Jedda and Hejaz representative in Cairo should be allowed to act as if they had the status of official representatives on all the usual matters without having the status formally conferred. This offer, recognized by Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been rejected by the Kingdom of Hejaz. The Hejaz representative in Cairo has stated that he may be exposed to an affront in view of present strained relations. Ministry for Foreign Affairs states withdrawal will be effected unobtrusively, e.g. acting consul will be transferred elsewhere and not replaced, consulate being left in the care of an archivist.

(Repeated to Jedidah)

E 1319 8 91.

No. 45

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austin Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 27)

India, March 21, 1929

1. N. S. A. D. agrees to general conditions of proposed arbitration, but suggests that the arbitrator should read "The arbitrator will examine only those claims which are proved to him as having been reported at the time of the raid by the Government claims submitted to him without such proof, whether presented by Nejd or by Transjordan."

If this condition is included, he is prepared to accept what is written in the letter.

(Repented to Jerusalem.)

E 1642 63 913

No. 45

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 22)

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, March 22, 1929

between 1st and middle of Shaban (12th January to 26th January). Shercef Shaker, Mathqan, Farz and others in Hama, a town near the Jordanian frontier, were driven into Nejd, urging Transjordanian tribes to withdraw from Wady Sirhan. Many of them, however, withdrew to Transjordanian frontier.

Most of the land was taken over and with a high educational penetration to what is today a well educated population, particularly as automobiles were used.

similar occurrences in future unless Hejaz Government first grants permission

Repented to Jerusalem)

(E 1583 94 91)

Mr. Stanshew-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain — Received March 26

(83)

21

Jeddah, March 1, 1929

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 28th February, 1929

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force (2), Cairo, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartoum, through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

F H W STONEHEWER-BIRD

Enclosure in No. 42

Jeddah Report for the Period February 1 to 28, 1920

MORE than half of Ramadan is past yet there have been no startling occurrences, nor does the situation in Nejd appear to arouse any interest in spite of the determined efforts of the editor of the "Um-el Qura" to focus public attention on the differences between Iraq and Nejd. In his recent articles on Iraq Yussuf Yussuf has completely changed his line of attack. All Arabs are brothers, whether Iraqi or Nejd, all owe those who have been tainted with Western ideas have one ideal: the freedom and unity of Arabia. A Western Power alone stands in the way of this unity. Were the "Um-el Qura" a paper of any influence or of more than restricted circulation exception might well be taken to the tone of these articles, which embody an invitation to Iraq to throw off the Western yoke. But to protest against Yussuf's vapourings in the Hejaz press is to give both him and his paper an honour which they are far from deserving.

In the issue of the 18th February the question of Nejd relations with Iraq
question of the Hajar Railway The writer finds an excuse for reverting to this
Conference by His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies The Hajar point
of view is exposed at length Hejazis regard the railway as a Wakf, and consider
that no discussion of technical matters can usefully be entered upon until the questions
of the ownership and unity of the line have been settled The Hejaz Government,
the writer states, is not interested in the line commercially They wish to derive no
profit from it, but, as a purely Islamic Government, they are bound first to respect
a Wakf and to oppose any breach of the conditions under which that Wakf was
founded, and moreover as keepers of the Holy Places, they are bound to do all in
their power to ensure the comfort of Muslims who perform the pilgrimage and one
of the greatest sources of comfort would undoubtedly be the reopening of the railway.
No official reply has yet been received to the note addressed to the Hejaz Government
in January wherein they were informed that His Majesty's Government and the
French Government were prepared to reopen a conference for the discussion of
technical considerations

3 The situation on the Nejd Iraq frontier appears to be unchanged, though disquieting reports of large concentrations of tribesmen and impending attacks on Iraq were received at Bagdad. A raid on the Zayyad tribe is reported to have taken place on the 12th. The King has not yet received any official confirmation has been received. These reports have been brought to the notice of the King and the Hejaz Government, who have been officially requested to take steps to disband the concentrations, and so remove all threat to the security of Iraq. The King has certainly no interest in the outbreak of trouble on the frontier at a time when his presence in the Hejaz is indispensable. Little more than two months remain before Haj day, and the King cannot much longer delay his departure from Mecca. There is no definite news of his return to Mecca, though it is generally felt that he will arrive before the end of March.

1 The question of the composition of the arbitration commission to decide on Iraq, Nejd differences is still unsettled. A reply received from Ibn Saud to the note asking for an explanation of his suggestions still leaves considerable doubt as to his wishes, and a further note has been addressed to him on the subject.

2 Permission has been obtained from Ibn Saud for the visit of a British air force officer to inspect and report on the condition of the Hejaz aircraft and workshop. It has been suggested that the officer should proceed to Jeddah by air, but the Hejaz Government see serious objections to the presence in Hejaz territory of foreign aircraft. The proposed flight could, they feel, not fail to arouse comment and adverse criticism in uninformed circles and cause embarrassment to both Governments. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has referred the matter to Ibn Saud, but has little hope that His Majesty will accord his sanction.

3 A Soviet ship, the steamship "Kommunist," arrived on the 3rd February with a cargo of benzine, petrol, flour and sugar, which they hoped to land at Jeddah. The Hejaz Government refused permission, and the "Kommunist" proceeded to Latakia, where it was discharged. The refusal of the Hejaz Government in refusing to allow Soviet ships to discharge cargo at Jeddah. The object of the Soviet in despatching to Arabia and selling at less than cost price commodities which in many cases they can ill spare from Russia is political. By the establishment of regular commercial relations with the Hejaz, the Soviet will gain a firm footing in the country and can make use of these relations for the dissemination of propaganda, they can, moreover, pose as benefactors to Islam, and thus they are preparing for the day when they will be able to take the second reason for the action of the Hejaz Government is the strong opposition of the big importers of Indian produce, who stand to lose heavily by unfair competition from the Soviet.

4 In spite of the presence in the Hejaz of over 30,000 pilgrims, trade is not flourishing. The Javanese, who alone have arrived in any numbers, are poor and are spending little money. The pilgrim trade is expected to be less than the numbers attained last year. The official figures are 31,942, as against 45,000 at this period last year. Of these, 30,000 are Javanese, 800 Indians and the balance Malays. Few Javanese or Malays are now expected, thus, on these two sources alone, there is likely to be a decrease of roughly 12,000. A new Indian pilgrim ship, the "Rahman," is expected on the 1st March, with 1,800 pilgrims on board. The pilgrim trade is expected to be less than last year. The pilgrim trade is expected to be less than last year. Its total carrying capacity is 1,772, including thirty first and twenty second class passengers.

5 A money order service is being inaugurated between India and the Hejaz. Negotiations were conducted between the respective postal authorities, and have resulted in the following agreement. The agreement has already been signed by the Hejaz authorities, and has been forwarded for signature to India. The Hejaz Government has suggested the 1st April as a suitable day for the introduction of the service. The Hejaz Government has not yet furnished the names of the agents to be appointed to the post offices at Jeddah and Mecca. The money order service is expected to be inaugurated on the 1st April.

6 The indefatigable Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has thought it necessary to issue a regulation regarding the introduction of motor vehicles into the Hejaz. The total number in the Hejaz probably does not exceed a few dozen. But the regulation satisfies Fuad Hamza's lust for law making, and incidentally brings in a few pounds to the Government Treasury. A licence renewable annually must be obtained from the municipal authorities by the applicant, at a cost of 2s. Failure to obtain a licence within the specified time entails the payment of a double fee. Number plates will be issued by the municipality at 1s. each. Bells must be attached and lamps lighted at night. Motor bicycles must, in addition, carry rear lamps. Bells must be attached to the right hand side of the road. Non-compliance with these regulations is punishable by fine, not exceeding 4s.

7 A praiseworthy attempt to beautify Jeddah has been made by the planting of trees in the principal residential street. The trees will have a hard struggle for existence between the neglect of the municipal waterer and the pressing attentions of the local goats.

8 During the period under review, one female slave of Abyssinian origin was repatriated to Massawa.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jenkins (Jeddah)

(No. 63.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 27, 1926

Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 7th February, and your telegram No. 20 of the 10th February, and your telegram No. 20 of the 10th March transmitted various complaints from King Ibn Saud and from the Acting Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in respect of (1) the action taken by British aircraft against the abortive raid of Ibn Ashwan against Iraqi shepherd tribes on the 28th December last; (2) the general conduct of Captain Glubb in his administration of the southern desert area of Iraq; and (3) the interpretation of the Hejaz Government's complaint against the British Government, in consultation with the British Government.

2 The question of the raid of Ibn Ashwan on the 28th December last was dealt with in Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 7th February. As you will have seen from Sir G. Clayton's telegram No. 98 of the 5th March to the Colonial Office, repeated to you as No. 25, the statements made by Ibn Saud in this note are not correct. The raid of Ibn Ashwan on the 28th December last was not a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government, but a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government.

3 The raid of Ibn Ashwan on the 28th December last was not a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government, but a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government. The raid of Ibn Ashwan on the 28th December last was not a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government, but a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government. The raid of Ibn Ashwan on the 28th December last was not a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government, but a raid on the part of Ibn Ashwan against the British Government.

4 As regards Captain Glubb's alleged infringement of article 5 of the Bahr Agreement by his correspondence with the Nejdian Amir (see Mr. BIRD'S telegram No. 20 of the 10th February), I am to enclose the accompanying copies of Colonial Office telegram No. 64 of the 5th March to Sir G. Clayton and of Sir G. Clayton's reply No. 102 of the 7th March on this subject. The question of direct communication between the Amir of Hail and the Iraqi administrative authorities in the southern desert area was dealt with in the correspondence ending with Jeddah telegram No. 46 to the Foreign Office of the 1st May, 1926, and, in view of the arrangements then made, the present complaint appears to be entirely without substance. It seems unnecessary therefore to pursue this point further in writing, but you may, should you consider that any useful purpose would be served thereby, remind Fuad Hamza of the arrangements made in 1926 and explain that the Hejaz Government in this respect is in complete agreement with the British Government.

5 The charge that Nejdian tribes have been illegally threatened with expulsion while camped in Iraq (see Mr. BIRD'S telegram No. 20 of the 10th February and Fuad Hamza's note of the 5th February enclosed in Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 10th February) is in complete contradiction with the complaint that Captain Glubb was seducing the Nejdian Shammar from their allegiance to Ibn Saud put forward in Fuad Hamza's note of the 31st December last, of which a copy was enclosed in Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 7th February.

6 The charge that Nejdian tribes have been illegally threatened with expulsion while camped in Iraq (see Mr. BIRD'S telegram No. 20 of the 10th February and Fuad Hamza's note of the 5th February enclosed in Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 10th February) is in complete contradiction with the complaint that Captain Glubb was seducing the Nejdian Shammar from their allegiance to Ibn Saud put forward in Fuad Hamza's note of the 31st December last, of which a copy was enclosed in Mr. BIRD'S despatch No. 43 of the 7th February.

your despatch No 17 of the 5th January. The attitude of the Iraqi authorities regard to the movements of Nejdian tribesmen across the frontier, and their anxiety

were explained in Sir H. Dobs's letter of the 5th January to King Ibn Saud, of which a copy was forwarded to you direct in Mr Bourdillon's letter No 50 24 of the same date, and in Mr Bourdillon's telegrams Nos 74 and 75 of the 20th February to the Colonial Office, referred to above. In view of the explanations already given to King Ibn Saud and the Hejazi Government on this point, Sir Austen Chamberlain considers that little would be gained by continuing this correspondence and returning detailed replies to the recent series of complaisants. You may, however, communicate to the Hejazi Government orally, the substance of Mr Bourdillon's telegrams Nos 74 and 75 to the Colonial Office, if you think it desirable to do so, and you should in any case inform the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in writing that full explanations have already been given to the Hejazi Government on this subject, and that, after close investigation, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that there is no foundation for the allegations which have been made against Captain Glubb's activities, which are clearly based upon inaccurate reports. You should add that the continued presentation of baseless protests can only further complicate an already difficult situation, and you may point out the obvious interest which such admittedly

result of Iraqi provocation. If the Hejazi Government prefer to give greater credence to their own sources of information than to the official assurances of His Majesty's Government, their action can only remain a matter of regret to His Majesty's Government.

6. You should at the same time request Sheikh Fuad Hamza orally, with reference to his note of the 31st December, to produce, in original, the documents alleged to be in Captain Glubb's handwriting and stated to prove his interference in His Majesty's Government had no previous knowledge of the existence of these documents and clearly cannot accept them as genuine without close examination of the originals, said to be in the hands of the Hejazi Government.

7. As regards article 6 of the Bahra Agreement the Secretary of State

Ibn Saud is unlikely to acquiesce in the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter, but the attitude of His Majesty's Government is indispensable that that attitude should be maintained. You should accordingly address a separate written communication to the Hejazi Government on this question, confirming the statements made by Mr Bird, as reported in paragraph 5 (but not the other paragraphs) of his despatch No 48, and explaining, in reply to Ibn Saud's letter of the 23rd January, that the statement made by His Majesty in that letter, to the effect that His Majesty's Government are now attempting to attach a condition to their undertaking to be bound by the article, does not correctly represent the position. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government have assured the Hejazi Government that they are bound by the article, and that they will observe its provisions.

The position is, indeed, that His Majesty's Government have every intention and desire to observe the provisions of the article and will naturally continue to do so as long as a normal situation exists. They have, however, thought it only fair to warn the Hejazi Government that, in the event of a situation of grave danger to Iraq being brought about by the actual occurrence of a serious attack on a large scale against a township in Iraq, or of continuous raiding by Nejdian tribes, which the Hejazi Government prove unable to prevent or punish, His Majesty's Government must reserve their liberty of action and their right to take the necessary measures against those guilty of the attack, if this should prove, in their opinion, the only means of defending the Iraqi tribes, for whose safety they are responsible, from further aggression. If, however, the Hejazi Government would establish the same degree of control over their tribes as has recently been enforced by the Iraqi Government, who have effectively restrained their tribes from raiding into Nejd, there would be no occasion for British forces to cross the frontier in any circumstances and thus no hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government in falling in with the wishes of the Hejazi Government in the matter of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement.

8. You should add orally that His Majesty's Government feel bound to point out that they cannot in any case allow unprovoked raiding against Iraqi tribes to continue with the almost complete immunity which the raiders at present enjoy. Six

raids against Iraqi tribes have taken place since the end of December last, and, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no effective action has yet been taken by the Hejazi Government to punish the offenders or to make reparation for the Iraqi losses. These raids have not only resulted in heavy losses to Iraqi tribes, but have led to the death of a British aircraftman and of an American missionary. The latest of these raids has been reported by the British air officers engaged to have been of a particularly impudent nature, in that the raiders, having recrossed the Nejd frontier, and relying upon their immunity from pursuit in virtue of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, halted in the open and within easy reach of British aircraft, proceeded to the distribution of their loot. In the face of such provocation, His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to hold their hand indefinitely.

I am &c

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Enclosure 1 in No 48

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq

(Sent 12 30 P.M. March 5, 1920)

(N 54)

MARCH 5. Your telegram 19th February No 74. Was Ibn Saud ever notified by Government officials authorised to correspond direct with the Amir of the Hejaz any foundation for the Hejaz Foreign Minister's statement that Captain Glubb was not included among officials so authorised (see enclosure in Jeddah despatch of 5th January, No 17, to Foreign Office)?

Enclosure 2 in No 48

Telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated March 7 — (Received Colonial Office, March 7 1920)

(Confidential)

No 102 of 7th March

Your telegram No 54. See Dobs's telegram No 65 S, 23rd April, 1920, to the Foreign Office under No 46. On 19th May, 1920, Ibn Saud was informed that the necessary instructions had been sent to Mulesarrif, Haura, Muntafiq and Diwanayah (no names were mentioned), and he replied in July confirming arrangements for direct correspondence between Hail and the local Iraq authorities, "particularly those mentioned." Though Ibn Saud was not specifically informed of Glubb's appointment to the north, at least, it was well known that he was in the desert portion of three Liwas mentioned, it was referred to during Jeddah negotiations in May 1920.

I think objection to Glubb personally emanates from Fuad Hamza himself rather than Ibn Saud, who would be unlikely to support such unwarranted aspersions on our sincerity or Glubb's honesty of purpose.

B 1867 1667 91

No 49

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received April 2)

(No. 242.)

Sir,

Cairo, March 22 1920

SHEIKH HAFEZ WAHBA informs me that, on instructions from their respective Governments, he and the German Minister in Cairo are engaged in the negotiation of a commercial treaty between Germany and the Hejaz.

[20485]

r 2

2. The sheikh states that the treaty will contain no contentious matter. It is to include the usual assurances of eternal amity, a clause giving Germany most-favoured-nation treatment in the matter of customs duties, and the right of mutual representation.

I have, &c
(For the High Commissioner),
MAURIE PETERSON

E 1668 381 91]

No. 50

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received April 2)

(No. 243)

Sir,

Cairo, March 22, 1929

WITH reference to my despatch No. 163 of the 22nd February regarding Ibn Saud's overtures with a view to anti-Bolshevik action in the Hejaz, I have the honour to report that Sheikh Hafez Wahba has received a letter from Ibn Saud in which he states that the King has decided to grant a subsidy to Ibn Saud for the purpose of enabling him to maintain order in the Hejaz and to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of the Bedouin raids.

2. Sheikh Hafez Wahba, in conversation with the oriental secretary, intimated frankly that it was a subsidy which Ibn Saud had in view. The King's position in the present Arabian scheme of things was growing more difficult. From the time of the outbreak of the war there were no insurmountable difficulties to the indulgence of this habit. Arabia was in the hands of various contending Powers—Turks, Ibn Rashid, Ibn Saud, the Shereshina, &c. The adherents of any of these different Powers had no scruples about raiding those of another. Now a great part of Arabia was unified under Ibn Saud, and the Arabs within that region could not raid one another. Iraq and Transjordan were under the British Government, and raids into those territories were not treated as normal romantic incidents of desert life. Something had to be done to prevent this. It was suggested by the oriental secretary that the tribes could be kept in order by presents and by lavish hospitality that Ibn Saud and his Government were meagre, and there was no doubt that he was faced with considerable financial stringency. The sheikh concluded that the former annual subsidy paid to Ibn Saud would cost His Majesty's and mandatory Governments less than the expenditure involved in movements of troops, aeroplanes, armoured cars, &c., and other defensive measures against unruly Nejd tribesmen whom Ibn Saud at present had great difficulty in controlling.

3. In spite, however, of these difficulties, Ibn Saud was, according to Sheikh Hafez Wahba, doing his utmost to keep the tribes in order. He had recently gone to Kassar in order to collect forces with a view to punitive action against the al-Dawish, Ibn Hithlein and Ibn Humeid, who appeared to be definitely out of control.

4. It is not unlikely that the British Government will be likely to renew the subsidy. I think, however, that the difficulty of the Arabian situation is worth sympathetic study, for the position of Ibn Saud between his own unruly tribesmen and his Shereshina enemies in our mandated territories is one of considerable difficulty.

5. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah.

I have, &c
LLOYD, High Commissioner

45

E 1740 3 91]

No. 51

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received April 7.)

(No. 40)

Telegraphic) R

Jedda, April 7, 1929

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that on 30th March the Saudi forces were in contact with the Shereshina tribe at Salla, some hours north-east of Nabqya. Faisal Dowleh is said to have been severely wounded and Ibn Saud put to flight.

He states that both subsequently offered their submission to Ibn Saud, but the King replied that they must surrender themselves at Riyadh and go before Sa'ud. An official communiqué is to be issued immediately. I will telegraph its contents. (Repeated to Bagdad and Jerusalem, No. 43)

E 1807/63/91]

No. 52

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received April 10)

(No. 40a)

Telegraphic) R

Jedda, April 10, 1929

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that he has been informed by the Saudi forces that the Shereshina tribe have been defeated at Nabqya and that the Shereshina have been driven out of the Hejaz. He states that the Saudi Government and Transjordanian Government is giving rise to uneasiness amongst the tribes.

I am sending by bag to-day translation of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter in which raids are recapitulated. Reference is again made to the use of Transjordan as his base by Audu Eleina. (Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 45)

E 1768 223/91]

No. 53

Foreign Office to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah)

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 11, 1929

I AM directed by Secretary of State to inform you that the Government, or between the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and King Ibn Saud, as regards the system of communications between the Government and the King, is being reviewed.

2. You will recollect that in the course of the renewed negotiations with the King, in August 1928, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of which a copy was sent to you in Foreign Office Eastern print (Arabia), September 7, 1928, Section 1), the King requested that as far as possible all messages and communications from Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan should in future be sent through His Majesty's agency at Jeddah even during his periods of residence in Nejd. In view of this request, the system hitherto in force, which has not proved entirely satisfactory, has been reviewed; and you should in future be guided by the instructions contained in the enclosed memorandum, which lays down the system which will be adopted until further notice.

I am, &c
MONTEAGLE.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Memorandum respecting communications with Ibn Saud.

1. UNTIL August 1928 communications intended for Ibn Saud were sent through His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. Ibn Saud was in the Hejaz or through the Resident in the Persian Gulf (at Bushire) when Ibn Saud was in Nejd.

2. In August 1928 Ibn Saud requested that this arrangement should no longer be followed, but that in future all communications should be addressed to him through

His Majesty's agent and consul, even during his periods of residence in Nejd. It therefore now be laid down as a general rule that all communications for Ibn Saud shall pass through His Majesty's agency at Jeddah.

3. The High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem are authorised to correspond direct with Ibn Saud on matters of detail arising out of the Bahra and Hadra agreements, and such communications will ordinarily be sent through His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, who will act merely as a channel of communication. In cases of extreme urgency, however, it will still be open to the High Commissioners to communicate with Ibn Saud through the quickest available channel, while sending a repetition or copy to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. Communications intended for Ibn Saud will ordinarily be addressed to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah direct by the High Commissioners concerned, but copies in the case of despatches, and repetitions in the case of telegrams, should in every case be sent to the Colonial Office.

4. As a general rule, such communications, whether sent by telegram or despatch, will be transmitted textually by His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, and they should be drafted on that understanding. His Majesty's agent will, however, have discretion, in the case of minor modifications of the original text, to make such alterations as may be necessary to bring the communication into conformity with the instructions of the Foreign Office for instruction. He may, however, if the matter is of importance, refer the communication to the Foreign Office for instruction. Those communications which are sent by telegram or despatch, or by His Majesty's agent to the Foreign Office, should be accompanied by a copy of the communication as received from the agent at Jeddah.

5. Communications for Ibn Saud, or regarding Nejdian or Hejaz affairs, from Iraq, Transjordan or Palestine on all other questions should be addressed to the Foreign Office. His Majesty's agent at Jeddah will not take official action on the communication until specifically authorised to do so by the Foreign Office. He may, however, if the matter is of importance, take such informal action with the competent Hejaz authorities as he may think desirable.

6. Similarly, His Majesty's agent at Jeddah may address the High Commissioners for Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine direct on points of fact, on matters of routine, or in reply to enquiries, sending a repetition, or copy, in each case to the Foreign Office, while on all other questions he will address the Foreign Office direct, sending a repetition or copy to Bagdad or Jerusalem, when either is concerned, and reporting in each case in the body of the telegram or despatch that he has done so.

Foreign Office, April 1929

[E 1868 54 91]

No. 54

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received April 11.)

(No. 284. Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 3, 1929

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your telegram No. 98 of the 21st March last, I am informed confidentially that King Fuad has received another letter from Imam Yahia. His Majesty had quite properly asked the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to draft his reply to the first letter, but his answer to this second communication was sent in a more direct manner from the Palace to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with the request that it be forwarded to the Imam. The Ministry therefore has no knowledge of the contents of this second royal message.

2. I am unable to represent to the King the impropriety of this procedure, as I would compromise my informant by betraying knowledge of this incident.

3. My informant, who is in a position to know expressed uneasiness at the King's attitude, and in the light indicated some sort of overhauling of the King's attitude.

4. I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

LLOYD, High Commissioner

[E 1868 54 91]

No. 55

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received April 11.)

(No. 294. Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 5, 1929

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your telegram No. 101 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram from Hussein bin Ali, King of the Hejaz, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which was sent from San'a to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was communicated to me privately by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. A telegram from Hodeida to "Al Mokattam," after reporting the official reception of the Egyptian Consul at Hodeida, states that the private secretary of the Imam's son Saif-ul-Islam, states that the Imam has given the following instructions:

3. In another message "Al Mokattam" states that Imam Yahia has, in his letter to King Fuad, expressed his desire that the Egyptian Government should recognise Yemeni passports. The Imam apparently pointed out that a Yemeni wishing to travel to Egypt via Aden had to obtain a British passport (? laissez-passer) and an Italian passport (? laissez-passer) to be able to travel to Mocha. The Imam has also expressed the desire that the Egyptian Government should recognise Yemeni stamps. All letters at present coming from the Yemen are stamped at Aden or Mocha. The correspondent understands that the Egyptian Government sees no objection to meeting the Imam's wishes regarding passports, but finds it difficult to recognise Yemeni stamps.

4. I am of opinion that all this activity displayed by King Fuad in the Yemen is a direct result of the fact that King Fuad, against the wishes of his own Ministers, has just virtually broken off relations with Ibn Saud, whom he obstinately refuses to recognise. His Majesty chooses this moment to send a friendly mission to Imam Yahia, who is not only the rival of Ibn Saud but has recently been engaged in active hostility against ourselves. This Egyptian interference can only be interpreted as an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the two rival powers. The responsible Egyptian Ministers even know what King Fuad is now writing to the Imam (see my confidential report of the 2nd instant).

5. I have on several occasions drawn attention to King Fuad's ambition to play the role of the Arab Emperor. Possibly he is influenced by the fact that his ancestors in some decisive anti-Wahhabi movement. His pro-Italian sympathies also must not be forgotten when considering the possibilities of his action in the Yemen. Anyhow, British interests in Egypt and Arabia have at present nothing to gain by any kind of Egypto-Arabian association. I think, therefore, this Yemen incident affords us every opportunity to prevent King Fuad from interfering in Arabia. The peculiar position of Yemen at this moment gives us a most reasonable pretext for representations to King Fuad, and such an excellent pretext may not recur in the immediate future. I should, therefore, be glad of your authority to inform His Majesty that we regard as extremely inappropriate his intervention at this moment in a country where Egypt has no interests. I would add that His Majesty's attitude towards Ibn Saud is hardly tactful in view of the unsettled relations between the Imam and the Egyptian Government.

6. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Resident at Aden and to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah.

I have, &c.

LLOYD, High Commissioner

Transcript of Cypher Telegram from Hussein Hosni Effendi (King Fuad's envoy to
March 30, 1929.—(Received April 1)

Knargia, Caire
ARRIVÉ lundi reçu sans aucun péril en audience solennelle plusieurs corps de
troupes musique en tête rendaient honneur dans la rue comblée foule enthousiasme
Ayant remis lettre royale j'en ai donné lecture selon désir Sa Majesté qui entouré
de M. ~~le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères~~ Sa M. ~~le Ministre de la Guerre~~ ~~le Ministre de la Marine~~
remercier notre auguste Souverain faisant éloges ses œuvres pour gloire Egypte et
religion puis déclarer que ladite lettre ouvrait nouveau chapitre dans histoire
relations deux pays ainsi qu'histoire religion et Orient.
De ma part je répondis selon les termes de convenance, faites l'opération espérer
voir dorénavant nos compatriotes venir aide pays voie de progrès.
Tous m'ont demandé si j'étais autorisé entrer en pourparlers en vue de conclure
Traité de Commerce je leur fis savoir que j'étais prêt étudier tout ce qui concerne
rapprochement deux pays puis vous soumettre résultat tolérable prendre les
dispositions nécessaires.
Je vous tiendrai au courant.

HUSSEIN HOSNY

[E 1800 381 91]

No. 56

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jenkins (Jeddah)

(Nos. 36 and 37)
(Telegraphic) P

Foreign Office, April 17, 1929

Y. H. R. 124. 125. Nos. 224. 125. December 1927 and 1928. Foreign
Proposed Commercial Treaty with the Hejaz
Y. H. R. 124. 125. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom are disposed to share his view that conclusion
of Commercial Convention would be in the interests of both countries, and that they
hope in due course to put forward proposals as to the lines on which such an
agreement might be made. (End of R)

(Confidential)

Please see Cairo despatch No. 109 and Mr. Bird's despatch No. 45 of the
former despatch, Ibn Saud's Government imagine that material benefits accruing
from proposed commercial treaty will be much greater than would actually be the
case. Should Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs revert to the treaty you must
avoid encouraging him to anticipate too much.

[E 1954/64, 91]

No. 57

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 18.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Downing Street, April 17, 1929.

With reference to the letter from this Department of the 1st March, I am
directed, by Mr. Secretary Ainslie to transmit to you to be laid before Secretary Sir
Austen Chamberlain, the accompanying copy of correspondence with the Resident at
Aden regarding his visit to the Governor of Eritrea at Asmara.

I am to request that consideration may be given to the suggestion made
in the concluding paragraph of the Resident's confidential despatch of the
19th March, and, in the event of no objection being seen, that the necessary steps
may be taken to convey to the Italian Government an expression of appreciation of
the hospitality shown to Sir S. Symes on the occasion of his visit to Signor Zoli.

3. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the Air Ministry and India
Office.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 57

Sir S. Symes to Mr. Ainslie

Aden March 19 1929

I HAVE the honour to report that I visited Asmara between the 10th and 16th
instant and was received and most hospitably entertained there by the Governor,
Signor Zoli.

We had several long discussions upon Yemen affairs, which was, of course, the
principal object of my visit. The Governor expressed his views informally and with
much frankness. I responded in the same fashion.

He impressed me as being well informed and anxious not to embarrass us in any
way. He said he had strict instructions from Rome in this sense and read me extracts
from his despatches and instructions to his agents in the Yemen showing how he had
on several occasions recently made it clear to the Imam that in no circumstances could
he expect Italian support for an anti-British policy. Very confidentially he told me
that he suspected his predecessor, Signor Gasparini, may not have been sufficiently
explicit on this point. He complained rather bitterly of the situation he found on
his arrival in Asmara. He said that, owing to the lack of communication with Aden and the
delay in communications via London and Rome, he was ill-informed of our relations
with the Imam and intentions regarding offensive operations in the Yemen. He had
discussed the matter with him through the Italian consul at Aden very
respect and welcomed the further opportunity of my visit to co-ordinate
policy with the Imam.

4. I said that I had no authority to discuss questions of general policy which had
formed the subjects of the conversations held at Rome in January 1927, but my
personal opinions were that too great smoothness in our communications with the Imam
at the present juncture was likely to be interpreted by him as a sign of weakness or
apathy, and that the most effective retort to his recent rapprochement with the Soviets
and Turks would be an evidence of Anglo-Italian political solidarity. Signor Zoli
replied that he had realised that my present visit would provide an evidence of this
sort, and felt that it was opportune. In the past Italy, by her later appearance in the
Yemen field, had been obliged to challenge the view that it should be considered an
exclusively British preserve. The Rome conversations had made it clear that while
British interests in the Red Sea were primarily strategic, Italian interests were mainly
commercial. The Imam was aware of this and also of the political understanding
between Italy and Great Britain, but he was still fearful and very suspicious of British
designs upon the Yemen, and in this frame of mind was more opposed than ever to
European enterprise, whether Italian or British. His attitude of passive host
had informed Signor Zoli that he had abandoned any present intention of recapturing
Dahran and the British Protectorate. He said that he would make it possible for the
Russians to get a footing, both commercial and political, in the
Yemen.

5. I agreed that the situation was difficult but, I thought, not hopeless, provided
that Anglo-Italian accord and aversion to the commercial penetration of the Yemen by
a third Power was made manifest. Ultimately it must become clear to the Imam that
jointly we were better able than the Russians to hinder or befriended him. Meanwhile,
it could be an object of our diplomacy to persuade him that we had no intention either
to annex his territory or to subject it to political tutelage and, further, that—leaving
aside the questions of the islands of Perim and Kamaran and the Aden Protectorate—
we recognised that the region of the Tihama, now subject (more or less) to his rule,
should be an integral part of the Yemen State.

6. Signor Zoli, after reflection, said he thought that this policy offered him the
best prospect of success, but it must take time to mature. He then asked me—rather
unexpectedly—whether there was a likelihood of further reduction in our military
effectives at Aden. I said: "No." He was evidently much relieved and told me he had
feared that a time factor might dispose us to force the pace with the Imam. He felt
strongly that this would be inexpedient, but was almost equally confident that with a
little patience friendly relations could be re-established, formally as well as actually.
He considered this would be as much in the Italian as in British interests.

7. We discussed at some length the Kamaran incident of last autumn. Gasparini
I was assured, had no prior knowledge of an intention on the part of a private Italian
company at Hodidah for purely commercial reasons to use Kamaran as an oil depot
and was fearful that any direct reference to the subject by one of us might be
[20483]

involve a formal recognition by Italy of British sovereign rights at Kamaran. Hence misunderstandings, due, I suggested, in part to the employment by the Italian company in future would be more expeditiously arranged by direct communications between Asmara and Aden. I took an opportunity in this connexion to explain my local preoccupation with the question of the garrison at Kamaran and the administrative advantage of providing the small force required there by detachment from Aden. Signor Zoli appreciated the fact that local recruits at Kamaran be sufficiently reliable.

8. I formed the opinion from the conversations and very friendly relations as his guest for several days that, under Signor Zoli, the local direction of Italian activities in the Red Sea will be less political and much less ardent than in the past. It is recognized that the relatively lavish expenditure by Signor Zoli has given small material result, that the Imam is a bad payer (Commandatore Morano's recent mission to obtain payment of over a million lire due from him has been

unsuccessful). You are not only well advised to avoid all appearance of a desire to thwart Italian commercial activities in the region and, in any case, in this respect I mentioned the advent of Lieutenant-Commander Crauford, of

that he was to be employed as a semi-official emissary to the Imam. Signor Zoli told me incidentally that he had just received from Colonel Jacob a closed letter addressed to the Imam with the request that it might be transmitted. I advised that the letter should be returned to Colonel Jacob and explained the latter's present situation.

9. In these and other ways I believe that my visit will promote a friendly understanding between Asmara and Aden, and I would suggest that, if possible, a reference might be made through the diplomatic channel to the extraordinary hospitality and apparently spontaneous kindness shown to me by the Governor and his officers, military and civil, during my stay at Asmara.

I have, Sir,
S. B. SYMES,
Lieutenant and Commander in Charge.

E 2098 63 91

No. 38

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakes (Jeddah)

Foreign Office April 26 1929

YOLR telegram No. 37 of 22nd March. Proposed arbitration on past raids between Transjordan and Nejd.

Condition now proposed by Ibn Saud is identical in substance with that originally put forward by him to Sir G. Clayton (see paragraphs 32 to 34 of Sir G. Clayton's report of 19th July, and final sub-paragraph of paragraph 21 of his report of 3rd September). Grounds on which it was then rejected, i.e., that it would unduly limit discretion of arbitrator and debar him from considering certain categories of claims, still apply and if condition is insisted on whole proposal for arbitration may have to be abandoned and present unsatisfactory situation will be made worse. Amir of Transjordan has already accepted proposal unconditionally.

2. You should address communication in this sense to Ibn Saud and make every effort to induce him to reconsider his reply. You should explain, moreover, that paragraph 4 of identic note was drafted precisely in order to meet Ibn Saud's point on subject of unregistered claims, and that His Majesty's Government fully intended to issue a note to arbitrator. You should add that he may rest assured that discretion allowed to arbitrator under this paragraph will not be abused while, if he insists on responsibility for failure of only scheme which promises to remedy present unsatisfactory situation in the Transjordan-Nejd regions.

31

E 2171 94 91

No. 39

Mr. Jakes to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received April 30)

(No. 78)

Sir

Jeddah, April 1, 1929

1. I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st March, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (two), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartoum through Port Sudan, Lagos (two), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Ships.

I have, Sir,
H. G. JAKES

Enclosure in No. 39

Jeddah Report for Period March 1 to 31 1929

THE month of March has seen Ibn Saud take what should, if meant seriously, prove to be the most momentous decision in recent Arabian history. His Majesty had already admitted that the Riyadh Conference of October last was not the complete success claimed by the "Im-el-Qura". In a letter to the agency he confessed that not all there present accepted his view that patient negotiation would best serve to secure the removal of the Iraqi southern desert posts. The sporadic raids which have recently occurred with some frequency gave rise to protests from

the Agency and the British Government. Thus, moved by these appeals or feeling himself at the end of his financial resources, and left by the repeated challenges of his insurgents to the pilgrimage evading his grasp, Ibn Saud on the 1st March admitted the possibility of the occurrence of raids on Iraq and announced his departure for Qaem at the head of a punitive force to enquire into the incidents which had occurred and to

bring them to a head. The month of March has seen the departure of the Amir of the Atabak. His Majesty was careful to make clear that he reached his decision in spite of his conviction that he owed his difficulties to Iraq, who having originally caused the trouble, had lately made military demonstrations on the frontiers and sent spies into Nejd to tell his people that he, their King, was in league with His Majesty's Government against them. No small share of blame His Majesty was pleased to apportion to the Administrative Inspector of the Iraqi Southern Desert who throughout the month has been the subject of scurrilous press attacks in the "Im-el-Qura".

2. The month of March has seen the departure of the Amir of the Atabak. His Majesty was careful to make clear that he reached his decision in spite of his conviction that he owed his difficulties to Iraq, who having originally caused the trouble, had lately made military demonstrations on the frontiers and sent spies into Nejd to tell his people that he, their King, was in league with His Majesty's Government against them. No small share of blame His Majesty was pleased to apportion to the Administrative Inspector of the Iraqi Southern Desert who throughout the month has been the subject of scurrilous press attacks in the "Im-el-Qura".

3. Mecca has produced only one protest this month of a Transjordan raid on Nejd when thirty five camels were taken, and this has been capped by a report from Jerusalem of a counter-raid of sixty camels. The Hejaz Government has, however, raised strong objection to a reported four days' motor visit in Nejd of a party from Transjordan and the Sheriff of Mecca.

4. The King will probably wreck the proposal to settle all raiding claims on the basis of a counter-raid of sixty camels. The Hejaz Government has, however, raised strong objection to a reported four days' motor visit in Nejd of a party from Transjordan and the Sheriff of Mecca.

formally notified by one Government to the other at the time of their occurrence shall be examined. His Majesty's Government had endeavoured to meet this point, which is of considerable importance to the Transjordan case, by introducing in the conditions a qualifying phrase allowing the acceptance of claims not formally

arrance if good and sufficient cause for the delay can be shown. The Hejaz

will not agree to arbitration and at the moment it seems unlikely that fear of responsibility for a break down will shake Ibn Saud from the position he has chosen or been induced to adopt.

3 The pilgrimage is going badly and is likely to fall considerably below last year's standard. It is anticipated that the North African pilgrimage will show no increase, and about 10,000 is given as the estimate for Egypt. My Persian colleague has recorded the arrival of five Persians, but considers that his numbers this year are somewhat less than last year's.

Indian pilgrims find no great favour in the eyes of the Hejaz Government, as they bring too little money into the country and have tenacious nests of kin. Fuad

Indian pilgrims is out of all proportion to the profit made out of their estates.

6 After persistent efforts and a suitable greasing of the wheels of State the fixed rates of motor-car hire have been abolished. The road is thus open to the severest competition, which, while it benefits pilgrims, will end in general bankruptcy. Only £1 per head (apart from Government dues) is now demanded for the return fare to Medina. That is for the journey Jeddah-Medina and back; car owners have only £14 to cover their heavy expenses in wages, petrol and oil and unfair wear and tear. The Saudia, the company in which the King is interested, is heavily in debt, and I have heard of one shareholder who is vainly seeking to dispose of his £1,000 holding for £100 cash.

7 Health conditions are not reassuring, although improvement is to be expected with the hotter weather. An abnormally cool winter brought with it dengue, typhoid and a somewhat severe outbreak of small pox. Small pox is always prevalent in the Hejaz, but has never before with living memory been so virulent and widespread. Vaccination is not compulsory, and medical facilities are inadequate for an outbreak on a large scale. Few moreover seek medical attention; the Hejazi prefers to rely on traditional remedies. In Mecca, where the disease has

such as to venture into the hospital at Jeddah, soon found himself in the centre of a freely circulating group of patients in all stages of the disease. One Indian member of the agency staff contracted small pox, but appears to be suffering from only a mild attack. No complications have developed, and his condition is daily improving. The absence and the consequent measures of disinfection which have had to be taken have thrown a considerable strain on the pilgrimage organisation at a time when

officer has worked hard under this handicap, and once registered no less than 1,500 pilgrims in one day, while the Indian doctor, with three sick members of the staff on his hands, at the same time managed, in an endeavour to keep the quarter free from infection, to vaccinate no less than 307 persons by the end of the month. The Government of India is sending an additional doctor to open their hospital at Mecca. The health statistics published by the Hejaz Government are unreliable, chiefly

among the native population in Mecca at 50 per cent, with a mortality rate of 40 per cent. In Jeddah, where small pox has not so far assumed alarming proportions, there are said to have been eighty cases during the last three months, with twenty deaths. Little reliance can, however, be placed on these estimates. The only safe conclusion is that the habitual late winter and early spring manifestation of small pox has been severer than usual this year, and that the disease may be expected, as in normal course, to decline with the onset of the hot weather.

8 Mohammed Matar left for Egypt on the 30th March, ostensibly to take up an appointment at Tehran, handing charge of the Egyptian consulate over to Ashmouni Bey, who recently arrived from Piræus. Matar took away with him the worst of impressions, which, as the time of his departure approached, he took less and less trouble to hide. It is unfortunate that illness prevented me from seeing my summering. Hejaz-Egypt relations have for some time been steadily getting worse.

outstanding questions of the Mahmal, the Egyptian Waqfs, the formal recognition of Ibn Saud, the Hejaz nationality law should all be susceptible of diplomatic action or inaction. Unfortunately however, the air is never sufficiently cool to allow the parties concerned to compose themselves. The Hejaz agent in Cairo is apparently treated with scorn. The authorities in the Hejaz retaliate by attempting to ignore the Egyptian consul in Jeddah. For a long time the consul's letters to the Hejaz Ministry for Foreign Affairs remained unanswered. The kaamakam refused to attend a celebration of the King of Egypt's birthday. Matar was compelled to pay the miserable motor-car tax levied on private journeys to Mecca, and when he asked to take leave of the Viceroy his request was refused. Matar I am told, left with the firm intention of going straight to King Fuad with his story, and he even, I believe, counts on getting a Court appointment on the strength of his vehemence. Matar, like Saud, his predecessor, is very sore at his treatment at the hands of Fuad Hamza. He feels that even if forced to take unpalatable official action, Fuad had no excuse for the gross discourtesy which he allowed to enter into his relations with successive Egyptian consuls, who claim him to be indebted to them for many personal services. Fuad is certainly no popular favourite. No one denies his ability, it is his inflexibility which is so fatiguing. "I am the King," the Emir and the Government in the Hejaz," he recently informed my Dutch colleague. The Egyptians have gained considerable local sympathy in their handling what is generally held to be a difficult situation. Rumours are being freely circulated that the salvation of the Hejaz lies in the intervention of Egypt, and that Matar has his bag packed with

a to this effect. In reading commercial circles reference has been made to the ejection of the Wahabias from the Hejaz by the Egyptians a hundred years ago in the time of Mehmet Ali, and signs are rumoured that history may repeat itself.

9 Sheikh Hafiz Waliba returned from Egypt on the 25th March and was greeted with the howls of his compatriots here, who had gone on board to meet a new Egyptian consular secretary arriving on the same boat. Sheikh Hafiz is apparently determined to leave no stone unturned to get back into Royal favour, and he has the highest importance on his conversations in Cairo. Waliba Hafiz, to use a facetious local variation, is leaving immediately with two assistants as Hejaz delegate to the Universal Postal Congress in London, will give himself little time for progress in his rehabilitation.

10 H.M.S. "Dahia" proposed to put into Jeddah for two days on the 10th March, but Sheikh Fuad Hamza asked that the visit should be cancelled. He said that the military movements in Nejd (which had been announced in the "Im-el-Qura" as a Royal review of troops) would be interpreted as unfriendly quarters as preparations for an attack on Iraq, in which case the visit to Jeddah of a British man of war might be misconstrued as a counter demonstration on the part of His Majesty's Government.

11 The French armed yacht "Diane" put in on the 22nd March and left on the 24th March, returning to Suez after a visit to Java, Sumatra, India, the Philippines, and the Yamen and Eritrea. Her commanding officer and lieutenant came ashore, and with great charm treated us to a very curious hotch potch of their

views on the situation in the East, and what they considered to be her fighting ineffectiveness to a strong conviction of Italian discomfiture in the Yamen. They expressed alarm at the extent of the reliance placed on aircraft for the defence of Iraq and Aden. The visit of the "Diane" was not without incident. On her arrival in port the quarantine doctor went aboard and announced that he had instructions to insist on a medical examination of the crew. This her commander categorically refused, with a threat to weigh anchor immediately. After much discussion, the doctor was allowed to withdraw, leaving the French consul to seek an explanation from the Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs.

12 Those who are aware of the severe limitation of the British colony in Jeddah to the male sex will appreciate the shock of the first announcement of a birth amongst us. Eager enquiry showed, however, that the wife of a hitherto unknown

13 Two items of commercial interest call for record. The first Austin seven has appeared in the Hejaz. It has not yet struggled through to Mecca, but there is every hope that with a following wind it will one day do so and secure for its manufacturer a block order for the Royal nursery. The Amir's Nejd bodyguard, whose comestible he fixed three years ago was bounded by dates and boiled rice, have taken

to shortbread and afternoon tea biscuits for breakfast, thus providing a most promising opening in British luxury trade.

14. During the period under review two slaves, one of Sudanese origin and the other West African, applied to the Government for repatriation to their homes by way of Suakin.

[E 2288 8/91]

No. 50

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.)

(N 91)
Sir

Jeddah, April 18, 1929

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of the official communication referred to in my telegram No. 40 of the 7th April. This notification adds little to the first report which reached me and on which my telegram under reference was based. On reconsideration, therefore, I did not see fit to telegraph its contents.

2. The report claims that the King's attitude towards Faisal-ed-Dowrah Ibn Humaid-bin-Bujad and their followers was completely conciliatory and that he did not attack them until forced to do so. Again, when the victory was assured the King took care that they should not suffer from the vengeance of his supporters and magnanimously instructed them to submit themselves to the Sharia at a safe distance.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch with its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS

Enclosure in No. 60.

Official Proclamation

(Translation.)

PEOPLE must have learned of the meeting of the General Assembly held in Nejd, of its discussion of internal and foreign affairs of the country, and of its issuing many decisions on various subjects, one of which was the summoning before the Sharia court of certain persons accused of acting contrary to the Sharia law.

Certain ambitious persons, such as Faisal-ed-Dowrah and Sultan Ibn Bujad, who have been concealing under the Sharia law a lust for plunder and an attempt to attain their selfish ends, found that the summons exposed their plans and tore off the veil which they had put on in order to hide their evil intentions, and destroyed their ambition to appear to be working in the name of religion, whereas religion had no concern with their deeds. They wanted to turn to their own use the general indignation and displeasure which arose out of the breach of agreements and covenants on the part of Iraq, and so declared that they intended to raid Iraq and to pull down the forts which had been built contrary to treaties.

Certain simple persons were deceived by their misrepresentations, and they were misled to the north where they also attacked certain peaceful travellers in Nejd. So all the chief commanders and headmen without exception asked His Majesty to adopt strict measures for their punishment and cut off their evil conduct at the roots.

This incident took place during the military review at Qasim. His Majesty sent messengers and delegates to the offenders to summon them to the Sharia for trial. He showed them the Sharia, thus showing mercy and pity towards them, lest blood should be shed to cure the ambitions of those self-seeking individuals. Guilt and ignorance, however, overpowered their hearts and they did not agree to the summons to the Sharia.

Orders, therefore, went forth to the commanders of the Nejd army to surround the offenders where they were encamped at Rudhat Sabla, which is seven hours' march from Artaw. The offenders refused to obey the orders of the Sharia, but they refused and ill-treated the messenger.

On the morning of the 19th Shawal (the 10th March, 1929) orders were issued for an attack on the offenders, and in one hour everything was over. Most of the followers of Faisal-ed-Dowrah and Sultan Ibn Bujad were killed. The former was seriously wounded and carried to Artawiyah, while the latter fled with him to his own country.

their submission and surrender, and asked for pardon for their misdeeds. His Majesty has ordered that those two persons should submit to the Sharia law at once. Orders have been issued that no harm should be done to them, and that they should not suffer injury at the hands of his troops if he came to the camp of His Majesty the King.

Faisal-ed-Dowrah's son Bandar was killed, and his other son, Abu-el-Aziz, has been ordered.

E 2280 1667 91]

No. 61

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 376.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 26, 1929

WITH reference to my telegram No. 376 of the 21st April, I have to inform you that the treaty signed in Cairo to-day by Herr von Stohrer, Sheikh Hafez Wahba and the local Hejaz agent.

2. The German Minister states that the treaty is a short document, and includes a clause whereby the German Government is bound to the Department of Overseas Trade. I am sending a copy to His Majesty's agent and consul in Jeddah.

I have, &c.

LLOYD, High Commissioner.

[E 2300 8 91]

No. 62

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.)

No. 50

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 6, 1929

MY telegram No. 40.

Minister for Foreign Affairs now informs me that Ibn Hithlam has been slain in Riyadh and that hopes are not entertained of Feisal's recovery. It is privately stated that he is still alive.

Ibn Saud arrived in Medina 4th May and is expected in Jeddah on his way to Mecca. His arrival has given rise to considerable doubts as to the success of the Nejd "battle". These doubts will be silenced by Ibn Saud's appearance in the Hejaz. The Amir Saud is remaining in Riyadh.

Repealed to Iraq and Transjordan. No. 60.

E 2322 2322 91]

No. 63

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 7.)

No. 52)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 7, 1929

IBN SAUD arrived at Jeddah this morning. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who went to Rabigh yesterday to meet His Majesty, saw me on his return and said that as a result of the death of Ibn Hithlam the King anticipated trouble with a man. He also mentioned the fact that he had round himself confronted with transport difficulties and the fact that he had dispersed troops recently asked for by the Nejd.

E 2327 2322 91

No. 64

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 7)(Nos. 53 and 54,
(Telegraphic))

Jedda, May 7, 1929

MY immediately preceding telegram

King therefore wished to make the following request of His Majesty's Government —

- (1) That they would place a troopship at his disposal so as to transport 1 000 men he had in Hejaz from Jeddah to Uqair immediately and then be available for any further similar employment
- (2) That they would supply him with 3,000 Lee-Enfield rifles (mixed, if possible, and with magazines to take seven rounds) and 1,000 boxes of ammunition (1 000 rounds to a box)

His Majesty thought that to send ship, arms and ammunition from England would entail too much delay. He therefore asked that they might be sent from the nearest available place (e.g., Aden, India or Iraq). The arms and ammunition could be sent by air, but the ship would have to be sent by sea. If the arms and ammunition were not available now, what could he have at once and when could they be landed at Uqair? In that case when would the balance arrive?

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I thought it unlikely that a British troopship would be available in the vicinity of Jeddah.

There are of course a number of British pilgrim ships lying idle in the harbour, they will not be required until after Haj and are suitable for the purpose in view. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he quite understood that payment would have to be made for services now desired. I gather, however, that they wish to keep cost as low as possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the King was anxious to receive a reply at the earliest possible moment and pressed me to beg for an early decision.

E 2347/2322 91,

No. 65

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 7)

(No. 55)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 8, 1929

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned me this morning from Mecca and said he had been charged to convey the following message from Ibn Saud —

"We understand that bands of our subjects fleeing from our punitive expedition intend to move towards Iraq. They have chosen as their bases Sabshin and frontier zone north of Haasa and near Koweit territory, moving northwards towards Koweit. We understand, moreover, that they are willing to commit hostile acts on Iraq and in the frontier zone. They are being pursued by our punitive forces and we are afraid they will eventually be compelled to commit in Iraq acts of which we disapprove. We therefore request His Majesty's Government to take steps to resist them so that any further trouble on the frontier may be avoided."

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that this message did not mean to imply that His Majesty's Government were to be held responsible for the crossing of the frontier.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he would confirm the message in writing to reach me to-morrow.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 71)

E 2348 2322 91)

No. 66

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 8)

(No. 56)

Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 8, 1929

INCIDENTAL: I have been asked to enquire whether the apparent inconsistency of my immediately preceding telegram with my telegram No. 52 as to forces available in Nejd.

E 2327 2322 91)

No. 67

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jenkins (Jedda,

(No. 46)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 9, 1929

YOU R telegrams Nos. 53 and 54 of 7th May. Request of Ibn Saud for troopship.

Matter is under active and sympathetic consideration, but decision has not yet been reached. In any case British troopship cannot be sent to Uqair. We are endeavouring to ascertain informally precise nature of arrangements proposed by Ibn Saud for small boats only and there can of course be no question of landing at Bahrein. Would alternative of delivering arms and ammunition at Bahrein be in any way helpful or practicable?

You should repeat all telegrams on this subject to Bagdad (who will repeat to Roshire) and India.

(Repeated to Bagdad and India, No. 27)

E 2432 2322 91

No. 68

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 13)

(No. 57)

Jedda, May 13, 1929

YOU R telegram No. 45. I explained to Minister for Foreign Affairs that British troopship cannot be made available and that we are attempting to arrange through Gulf States for a British vessel to be sent to Uqair. Ibn Saud assures me that adequate arrangements for unloading in launches can be made for ships lying at Uqair. I explained that landing at Bahrein was out of the question. His Majesty said that delivery of arms, &c., at Jeddah would not help in the least—they were required in the Persian Gulf.

(Repeated to Bagdad and India, No. 76)

E 2478 2322 91)

No. 69

Mr. Jenkins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 15)

(No. 61)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, May 15, 1929

MY telegram No. 60

Ibn Saud sent Minister for Foreign Affairs to Jeddah this morning to enquire the position as regards required arms and ammunition. If their arrival was delayed they would be of no use. Need was urgent. I endeavoured to reassure Minister for Foreign Affairs on lines of your telegrams Nos. 45 and 48, but could not entirely relieve his anxiety. He said that even 500 rifles, if available immediately, would be a great help. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether I could not obtain some further information for early communication to His Majesty.

(Repeated to Bagdad and India, No. 78)

E 2479 2479 91

No. 70

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 15)

(No. 62)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 15, 1929

MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs stated that the King expected to return to Nejd not later than the middle of August. Before his departure, however, he would like to discuss general question of relations in the Persian Gulf. The chief points he had in mind were (a) Customs duties levied on articles destined for Nejd (b) trade facilities, (c) nationality and passport questions—particularly with reference to Nejd subjects in Bahrain and existing practice there (d) Nejd representatives in Bahrain and Kuwait.

(Repeated to Bahrain and Kuwait, No. 70)

E 2442 63 91

No. 71

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jedda)

(No. 50)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, May 15, 1929

MY telegram No. 10 of 15th January. Crossing of Nejd frontier by British aircraft.

Please inform Ibn Saud that two Royal Air Force aircraft from Transjordan inadvertently crossed Nejd frontier near Kaf on 10th May, and express regret of His Majesty's Government for this occurrence.

E 2257 323 91

No. 72

Foreign Office to Mr. Jakins (Jedda)

(No. 98)

(No. 98)

Foreign Office, May 15, 1929

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 71 of the 11th April enclosing a memorandum on the question of the channels to be used for communications between His Majesty's Government, or between the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and King Ibn Saud, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that the memorandum is being sent to you by the same channel as the semi-official correspondence with the Colonial Office. The incident which gave rise to this correspondence is that reported in your telegram No. 43 of the 15th April.

2. You may in future communicate to the Hejazi Government, without awaiting further instructions, any information received from the Transjordanian or Iraqi Governments not only relating to raids, as laid down in paragraph 4 of the memorandum referred to above, but also relating to other frontier incidents of a serious nature.

I am, &c
G. W. RENDEL

E 2479 2479 91

No. 73

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jedda)

(No. 54)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, May 17, 1929

YOUR telegram No. 62. Ibn Saud's desire to discuss relations in Persian Gulf. Meanwhile obtain from the Hejaz Government and send by bag as soon as possible. A copy of the memorandum should be sent direct to Political Resident at Basra to whom you should repeat your telegram No. 62 and any future telegrams on this subject.

E 2404 821 91

No. 74

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jedda)

(No. 50)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, May 18, 1929

Mr. W. L. BOND at present acting consul at Tangier, has been appointed to be His Majesty's Agent and Consul at Jeddah in succession to Mr. Bird, and expects to arrive in Jeddah about the middle of June.

Please inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bond will be instructed to inform you direct of exact date of his arrival.

E 2593 2322 91

No. 75

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 22)

(No. 98)

Jeddah, April 28, 1929

The report claims that for two years there had been no personal contact between the King and the unruly chiefs of the Mutair and Ati-bah tribes who, in the erection of the Iraq desert posts, had been provided with an excuse for raiding and with a number of adherents.

3. Stress is laid on His Majesty's efforts for peace even after Faisal and Ibn Bujad had joined forces against him, and it was not until these chiefs had ignored a final injunction to return and submit themselves to the Sharia under threat of attack that Ibn Saud marched against them.

4. In conclusion the extract states that unrest, which is inevitably associated with change arose in Nejd from a failure to appreciate the underlying religious principles of the new social order. The hope is expressed that as a result of the military action of Ibn Saud, Nejd may be freed from dissension and in the pursuit of religion and social progress serve to lead the Arab renaissance.

I have, &c
H. G. JAKINS

E 2594 2322 91

No. 76

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 22)

(No. 99)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 29, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 98 of the 28th April, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of a further extract from the "Um-el-Qura" concerning the action taken by Ibn Saud against Faisal-ed-Dowish and Ibn Bujad.

This extract reports the flight of Faisal and Ibn Bujad, the former seriously wounded, after a decisive encounter on the 30th March. Ibn Saud subsequently captured Faisal and Ibn Bujad, after he had recovered from his wounds, on condition that he held no communication with his tribe, the Mutair. Ibn Bujad proceeded to Riyadh to surrender himself there, lest his life should be endangered by his presenting himself in the Royal camp.

3. The day after the battle Ibn Saud called together the ulama and the chief tribesmen to the number of 2,000 that, warned by the recent incidents, they ought arrive at an improved line of conduct. He therefore suggested that, so far as religion was concerned, they must rely on the rulings of the ulama and not on their individual judgment, that they should give him their complete allegiance, that they should have no meetings or assemblies without his permission; and, finally, that they should respect their fellow Moslems and their property.

4. The ulama approved of these proposals, which exactly met the wishes of the assembled chieftains.

I have, &c
H. G. JAKINS

Mr Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 27)

No. 102

Sir,

Jeddah, May 1, 1920

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 30th April, 1920.

2 Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2) Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Kharطوم through Port Sudan, Lagos (2) the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloop.

I have &c

H G JAKINS

Enclosure 1 in No 77

Jeddah Report for Period April 1 to 30, 1920

THE first reports on Ibn Saud's march to Qasim at the head of a punitive expedition have now been received. An official communiqué states that on the 30th March (a month after the King informed His Majesty's Government of the decision he had taken) Ibn Humaid bin Buraid and Faisal ed Doweish were surrounded at Sabla (near Artawiyah) and defeated after an hour's battle. Faisal had offered surrender, but to have been instructed to submit themselves to the Sharia. The "Um el Qura" embellishes the story, and adds the usual reference to the tears shed by His Majesty and his troops. According to the "Um el Qura" Ibn Bujad proceeded after the battle to Riyadh to surrender himself there, while Faisal, whose wounds were too severe for him to appear in person, was promised pardon on the condition that he held no communication with his tribe, the Mutair.

2. Meanwhile, the news of the reported defeat of the insurgents, suddenly at the end of the month, produced a most interesting version of its own. The holy city's account is that Ibn Saud, with a force not less than 20,000 in all, including the tribesmen of Ibn Bujad and Faisal ed Doweish. Preserving the utmost secrecy as to his ultimate intentions, he so arranged the camp as to have the Bedouins of Ibn Bujad and Faisal ed Doweish completely surrounded by his own adherents—town dwellers, for the most part, who had suffered at the hands of the two notorious chieftains. He sent certain unreliable members of the ulama to Mecca and placed Khalid bin Luay (who was responsible

in case of necessity). Then, two days before the date of the supposed advance on Iraq, Ibn Saud suddenly demanded the surrender of the rebel pair. The battle which ensued arose from their resistance. Faisal is said to have escaped and to be still at large, and Ibn Bujad to have been captured and to have had the hairs of his beard pulled out one by one before being cast into prison in Riyadh. Some support of this version has been found in the fact that the "Um el Qura" never mentioned the decision to advance against the raiders. This was conveyed by the King in a letter to the agency. The "Um el Qura" referred throughout to a royal review of troops and even the official communiqué of the battle commences with the words "during the

bellicosity of the "Um el Qura's" reference to Iraq during the last few months and to return to paragraph 10 of the Jeddah report for the month of March, which recorded Sheikh Fuad Hamza's objection to the presence of a sloop in Jeddah harbour on the grounds that it might be misinterpreted as a counter demonstration by His Majesty's Government to rumours of military movements against Iraq.

3. In any case Nejd is apparently sufficiently quiet to permit the King to return to the Hejaz even although the proposed visit of the Amir Saud (his viceroy in Riyadh) has been postponed. The streets of Jeddah have been decorated with hunting, and the barracks where the King is to lodge, and two queer triumphal arches arbitrarily placed among the sandhills splashed red and green. His Majesty will enter the city through the new double gate which has been pierced in the wall some 100 yards to the east of the former Bab Jadid, and it is to be hoped that he will be

more fortunate than last year when the dense mass of the cheering populace failed to materialise and he was compelled to go out again and have a second shot, through the Mecca gate, at a triumphant entry. A considerable number of houses have been built in Mecca for the Royal family, from which it is deduced that the King hopes to be relieved of the necessity for yearly visits to Nejd and to govern from Mecca.

4. Both Nejd and Transjordan have reported raids during April. Nejd many more than Transjordan. Transjordan, however, appears to have sustained the heavier losses. Transjordan, moreover, claims that one of the alleged raiders did not concern that country at all but was a domestic difference among the Transjordan section of the Beni Attiya. It is also stated that the names of some of those given as raiders by the Hejaz Government are unknown. On instructions from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

5. During the month an attempt was made to secure the person of Amir Attia. A summons to appear at Amman was unfortunately conveyed in the form of an invitation to visit the Amir Abdulla. Attia was arrested on arrival but subsequently released, as it was felt that the circumstances of his arrest offended both British and Arab sentiment. Endeavours are now to be made to secure his arrest by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

6. Meanwhile, His Majesty has been asked to make a prompt investigation of the circumstances surrounding the death of Sheikh Khalid bin Jum'at of the Transjordan section of the Beni Attiya, who is stated to have been captured in the Hejaz by Ibn Saud's subjects and then shot dead. Punishment of those guilty of this treachery and payment of compensation is demanded.

7. The Hejaz Government has been informed that the reported motor visit in Nejd of a party from Transjordan, including the Sheriff Shukar (referred to in paragraph 8 of last month's report), is entirely without foundation.

8. A reply has now been received to the joint note on the Hejaz Railway conveying the suggestion of His Majesty's Government and the French Government that the Hejaz should send experts to a conference having the limited scope of that proposed at Haifa provided it was clearly understood and agreed beforehand that the conference was not empowered to discuss the question of the status of the railway. The reply pays no attention to this suggestion but returns to the old arguments of the religious character of the line, and asks that His Majesty's Government and the French Government will reconsider their decision and agree to reopen the matter for full discussion. When within a fortnight of sending this reply Sheikh Fuad Hamza asked me whether I had received any further expression of His Majesty's Government's views. I assured him that I had not received, and did not expect to receive, anything further on the subject.

9. His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, in his capacity of Law giver, has again during the past month given abundant proof of his superiority in this respect. El Ala has now been organised. The Ottoman administrative boundaries are to remain, and an Amir is to be appointed with a kaimakam as assistant. The municipality, the police, the Post Office, the Franco-Turkish department, the kadi and the military detachments are severally put into their places and instructed in the pleasant diversion of passing papers to one another with the endorsement "Seen."

10. The text of a regulation of some importance on the press and printing has been received from the Hejaz Government.

11. There is a lighter touch in the advice to pilgrims published by the Health Department. Pilgrims, mutawifs and sheikhs are to take care not to expose themselves to the hot sun. If they feel the effect of the heat they are to retire to a place in the shade and apply compresses of cold water to the head. Sufferers at night are counselled to repair to the nearest place with a red light over the entrance—this apparently being the distinguishing mark of a health station. By day such posts fly a white and a green flag. Nine stations or sheds with doctors, orderlies and water have been established between Mecca, Muna and Arafat. Electric lights are to be placed on the way between Mecca and Muna. Six large cars, seven mule-drawn vehicles, hand carts and stretchers are available for the transport of the sick to the health stations. Two men on motor cycles are to render first aid to the multitude.

12. Tenders are invited for the conveyance by motor car of mails between Jeddah and Mecca. A regular camel mail service is to be instituted between Wajh and El Ala, Mecca and Lith, Lith and Qunfida, Qunfida and Jizan. Commencing

the 11th April, the rate of ordinary letters for abroad was increased from three to three and a half grash sandi. The registration fee has been similarly increased.

13. My Egyptian colleague has had an animated month. On the 14th April he was informed by telephone from the quay that the Khedivial mail steamer had brought an Egyptian medical mission complete with doctors, dispensers, orderlies, tents, stores, etc. As no notice had been sent of their departure from Egypt, the mission had not been warned of their arrival. Each member of the mission had a *carte d'identité* issued by the authorities in Egypt but no other travel document and no Hejaz visa. After prolonged discussions with the Foreign Minister and the kaimekani, the Egyptian consul secured permission for the personnel to land and all the equipment subsequently passed duty free through the customs with the exception of the two ambulances, which still await release. The Hejaz authorities seem to have been induced to admit the mission on the strength of 24,000 Egyptian pilgrims who were said to be following and whom they naturally could not afford to lose. Nevertheless, in view of the relations existing between the two Governments, the Egyptian *démarche* must be considered as singularly impudent. Half a dozen or so of the hospital tents have now been pitched outside the walls on the north of the town and immediately facing the barracks where Ibn Saud is expected to stay. Equipment is provided for similar installations at Mecca, Medina and Yanbo. Included are a number of gay green striped canvas latrines, although, with the gunselman who was asked if his kit contained a handkerchief, one is tempted to enquire "what for?"

14. Pilgrimage statistics are now beginning to assume a final form. The expected number for the year is 5,000 and North Africa 4,000. The last issue this month of the "El-Qura" gave the meagre total of pilgrims in the Hejaz as 54,220. The financial prospects of the country are thus far from reassuring.

15. M. Maigret arrived from Bagdad on the French armed yacht "Baccarat" to take up his appointment as French consul at Jeddah. He spent seven years in his last post and is apparently prepared to stay as long here. As, however, his practice seems to be to use his post as a base for extended travels in the Middle and Far East, he is not likely to suffer much from the change. M. Maigret is returning immediately to Bagdad and proposes to proceed thence to Paris.

16. During the period under review no slaves have been repatriated by the

Enclosure 2 in No. 77

Regulation for the Press and Printing

1. THIS regulation will be called the regulation of the press and printing.

2. The term *press* shall mean the printing press.

- (a) A press is any instrument for printing written copies either by machine, jelly or other means.
- (b) Periodical and temporary publications are those which are not issued regularly from time to time.
- (c) The responsible director is the person who undertakes to be responsible to the Government for the work of the press, regular newspapers and periodical temporary publications.
- (d) The proprietor is the person to whom the right to issue a newspaper or publication has been granted.

Section 2

3. Any person wishing to open a press must obtain permission from the Government.

4. Any person wishing to obtain permission to open a press must apply to the Government giving his name, surname, place of residence, together with the names of his partners, their residences and any other details the Government may require from time to time. He must also deposit a guarantee of £50 cash with the Government Treasury.

5. The proprietor or proprietors of a press must inform the Government of any transfer from one place to another. When the ownership of a press is changed from

one person to another, whether by sale, purchase or inheritance, the new owner or their guardian, shall forward the details required under article 6.

6. Those presses which have their presses closed by the Government shall be closed.

7. Proprietors of existing presses should, in compliance with the foregoing, forward the required details and obtain the permission within a month from the publication of this regulation.

The proprietor of a press or its director should forward copies of the following printed matter before distribution:—

- (a) All kinds of books and pamphlets.
- (b) Newspapers and all kinds of circulars.
- (c) Magazines and all kinds of periodical publications.

more than a month later mentioned in (a), &c., without first obtaining permission from the Government.

10. The name of the press must appear on all publications, books or magazines printed by it with the exception of governmental or purely personal papers.

11. Any infraction of the above regulations (except as is mentioned in article 6) will be fined from £1 to £10, and the fine will be doubled for recidivists.

Section 3

12. No one may publish or edit a newspaper, magazine or a periodical or any other publication without the permission of the Government.

13. Anyone wishing to obtain permission to establish a newspaper, magazine, periodical or temporary paper shall submit to the Viceroy's office an application, signed by himself and the responsible director, giving the following details:—

- (a) Name of the paper, magazine or publication.
- (b) Place of publication, its scope and subject.
- (c) Appointed dates of issue.
- (d) The language in which it will be published.
- (e) Name of applicant, his surname, nationality and residence.
- (f) Name of the director responsible, his age, nationality and residence.

E 2688 1867 91

Mr. J. J. to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 27)

(No. 101.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 5, 1929

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st inst. enclosing a copy of the proposed text of the Treaty of Commerce and Consular Relations between the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Kingdom of Italy.

2. I asked the Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, following the example of the Kingdom of Italy in 1927, he intended to convey to me the text of the treaty before its ratification. Sheikh Foad replied that he had no authority to do so. During the course of conversation I gathered, however, that the chief clauses covered the establishment of formal relations, the reciprocal appointment in due course of diplomatic and consular representatives, the protection of nationals in accordance with the principles of international law and commerce on the basis of the treatment of the most favoured nation.

1.3.4

Enclosure in No. 75

1774-1775

The text of the treaty will be published after its ratification.

No 79

1874

Friday, June 2, 1924

He demurred when reference was made to responsibility he would incur if he
contained in your telegram. He said he would reply in due course to note I was to
address to him in the matter.



(No. 70 and 76.)

Ledda, June 2, 1926

Minister of Foreign Affairs. He would further say that at the same time he would tell His Majesty that existing conditions in the country were not favorable for the establishment of a responsible government. He would have been prepared to insist that Your Majesty will incur grave responsibility, the words "His Majesty's Government cannot accept grave responsibility" being used. The other one is from a wholehearted acceptance of the foreign Affairs said that existing conditions in the country were very strong and would lead to a revolution, saying that the King had no desire to interfere with the existing government. He would mention ways to be tried and hampered. He therefore suggested that some of note should be withdrawn in which case he would put forward or possibly referred to in an immediate pressing telegram.

E 2881 2522 91

Added June 8 11:25

His Majesty states that he intends severely to punish remaining offenders, but cannot begin until

- In order that he may eradicate disaffection in the whole of the frontier zone His Majesty's Government and the sheikh will agree to his forces pursuing offenders across the Kuwait frontier and driving them out of that territory.

(Reprinted to India, Baghdad, Amherst and Kowen, No. 102)

No. 52

4/20/21

Added, June 7, 1929

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that if His Majesty's Government wished to put an end to the difficulty they should institute the blockade. Ibn Saud on his side could inflict no effective punishment if those under influence of [group omitted] did not do their share.

(Reprinted to India, Bagdad, Koweit and Bushire, No. 104.)

No 88

(No. 481.)

Sir,

Cairo, June 1, 1929.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your telegram No. 163 of the 15th ultimo I have the honor to report that on the 26th ultimo I was farwelled with the King & I spoke to His Majesty on the lines of the 15th paragraph of my despatch No. 293 of the 5th April last.

[20485]

2. The King showed a good deal of ill-humour over the matter, and did not seem to relish my representations. His Majesty replied that he had sent an envoy to the Imam to enquire after his health, and that the only object of the Yemeni Mission here and of any message from the Imam had been to show alarm at the reforms now being made in the Azhar.

3. This statement of the King's is in complete contradiction to the statement made by the King's representative to the King (see first paragraph of my telegram No 81 of the 4th March last). His Majesty's explanations were obviously quite unsatisfactory, but I think that my representations to him may have been salutary.

I have &c

LLOYD High Commissioner

E 2982/63/91

No. 64

Mr Jakins to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 12)

(No. 55)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, June 12 1929

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has addressed me a letter on the subject of raids from Transjordan. He complains that protests are left without reply, loot is not returned, raiders are not punished nor do attacks cease. During the past month reports of more than twenty incidents have been received, and Hejaz tribe have lost all patience.

Hejaz Government have therefore decided to send two punitive expeditions to the border of Transjordan. The first expedition will be sent to the border of the Nejd and will be composed of the Hejaz and Nejd forces. The second expedition will be sent to the border of the Nejd and will be composed of the Hejaz and Nejd forces. Cooperation with His Majesty's Government is sought in this matter.

(Repeated to Jerusalem No 113)

E 3007 2322 91

No. 65

Mr A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda)

(No 62)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 18, 1929

YOUR telegrams No. 79 of 6th June and No. 81 of 7th June. Akhwan refugees in Kuwait.

You should inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government are concerting measures for the co-operation of British forces with those of the Sheikh of Kuwait, with a view to preventing the improper use of Kuwait territory by any refugees from Nejd. As His Majesty has already been informed by Sir G. Clayton direct adequate measures have been taken to prevent such refugees from obtaining asylum in Iraq.

In these circumstances the question of Nejd forces crossing the Kuwait frontier does not arise. His Majesty will appreciate, however, that there would in any case have been serious political objections to such a course.

As regards the matter of the Nejd, Ibn Saud has stated that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd, and that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd. He has also stated that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd, and that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd. He has also stated that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd, and that he has no intention of sending any forces to the Nejd.

(Addressed to Jedda, No 62. Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Kuwait)

E 3115 2322 91

No. 86

Mr Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 19)

(No. 114)

HIS Majesty's acting agent and consul at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from the Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 9th May, 1929, acknowledging the message from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

Jedda, May 18, 1929

Enclosure in No. 86

Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Acting British Agent and Consul Jedda

25111347 May 9, 1929

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty, my Sovereign, has received through His Britannic Majesty's consul in Bahrein (Lieut. Colonel Harrold) a message of congratulation from His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq. I enclose herewith His Majesty's reply, which I beg you to transmit by the first opportunity to his Excellency:—

"We thank your Excellency for the sympathy expressed in your message, likewise for your wishes to the effect that our recent punitive actions may be the preface to the settlement of the dispute outstanding between us and Iraq in a manner which will guarantee the attainment of the end we have previously and repeatedly pointed out to your Excellency."

"We were particularly pleased with one point mentioned in your Excellency's message that the request of certain of our subjects to the administrative inspector of the southern Bedouins to protect them from our punishment has been rigorously refused, and we are accordingly grateful for such action."

"We have noted also that the Iraq Government will never afford asylum to our subjects who are in the Iraq territory. We wish to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between the criminal and the innocent in this matter, and we fear lest anything might happen to cause misunderstanding at the present time or in the future. We are therefore of opinion that the co-operation of the Iraq Government with us would be perfected by their taking measures to prevent the outrages and the stay in Iraq territory of refugees from among our subjects wherever they may be."

We have endeavoured to do our best to prevent the entry of certain people who, it has been reported to us, may take refuge in Iraq, so that he may communicate with the British Government to prevent them from entering Iraq and staying there. We shall not fail to forward later any further information about refugees who may be going, in order that they may be watched in a special way.

With highest respects,

FLAD HAMZA,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

E 3145 2322 91

No. 87

Mr Bond to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received June 20)

(No 90)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 19, 1929

HEJAZ Government learn that Feisal-ed Doweish left Artawiya some days ago to join Ajman and Ibn Makhmur. He requests that His Majesty's Government will prevent communication between rebels and Kuwait and Iraq and prevent anyone from Kuwait and Iraq from joining them. He adds that for the present occasion only the Hejaz Government agree to British aeroplanes being sent to bomb the rebels if necessary within Nejd territory itself.

(Repeated to Kuwait, Bushire, Bagdad and Government of India No 123)

E 3146 2322 91

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson — (Received, June 19)

No 91

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 19, 1920

MY immediately preceding telegram

Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that if no active measures were taken by His Majesty's Government loyal subjects as well as rebels would think the latter were being encouraged by His Majesty's Government to oppose Ibn Saud, with prospect of subsequently being allowed to take refuge in Mesopotamia or Kuwait.

Irrespective, therefore, of whether His Majesty's Government agreed to other points raised, King wished for the sake of moral as well as material effect that aeroplanes should bomb rebels immediately even if this entailed crossing into Nejd territory.

Minister for Foreign Affairs produced for my inspection fanatical letter purporting to have been addressed by Faisal-ed Dowish to [? Amir] Saud at Riyadh and on the infidel. This, he states, proves that position calls for resolute active assistance from His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Mesopotamia, India, Bushire and Kuwait No 124)

E 3263 03 91

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson — (Received June 26)

No 98

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, June 25, 1920

YOUR telegram No 81 of 14th June

Following is extract from a note received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

Hejaz Government wish to do away with arbitration as regards loot with Transjordan in the form in which it was put forward by British Government, and desire British Government itself to act as arbitrator in the matter and dispose of it in a manner it may consider fit and just. This may be done by their studying whole of claims of His Majesty's subjects, together with counter-claims.

Loss which are found to be correct will be put down to account of creditor Government and final liquidation carried out by this method.

Hejaz Government trust that British Government will soon succeed in settling this question, which is now about five years old, as it is in the interest of both sides that a solution should soon be found.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No 133)

E 3241 2322 91

No 100

Mr A Henderson to Mr Bond (Jedda)

No 96

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 26, 1920

YOUR telegrams Nos. 90 and 91 of 19th June and Colonial Office telegram No. 200 of 22nd June to Bagdad, repeated to you: Request of Ibn Saud for assistance against rebel Akhwan on borders of Nejd, Iraq and Kuwait.

You should now inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government are prepared to assist him by co-operating with Sheikh of Kuwait in preventing improper use of Kuwait territory by Nejd refugees, and that authority has accordingly been given for Faisal al-Dowish to be attacked at once in the event of his entering Kuwait territory, but that the frontier is not to be crossed except in hot pursuit and unless contact has been maintained with the rebels, and that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to aeroplanes crossing the frontier merely to search for rebels or to initiate operations in Nejd.

E 3297 2322 91

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson — (Received June 29)

No 101

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 29, 1920

W. I. F. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that severe defeat has been inflicted on Ajman tribe and its adherents, and that several of their leaders have been killed. My information, however, is to the effect that these tribes have extended their field of operations and have succeeded in cutting communications between Riyadh and Hasa.

Amongst his own local sympathisers Ibn Saud's position, both in the Hejaz and in the north, is considered to be somewhat serious.

Ataba tribes are reported to be collecting at Ruqba, on Mecca-Riyadh road, and King has been rushing numbers of troops to concentration camp north of Ta'if to deal with the situation. It is reported that some fighting has already taken place.

There is also good evidence to show that the King is concentrating another force at Hennakiya north east of Medina.

Motor cars, lorries and drivers are being commandeered wholesale in Jedda and Mecca, and are being sent to both camps with troops.

The King is leaving Mecca for Riyadh to-day having delayed his departure, it is said, owing to insecurity of the road and necessity for collecting a large force to accompany him.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Kuwait, Government of India No 136)

CHAPTER II. PALESTINE

E 5897 651 65

Sir Austen Chamberlain to His Majesty's Legation

(Circular.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 17, 1929

ON various occasions during the past year questions have arisen regarding the attitude of our consular officers towards the activities of the Zionist movement in the countries where they reside, and in particular regarding the extent to which facilities should be granted by them to representatives of the Zionist Organisation.

In order to ensure consistency, I consider it desirable to define the attitude to be adopted and the rules to be followed regarding the grant of facilities in such cases. You are aware from Foreign Office letter of the 25th February, 1927, to the Colonial Office ("Eastern" Print, Volume XX, p. 99), that His Majesty's representatives abroad should not in any way be actively associated with the Zionist movement, or hold a reception on the 2nd November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. This statement of principle implies that you are debarred from attending any Zionist function. It would be invidious were an exception to be made to this rule, even if other foreign representatives should have accepted invitations to be present.

3. There remains the question of the extent to which ordinary facilities, such as arranging interviews with the Head of the State, or with high Government officials, should be afforded to Zionist representatives abroad. In such cases your action must be determined purely by the status, as a British subject, of the representative of the Zionist Organisation concerned. Some of these representatives, for instance, are men who, by reason of their high standing in this country or of their past services to His Majesty's Government, may be considered as having in themselves a claim to your good offices. Only, therefore, in the event of a Zionist representative's British status not being clear, or of there being difficulties of a political nature, will it be necessary for you to refer to me for instructions in a particular case.

4. The foregoing regulations do not introduce a new principle into the relations of His Majesty's Government with the Zionist movement. They are simply necessitated by the fact that in some countries any suspected intervention by His Majesty's Government on behalf of Zionism would be liable to

5. A similar circular has been addressed to His Majesty's consular officers.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 345 319 65

No. 43

Mr Chilton to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 13. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

British Legation to the Holy See,

Rome, January 18, 1929

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that the Holy See wished to send Mgr. Valerio as Delegate Apostolic to Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, in addition to Egypt. I had recently heard from a reliable source that this had been proposed by the congregation of the Eastern Church which, for some time past, had been thinking of some means of removing the Latin Patriarch from his position of first Papal representative in Palestine. Mgr. Valerio, I am assured, does excellent work in the purely religious sphere, but he is so completely lacking in diplomatic qualities and political good sense that he has proved an embarrassment, not only to His Majesty's Government but also to the

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Vatican. In view of his good work in other directions, it is unthinkable that he could be removed without promotion to the College of Cardinals, but this solution is apparently not feasible, and the only other means of dealing with the situation therefore is to appoint a Delegate Apostolic who, *ex officio*, is supreme Papal representative and sole official channel of communication with the Holy See. At present the nominal Delegate Apostolic for Palestine and Transjordan is the Delegate Apostolic in Syria, but I believe he has not been to Palestine since the end of the war, and in any case the Holy See prefers not to allow the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Catholics in two British mandated territories to remain attached to a French one. At one time it was under consideration whether or not to send Mgr. Paschal Robinson as full delegate to Jerusalem, but this, at least for the immediate future, has been abandoned out of consideration for the Patriarch, and also, I think, because the fact of Mgr. Robinson's being a Franciscan might create difficulties. This is, in brief, the background of the Vatican proposal I reported in my telegram under reference. Mgr. Valerio's professed intention is to make a more convenient arrangement of territory for the purpose of ecclesiastical administration, and to secure a more adequate and better trained representative than the present Latin Patriarch.

I have, &c.

J. G. CHILTON.

E 754 319 65

No. 104

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd (Cyprus)

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office February 21, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 31 of the 21st January relative to the proposed extension of Mgr. Valerio's jurisdiction to include Palestine and Cyprus, I have to inform your Lordship that the question of exercising further pressure on the Vatican to appoint a British subject over the combined jurisdiction has engaged my attention.

2. In view of the circumstances revealed in the previous correspondence regarding both the appointment of Mgr. Valerio to be Apostolic Delegate to Egypt and the appointment of various Catholic authorities in Palestine, it is clear that nothing would be gained by returning to the charge with the Vatican in the sense suggested by you at the present stage more especially as it appears from Mgr. Valerio's own statement that the arrangement contemplated is intended to be of a temporary nature. In these circumstances, I have instructed Mr. Chilton to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government do not wish to raise any objection to the Vatican's proposal.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 754 319 65

No. 95

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr Chilton (Holy See)

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Foreign Office February 21, 1929

HAVE the pleasure to inform you that the Holy See has accepted the proposal (which forms the subject of your telegrams Nos. 2 and 3 of the 18th and 21st January, your despatch No. 13 of the 18th January and Lord Lloyd's telegram No. 31 of the 21st January, that the jurisdiction of Mgr. Valerio, the present Apostolic Delegate to Egypt, be extended to include Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus.

2. I shall be glad if you will now inform the Cardinal Secretary of State in reply to his Eminence's enquiry, that His Majesty's Government do not desire to raise any objection to this proposal.

A copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Lloyd on this subject is enclosed herein for your information.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[J 492 492 16]

No. 96

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 22)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, February 21, 1929

ITTEHADIST press reports that the Apostolic delegate will shortly be raised to the rank of a Nuncio.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs have no information on the subject, but if any general change in the status of the Vatican's representatives abroad is in contemplation as the result of the recent agreement it might be well to remind the Cardinal Secretary of State of the undertaking referred to in first paragraph of Sir O. Russell's P. despatch No. 91 of 1st June 1928.

Any claim on behalf of the Vatican's representative here to perpetual deanship of the Diplomatic Body would be highly inconvenient, and in the event of a change in the status of His Majesty's representative such as was contemplated in the Sarwat draft treaty might lead to serious difficulties.

[J 492 492 16]

No. 97

Sir R. Lindsay (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Chilton (Holy See)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic)

Holy See, March 1, 1929

PLEASE see Cairo telegram No. 63 of the 21st February. Press reports of elevation of Apostolic Delegate to Nuncio; and your telegram No. 2 of the 18th January.

Since, as recorded in your telegram, Cardinal Secretary of State recently enquired whether His Majesty's Government would have any objection to the proposed extension of the jurisdiction of Mgr. Valeri, Apostolic Delegate in Egypt, to include Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, I shall be glad if you will draw Cardinal Gasparri's attention to these Egyptian press reports, and make what representations are called for in your opinion. If necessary, it might be well to remind him of the promise recorded in the first of the two telegrams referred to above.

[J 627 492 16]

No. 98

Mr. Chilton to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Holy See, March 7, 1929

PLEASE see your telegram No. 6. On enquiry at the Vatican I am informed that there is no intention of sending a Nuncio to Cairo. The Delegate Apostolic will continue to hold his position but from henceforward will spend a considerable part of the year in Jerusalem.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

E 1270 319 65

No. 99

Mr. Chilton to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 12.)

Sup.

Holy See, February 26, 1929

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 50 of the 21st February, and to state that I only conveyed to the Cardinal Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government had no desire to raise any objection to the extension of the jurisdiction of Mgr. Valeri, at present Delegate Apostolic in Egypt to Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus. The Vatican are of the opinion that this

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change will be found very satisfactory to His Majesty's Government. I have to inform His Majesty's Government that the Cardinal Secretary of State has

2. In a note I have just received from the Cardinal Secretary of State his Excellency states that the extension of the jurisdiction of Mgr. Valeri to the supreme representative in Palestine of Catholic interests, to whom his Excellency should address himself in all that concerns these interests. Although in his note the Cardinal does not mention it, I presume that his Eminence would like a similar communication sent to the Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.

H. G. CHILTON

6. The "Tamps" states that in these circumstances France has the obligation which she has contracted vis-à-vis the League of Nations were she to admit the insertion in the Treaty of Commerce between France and Japan. "The attitude of France in this matter is in complete accordance with the policy which has been pursued by her since the end of the war." "France has no intention of extending the principle of reciprocity to the detriment of the interests of her own people."

E 1301 182 691 No. 102

(No 26, Confidential)
Sgt.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 7th February the Constituent Assembly was formally re-invested with the

2. It will be within my recollection that at the last session of the Assembly on the 9th August the French High Commissioner formulated reserves to six articles in the draft Constitution, which were in conflict with his conception of the mandate, on which was subsequently prolonged till the 11th February. Those matters were reported on at the time in my despatches Nos. 57 of the 9th August, 58 of the 15th August, and 62 of the 24th November, 1928.

3. Sustained efforts were made by the French High Commissioner and the Nationalist leaders to arrive at a formula acceptable to both parties, and it seems probable that a general reserve will be made. On the 11th January the text of a general reserve (a copy of which is attached to the present despatch), the terms of which the Nationalists considered too wide. The French High Commissioner, however, refused to accept the Nationalist proposal regarding the unity of Syria (towards which their attitude remains substantially unchanged), and to add a new article providing for special agreements between the French and the Nationalist Government. The Nationalist party was prepared to make any further concessions and a position of stalemate was reached.

4. The note addressed by the French High Commissioner to Hashim Bey Atassi on 10 July 1942, is conciliatory in tone and expresses the hope that negotiations will continue and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

5. The prorogation of the Assembly had long been discounted, and the news excited no manifestations.

6. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E. C. Holt.

Enclosure 1 in No. 102

4 Pontot to Hashem Rey Atase.

M. le Président.

Brymouth, le 5 février 1929

J'AI eu l'honneur, au cours de divers entretiens, d'examiner avec vous la situation résultant des efforts poursuivis depuis le mois d'août dernier pour rechercher les bases d'un accord qui mit en harmonie les vœux librement exprimés par les Députés du pays avec le droit public défini par l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et par la déclaration de mandat.

Après l'effort de conciliation déployé depuis bientôt six mois en France comme en Syrie, tant par le Haut-Commissaire que par les personnes qualifiées, de votre part, pour garder le contact avec les autorités françaises en exécution de la décision

[20465]

其 二

L'Assemblée du 11 août 1928, j'avais bien d'espérer que l'accord, qui, de part et d'autre, n'a toujours été entrevu comme possible sur le fond même du problème, ne manquerait pas de trouver son expression dans une formule précise qui eût prévenu tout risque de malentendu.

Comme conclusion à ces échanges de vues préliminaires, je vous ai remis, le 11 janvier dernier, le texte d'une réserve générale strictement inspirée des obligations internationales de la France.

L'adoption de cet article additionnel, dont je joins à titre de rappel le texte à cette lettre, eût permis à l'Assemblée de conserver presque intact le texte même de la Constitution qu'elle avait pris en considération par son vote du 7 août dernier.

En l'absence de cette proposition, pesée dans tous ses termes pour répondre à l'exigence d'une situation de droit qu'il n'est pas au pouvoir du Gouvernement français de modifier sans l'accord de la Société des Nations, comme aussi pour sauvegarder les droits essentiels constitués en application de la Constitution, il ne paraît pas permis de penser que le bureau à qui elle était transmise voudrait bien la recommander à l'adoption de l'Assemblée.

Cet espoir ne s'est pas réalisé, et, le 25 janvier, lors de notre dernier entretien, vous n'avez pu me donner l'adhésion et les assurances que je vous avais demandées.

Toutefois, pour marquer votre désir d'entente, vous avez bien voulu me faire savoir que le président et les membres du bureau accepteraient que les articles de la Constitution, dont la disjonction demandée par le Haut-Commissaire le 9 août dernier

ne fussent appliqués conformément aux accords intervenus entre les Gouvernements français et syrien, en attendant la conclusion d'un traité qui définirait les relations entre les deux pays.

J'ai donné toute mon attention à l'expression de vos vues. C'est avec regret que j'ai dû constater le défaut d'accord sur le texte que je vous ai remis, et dont la rédaction, cependant, de la part de la Puissance mandataire, à un extrême esprit de conciliation. Il m'a été, d'autre part, impossible de trouver dans la proposition limitée que vous m'avez présentée, les garanties nécessaires à la réalisation de vos vœux.

Il est évident que des accords spéciaux à réaliser ne sauraient en effet suffire pour donner aux intérêts généraux en cause les garanties entières et immédiates dont le principe même du mandat nous oblige à les entourer.

On n'est ni à l'abri d'un malentendu, ni dans la méconnaissance des réalités que l'on peut utilement apaiser le différend qui a interrompu depuis six mois les travaux de l'Assemblée.

Un patient effort paraît encore nécessaire pour trouver une issue aux difficultés actuelles, mais, en attendant que la réflexion ait mûri la solution de ce problème essentiel, une réunion de l'Assemblée serait sans objet.

C'est pourquoi, dans l'incertitude de l'heure où un résultat également désiré en France et en Syrie pourra être atteint, j'ai pris aujourd'hui un arrêté ajournant sine die la tenue de l'Assemblée.

En vous transmettant ce texte, qui parviendra en même temps que le présent message à la connaissance des membres de l'Assemblée, je tiens à exprimer l'espoir que les progrès déjà accomplis dans les voies de l'entente ne feront que s'affirmer, et que le succès viendra finalement récompenser nos efforts et justifier notre persévérante bonne volonté.

Agrée, S.
HENRI PONSOT

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

Le message général dont le Texte a été remis le 11 Janvier 1929 par le Haut-Commissaire à l'Examen du Bureau en vue de son Adoption par l'Assemblée.

AUCUNE disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations.

Les articles de la Constitution qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et à la défense du pays et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures.

Pendant toute la durée des obligations internationales de la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à

être appliquées que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements français et syrien.

En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ces responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord.

Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du Gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

Enclosure 3 in No. 102.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire de la République française No. 2385 du 5 Février 1929 portant Ajournement sine die de l'Assemblée chargée d'élaborer la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
date des 8 octobre 1919,
No. 1024, portant organisa-

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1968 du 2 Juin 1928, prescrivant la convocation des candidats proclamés élus à la suite des opérations électorales des 25 et 27 avril 1928.

arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 2063 du 16 août 1928, et l'arrêté No. 2105 du 5 novembre 1928, ajournant à trois mois l'Assemblée.

Attendu que les efforts poursuivis depuis le mois d'août dernier pour mettre en harmonie le texte du projet de Constitution pris en considération par l'Assemblée le 7 août 1928 avec le droit public défini par l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et par la déclaration de mandat du 24 juillet 1922, n'ont pas jusqu'ici abouti.

Attendu qu'à la suite du dernier échange de vues, l'heure où un résultat positif pourra être atteint n'est pas encore prochain.

Vu le message adressé à la tête de ce jour par le Haut-Commissaire au Président de l'Assemblée fixant la possibilité actuelle de la question.

Arrêté.

Article unique. L'Assemblée réunie à Damas le 9 juin 1928 pour procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie, et dont les travaux sont suspendus depuis le 11 août 1928, est ajournée sine die.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République,
HENRI PONSOT

Vu:
Le Secrétaire général,
N. LAB

Beyrouth, le 5 février 1929

E 1687 1687 89

No 103

(General Salow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 103)
Sir,

Beirut, March 20, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine reached Beirut on an official visit to the French High Commissioner on the 16th March, and that he left to-day to make a short trip to Damascus and the Jebel Druse via Tripoli, Hama, Hama and Baalbek before returning to Palestine. M. Ponsot gave two dinner parties in his honour, of which the second was followed by a reception attended by notabilities of various kinds. No toasts were exchanged at the first dinner party, which was considered to be the official one. I understood that the reason was that the President of the Lebanese Republic was one of the guests. It was felt that the exchange of courtesies between the French and British representatives was rendered difficult by the presence of President Debbas, and it was therefore decided to omit

them. The French authorities have done all in their power with the resources at their disposal to make the visit of Sir John and Lady Chancellor a pleasant one. The usual routine of excursions and sight-seeing was rendered impossible owing to climatic conditions, and from Hama onwards use will be made of the railway as far as is possible.

2. This visit, following as it has on those of Sir Gilbert Clayton and of Sir Henry Dobbs, who on reaching Aleppo found the way across Aam Minor barred by snow and had therefore unexpectedly to come down to Beirut to take ship, can only have the happiest results. It appears to me to be especially fortunate that Sir John Chancellor was present, for the visits of the past few years seem mainly to have had their origin in that region.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

[E 2092 1976 89]

No. 104

Consul Monck Mason to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 25.)

(N. 12)

Sir,

Aleppo, April 16, 1929

WITH reference to Mr. Consul-General Satow's despatch No. 84, Confidential, of the 23rd November last, on the subject of the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and the Lebanon, I have the honour to append a few notes on Armenian refugee colonies in the Sandjak of Alexandretta and the Aleppo district, from information largely derived from Archdeacon Buxton, who inspected these colonies recently.

2. I am inclined to think that the colonies at Alexandretta, Antioch, Bitlis, Kirikhan have not been planted there exclusively from political motives, the main reason being, as Mr. Satow suggests, the previous existence in the district of Armenian villages. The whole field of colonisation in the sandjak is, moreover, very fertile and comparatively little inhabited; that it is mostly rather malarial is perhaps an accidental circumstance. The Bays are situated at elevations of 1,500 feet above the sea, and the Armenians there are repairing old terraces of cultivation.

3. Considerations of suitability on account of racial associations and nearness to the sea (coupled, in the case of the Sandjak of Alexandretta, it must be said, with proximity to the frontier) certainly coincide with reasons of political convenience, for the sandjak, with a population which is largely Turkish, is, and is likely to remain for a long time, a hotbed of Turkish propaganda; it is evident that a vigorous Armenian element dotted about the sandjak, enjoying the support of the mandatory authorities and rapidly increasing in numbers, would be in the nature of a safeguard against a reactionary Turkish population. It is true that on the other hand a strong Armenian nucleus might be capable, in certain circumstances, of working against the mandatory power. But such a danger is remote. It is clear that Armenians are characteristically less Armenian than Gregorians, even becoming almost indistinguishable from Syrians at times. A language also exists, and the recent establishment of an Armenian Catholic Church at Kirikhan, an almost entirely Armenian small town or large village on the western edge of the potentially rich Amok Plain, may be not unconnected with this fact.

4. Archdeacon Buxton tells me that a colony of about 150 Armenian families is in process of being installed near Rihana, at the south-eastern corner of the Amok Plain. It is a healthy spot and it has been suggested to me by Archdeacon that the object of this new establishment is definitely political. The notorious favouring of the Christians in the Lebanon and the Fairbairn Valley, who, as Englishmen, were treated as a separate race, and the fact that the Armenians are a more numerous and more powerful element in the Lebanon, may be connected with this fact.

5. At any rate, Armenians develop trade and industry wherever they settle (whether they will take kindly to agriculture, in present conditions, remains to be seen), and in this a good case can be made out for their settlement in a potentially

rich and inadequately inhabited districts like that of Amok Plain. There seems less reason for a large colony of non-agricultural Armenians at Alexandretta.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. MONCK-MASON.

E 2102 1687 89,

No. 105

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

Sir,

Downing Street, April 25, 1929

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, copies of letters from and to the High Commissioner for Palestine, of the 5th and 24th April, on the subject of his recent visit to Syria.

I am, &c.
S. H. WILSON

Enclosure 1 in No. 105

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J. R. Chancellor to Mr. Amery.

(Confidential 'D')

Sir,

April 5, 1929

1. I HAVE the honour to report that on Monday, the 18th March, I proceeded to Beirut to pay an official visit to M. Ponsot, High Commissioner of Syria.

2. I travelled from Haifa by motor car, accompanied by my wife and staff, and arrived at Beirut at 4 P.M.

We were cordially received at Government House by M. and Mme. Ponsot, a guard of honour, consisting of a squadron of Spahis, being in attendance.

M. Ponsot had arranged an interesting programme for our week's visit, of which I enclose a copy.

It will be seen that ample opportunities were given for touring the country and seeing some of the most interesting of the ancient monuments.

3. After tea in the afternoon of our arrival, I accompanied M. Ponsot on a drive round the old part of the city and the port, in the course of which he explained the improvements that were in course of execution and contemplated. He took me also to the Government Offices and presented to me the leading members of his staff who were still hard at work, although the hour was after 6.30 P.M.

An official dinner was given on the evening of the 18th March at which the leading naval, military and civil officials were present. There were no toasts and no speeches. I learned afterwards from His Britannic Majesty's consul general that the reason for that omission was that it was thought that, owing to the presence of the President of the Lebanese Republic as one of the guests, the exchange of courtesies between the French and British representatives might give rise to

4. After breakfast on the morning of the 19th March, I had a long conversation with M. Ponsot, in the course of which various matters of common interest to Palestine, Transjordan and Syria were discussed.

M. Ponsot was at first somewhat reticent and guarded, but he gradually relaxed and discussed freely the various questions which I raised, his conversation being flavoured by a pleasantly sardonic humour. He explained to me the organisation of the mandated territory of Syria in four States and their different systems of government.

Raiding between Syria and Transjordan

Transjordan, and to the despatch which I had addressed to him on the subject on the 1st March. I also discussed with him the operations that had been undertaken on the 18th March against the Syrian tribes who had raided the Beni Sakhr in Transjordan on the 5th March. These operations were reported to you in my telegram of the 13th March.

M. Ponsot told me that my despatch of the 14th March had not then reached him, but that he would study it and would discuss the question of raids with me as soon as he had done so. Conversation on this subject was resumed at Sourida on the 24th March (paragraphs 17 and 18 of this despatch).

Customs Agreement between Syria and Palestine

6. In reply to my enquiries M. Ponsot informed me that he concurred in the amendments to the draft agreement that had been suggested in my despatch to him. No. 28 M. of the 28th February. He added that he was prepared to sign the agreement in its present form, and would send a signed copy to me on my return to Jerusalem.

Wireless Telegraphy Liaison between Syria, Amman and Haifa

7. I explained to M. Ponsot that difficulties had arisen in giving effect to the proposed wireless telegraph line between Haifa, Amman, and the Desert Frontiers and Amman, with the object of affording better protection to the overland mail route west of Rutha. M. Ponsot undertook to try and remove the difficulties. I have just learned from the Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, that arrangements have been made to start the liaison as from the 2nd April.

Frontier between Syria and Transjordan

8. I enquired if M. Ponsot had any information as to whether the French Government were yet in a position to discuss the question of the frontier between Syria and Transjordan.

He stated that they were unwilling to enter into negotiations in regard to the Iraq and Transjordan frontiers until an agreement had been arrived at with Turkey in regard to the frontier on the north of Syria. The Turks were very troublesome and if negotiations were now entered into as regards the frontier with Iraq and Transjordan the difficulties of the French would be greatly increased. For any concessions that they might make in regard to the southern frontier of Syria would encourage the Turks to put forward more extravagant claims on the north.

As to the Iraq and Transjordan frontiers, he said that the French Government were in connexion with the country to the south of Jebel Druse where the tribes exercised grazing rights on both sides of the present "frontière de fait".

He was aware that the Governments of both Iraq and Transjordan maintained that the questions of the border at Jebel Sinjar and to the south of Jebel Druse had no connexion with one another, and each declined to make any concession as regards its territorial claims for the benefit of the other. His view was, however, that England and France were the two great Powers in that part of the world, and they had therefore only to make up their minds on the point and the question would be settled.

Railway from Bagdad and Pipe line from Iraq to the Mediterranean

9. I asked M. Ponsot if he had any recent information as to the proposal to construct a railway from Bagdad and a pipe-line from Iraq to the Mediterranean.

I told him that when I left England last November I was informed that the oil companies were studying the question, but that since then I had received no information as to whether any decision had been arrived at. I added that the Government of Palestine were about to begin the construction of the harbour at Haifa, and that it had now been decided that the work should be carried out departmentally instead of by contract as had been originally proposed.

M. Ponsot said that he regarded the construction of a railway from Tripoli to open up the interior of Syria and a pipe-line from Tripoli to Iraq as important French interests.

He had studied carefully the topography of the country, and it was clear to him that there would be no serious difficulty in constructing a railway line from Tripoli via Palmira to Deir-es-Zor on the Euphrates. That line and also a line from Damascus to Palmira were necessary for the development of a large area of fertile country.

As regards the pipe-line, he had no doubt that the most favourable route from Iraq to the Mediterranean would be to a terminus at Tripoli. On that route there was no mountain range and no depression to be crossed. The country to be traversed too, was favourable for motor transport. There would therefore be no difficulty

in constructing a pipe-line without the assistance of a railway for the transport of the materials.

He recognised that the development of the harbour at Haifa was of great importance to Great Britain. Haifa would probably become a naval centre, and as a station on the overland route to Iraq and India and also as a terminus for a pipe-line from Iraq it might have considerable strategic importance.

There was no need to assume that French and English interests in regard to those matters were irreconcilable. He understood that to enable a pipe-line of the length proposed to pay its way 2 million tons of oil per annum must be carried by it. He believed that before long the output of the Iraq oil field would be about 8 million tons per annum so that there would be ample room for two pipe-lines.

I said that I was disposed to agree with him, but that the question was one for the oil companies to settle, as neither Palestine nor the other States concerned had funds available for the construction of either a railway or a pipe-line.

If an agreement were arranged between the large oil companies for the division of the world into certain areas in order to ensure that the oil from the various fields should be marketed in the most economical manner, it was probable that there would be a large demand for oil from Iraq and Persia for consumption in Eastern Europe.

I believed that the possibility of making such an agreement had been discussed, but I was not aware if any progress had been made in the negotiations.

Beirut-Haifa Railway

10. I enquired if the Government of Syria were likely soon to take a decision in regard to the construction of their section of the Beirut-Haifa Railway.

M. Ponsot said that there was little chance of that railway being constructed in the near future, although it was probable that the Beirut-Haifa line would be constructed before the Beirut-Tripoli line, which would be very expensive and would not be of great use commercially. The former line would be easy to construct, and there was a considerable demand in Beirut for railway connexion with Egypt in order to encourage visitors from Egypt who now came to Syria in considerable numbers to spend the summer months in the Lebanon.

M. Ponsot went on to say that he had no intention of developing the port at Alexandretta. It was too far to the north to be of any great value to the trade of Syria, and it was too exposed to attack by the Turks to justify any large expenditure upon it. Tripoli was the natural port for the export of the products of Syria. It was centrally situated and had good communications with the interior.

Beirut was making rapid progress as a port. The recent improvements and the reclamation of land now in progress there had greatly increased the facilities for handling the traffic. Further works were now under consideration with the object of increasing the accommodation for shipping, but as any extension of the break-water would be carried out in water 28 metres in depth, it would necessarily be very expensive.

The development of Beirut harbour was not affected by the proposals to construct a pipe-line and railway from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Beirut could never become the main port for the export trade of Syria or the terminus of a pipe-line from Iraq.

Telephonic Communication with Palestine

11. I enquired if the Syrian Government were likely soon to be able to establish telephonic communication with Palestine and Egypt. Palestine had already completed the installation of the apparatus required to enable the service to be put into operation as soon as the Syrian Government were ready for it.

M. Ponsot explained that, except in the large towns, the telephonic system in Syria was operated by the army. The military authorities, however, now desired to transfer the telephones to the civil Government, and that was about to be done. But the existing telephones were in such a bad state (they consisted mainly of military field lines) that the whole system would have to be reconstructed before any new services could be undertaken. He hoped that the reconstruction of the telephone system would be completed in two years' time at a cost of 40 million francs. He added that the reconstruction of the Beirut-Haifa line to enable telephonic communication with Palestine to be established would have an early place in the programme.

12. The rest of the 19th March was spent in visiting various places of interest in Beirut and in a motor tour through the mountains of the Lebanon.

In the evening a reception was given at Government House, at which I made the acquaintance of many of the Syrian notables.

I had a long conversation with M. Debius, President of the Lebanese Republic who is an Eastern Orthodox Christian and is married to a French lady.

He appeared to be on very good terms with the French, and the main subject of his conversation was the parliamentary system of government. He condemned it severely and expressed the opinion that it was quite unsuited for any country except England, which had invented it. He held up to special ridicule the representative institutions which had recently been set up in Iraq and Transjordan and prophesied that their life would be short.

13 On the 20th March the ancient Crusaders' stronghold, Krak des Chevaliers, at Kalat el Homs, north of the Tripoli-Homs road was visited. This is perhaps the most important and best preserved of the Crusader buildings in Syria and led the pass through the hills to the interior.

On this tour we were accompanied by M. Schoedler, the Governor of the State of the Amontes.

He appeared to be an able administrator and to be much interested in the development of his State, which is administered by him directly without the aid of a council. He informed me that the form of government they were now in was a direct administration of the country.

The night was spent on a coach on the railway at Homs, which we reached before dark, but in time to enjoy a view of the town from the citadel which commands it.

14 Early on the 21st March we proceeded to Hama by train and after a brief visit to that town, which lasted little more than an hour, we rejoined the train and travelled to Haleb, where the ruins were visited in the company of M. Bravais, the archaeologist now in charge of the ruins and of the excavations now in progress.

15 The night of the 21st was spent on the train at Rayak, and on the morning of the 22nd the journey was continued to Damascus, which was reached about midday.

After lunch M. Ponsot drove me to the various places of interest in the city. We also visited a site on the slopes of the hills overlooking Damascus, where he proposed to construct a new residence for the High Commission.

He did not omit to take me to the part of the city which had been shelled by the rebels. It was a low quarter of the town in which a number of bandits were known to have assembled, and that drastic measures had been necessary in order to avert a threatened massacre of the Christian population.

The only building of interest that was seriously damaged during the rebellion was the Palais Azem, which was a fine example of Syrian architecture. It was in hopes of trapping in it General Sarrail, who had been occupying it.

16 A reception was given at the Palais Azem at Damascus on the afternoon of the 22nd March to which all the local notables were invited.

At the beginning of the reception M. Ponsot called my attention to the fact that all the supporters of the Government were congregated at the end of the room at which he and I were standing, and that all the Nationalists were at the other end. He remarked that the Nationalists were very anxious to re-establish contact with him, as I would observe before the reception ended.

As he had foretold, in the course of the proceedings Nationalists individually and in twos and threes, came across the room to pay their respects to M. Ponsot. They were very *empresses* in their manner to him, and urged him to prolong his stay in Damascus. M. Ponsot appeared to be on friendly terms with all, and chaffed them a little. Their *empresses* and outward marks of appreciation demanded by the customs of the East. M. Ponsot referred jestingly to the dissolution of the National Assembly and told the Nationalists that he would be back in Damascus, although his stay at Damascus on this occasion must be short, he would be back in Damascus.

M. Ponsot informed me, incidentally, that he would probably go to Geneva this year in order to explain to the Council of the League of Nations the connexion with the closing of the National Assembly.

17 We left Damascus by train at 8.30 A.M. on the morning of the 23rd March, and reached Ezraa at 11.30 A.M.

We were met at Ezraa by Colonel Clement-Grandcourt, Governor of the Jebel Druze and Officer Commanding the Troops in Southern Syria. From Ezraa we travelled by motor car to Soueida, and were joined there by M. Ponsot, who had motored from Damascus early that morning with the object of learning from the local officers the position as regards the recent raids on the border before discussing the question with me (see paragraph 5 of this despatch).

18 On our arrival at Soueida I visited, in company with M. Ponsot, the new schools for boys and girls which have recently been opened by the French. The High Commissioner was received with an address of welcome recited by one of the pupils, and I was pleasantly surprised by the cheerful and independent manner in which several of the boys replied in French to the questions put to them by M. Ponsot.

In their appearance, independence of manner and sense of humour the Druzes greatly resemble the Afridis of the north west frontier of India, and they are apparently, not far behind them in fighting qualities.

Owing to two successive bad seasons the Druzes are at present living in a state of extreme poverty.

M. Ponsot told me that the demands of the Druzes were for the establishment of schools and dispensaries and the installation of water supplies into the villages. The administration are supplying these needs as rapidly as possible. I visited

villages where new water supplies have recently been installed.

I was informed by Colonel Clement-Grandcourt that the disarmament of the Druzes had been carried out pretty thoroughly although no doubt, some arms remained in concealment. The high price now paid for rifles however showed that

to station troops at several points on the border for their protection from their neighbours to the south an arrangement which was administratively very in convenient.

19 I visited certain villages of Shabha and Kana'at without police escort, although patrols of police were visible at various points of the road.

At the villages which we visited the Governor was courteously received by the notables, but Colonel Clement-Grandcourt was not responsive to the compliments and addresses of welcome which were presented to him; and he cut short the representation of petitioners with unnecessary abruptness.

He told me that the population was now tranquil, and that he hoped that by the establishment of schools and by the other measures which he was taking for their welfare they would be inclined to remain so, but that one could not be certain as to their attitude for they were subject to rapid changes of opinion and to accessions of violent emotion.

The Druzes, he added, could work hard under the direction of others but were without initiative, and were naturally indolent. The season promised to be a favourable one for the crops, and he hoped that an abundant harvest would relieve the poverty from which they have been suffering owing to the recent bad seasons.

19 I resumed the discussion with M. Ponsot on the position on the frontier of Syria and Transjordan (see paragraph 5 above).

He told me that he had received a report of that action from one of his officials who happened to be on the border at the time and who had recorded what he had seen, and had noted the exact time of each incident.

His informant had reported that the armoured cars were accompanied by tenders, from which a number of armed Arabs were observed to descend. He deprecated the association of armed Arabs with British troops in such punitive operations, and said that the French never permitted armed Arabs to accompany their troops in such circumstances.

I agreed that the association of armed tribesmen with our troops in punitive operations was highly undesirable, and I assured him that it was contrary to our practice. I felt sure that his informant had been mistaken as in none of the reports which had reached me was reference made to the presence of armed Beduins with our troops.

I have since learned from Group-Captain Playfair, Officer Commanding Royal Air Force, that the armoured cars were accompanied by the Amir Shaker, a cousin of the Amir, who is usually present on such occasions, and that he had with him a few attendants, who were doubtless the Arabs referred to by the French observer.

M. Ponsot discussed the position as regards the raids with me quite frankly and said that he would send me a despatch dealing seriatim with the matters dealt with in my letter to him of the 14th March. He put forward the following suggestions with the object of improving the situation, to which I shall give careful consideration:

- (1) That close contact should be established between the British and French authorities on the border.
- (2) That three monthly conferences between the British and French authorities should be held in order to clear up the situation as regards raids that may have occurred without undue delay.
- (3) That in view of the fact that all the recent raids had taken place in the neighbourhood of Azraq, the British authorities should consider the question of re-establishing a post there.
- (4) That direct telephone communication between Amman and Soueida should be established in order to permit of the rapid transmission of information in regard to the movements of the tribes.

20. On the morning of the 24th we bade farewell to M. Ponsot, who departed by motor car for Damascus.

In the course of the morning we visited the village of Kanawat and the Roman remains there with Colonel Clement-Grandcourt. In the afternoon he motored with us to Baura, where we visited the Roman theatre and the Moslem fortress that was built round it.

Colonel Clement-Grandcourt accompanied us to Derna, where we joined the train and travelled by the Yarmuk Valley to Samakh in Palestine territory, which was reached at 8.30 p.m.

21. As the result of a very brief visit to the country, I formed a much more correct impression of the situation than I had previously reached me.

The officers, military and civil, with whom I came in contact, were in almost all cases of high rank and of high standing in the country. I was told that service in Syria is now very popular in the French army, and that almost all the officers now serving in Syria were volunteers. Several of them told me that when they had been in France for a few months after completing a tour of service in Syria they had applied for permission to return, as they found the service and the conditions of life in Syria more agreeable than in France.

M. Ponsot told me that he had been appointed High Commissioner for Syria for a period of ten years, of which over two years had elapsed.

He informed me that there were now about 15,000 French troops in Syria and that the cost to the French Treasury amounted to about 300 million fr. a year. He saw little immediate prospect of a reduction of that charge.

22. With their confidence in the future of Syria that now seems to be established, the French are turning seriously to the development of the latent resources of the country.

An irrigation department has recently been created, the staff of which are now engaged in studying projects for large irrigation works. It is hoped that work will be begun on some of them in two years' time.

Work on an important irrigation scheme in the Alawite State is to be begun during the present year.

When travelling down the Barada Valley by train on the 22nd March we passed a hydro-electric station in course of construction which will furnish power for the lighting of Damascus.

A scheme for the electrification of the Beirut-Damascus Railway, using power developed from the rivers of the Lebanon, is now being studied by a hydraulic engineer. It is estimated that the cost of the scheme would be about 100 million fr. and that it would be doubled and considerable economies in working expenses effected.

Much work is being done on the construction of new roads and the improvement of the existing ones, which have suffered considerable damage from the abnormally heavy rainfall of the past winter.

The French are taking steps to secure the preservation of the ancient monuments of Syria and to revive Arab decorative art.

The Palais Azem at Damascus has been converted into a museum of Arab art and M. de Lorey, the director, has established in connexion with it a school of instruction for the training of artisans in decorative and other work in order that the Arab tradition may be preserved.

23. In conclusion I desire to state that I appreciate warmly the cordiality and hospitality with which the High Commissioner and Mme. Ponsot received me and my party, and that I am very grateful to him and his officers for the trouble they took to enable us to visit many places of interest under very favourable conditions and for the readiness and frankness with which they replied to my enquiries on all matters in regard to which I sought information.

I have &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,
High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan

Enclosure 2 in No. 105

Voyage du Haut-Commissaire britannique du 18 au 24 Mars 1929

Sir J. Chancellor

Lady Chancellor

Lieutenant-Commander Archdale

Commandant de Maurepas
Capitaine Luras

Jour	M	N	A	R	S
Lundi 18 Mars.					
10 h.	11 h.	12 h.	13 h.	14 h.	15 h.
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19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30
31					
Mardi 19 Mars.					
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13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30
31					
Mercredi 20 Mars.					
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31					
Jeudi 21 Mars.					
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31					
Vendredi 22 Mars.					
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Samedi 23 Mars.					
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31					
Dimanche 24 Mars.					
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31					

Le 18 mars 1929

Enclosure 3 in No. 105

Mr. Amery to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J. Chancellor

Confidential "A")

Sir,

Downing Street, April 24 1929

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch confidential "D" of the 5th April containing an account of your recent official visit to M. Ponsot, High Commissioner of Syria and to inform you that I have read the report with much interest.

I have &c
I. S. AMERY

(E 2290 101 65)

No. 106

Consul-General Nisour to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received May 7.)

(N. 44 Confidential)

Sir,

Beirut, April 1 1929

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in the hope of some interest, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine relative to the cross-desert route to Bagdad. Sir John Chamberlain has sent me for my observations a copy of a memorandum from the High Commissioner for Palestine which should be made to develop the route from Beirut to Bagdad.

I have &c
(in the absence of the consul general)
R. ELISON ELISON

Enclosure in No. 106

Consul-General Nisour to High Commissioner for Palestine

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 16, 1929

WITH reference to your Excellency's confidential despatch No. 33 M. of the 13th March relative to overland communications between Palestine and Iraq, I have the honour to state that there can be no doubt that the French authorities have done their utmost to encourage similar communications between Syria and Iraq, and that their efforts have been crowned with very considerable success.

2. The practical demonstration of the possibility of trans-desert motor services between Beirut and Bagdad stands to the credit of Mr. Norman Nairn, who, with Mr. Palmer, then His Majesty's consul at Damascus, and Major McCallum, British Consul at Beirut, have done much to bring about the opening of the route without insuperable difficulties. The Nairn transport companies worked in the face of considerable difficulties, not least of which was the competition of other companies, either native or with a considerable native element in their composition. These enjoyed support from the French authorities which was not altogether wise, and was certainly fruitless, for, in the end, both of the companies which catered for what may be called the first-class traffic came, owing to bad management, to a bad end. Before the Kawntly Tawil Company's collapse the French had realised that Mr. Nairn's concern was the only one that was likely to succeed, and in the end the Nairn Transport Company became the Nairn Eastern Transport Company, an Anglo-French society registered in Cyprus.

3. Statistics, especially in this part of the world, are apt to be misleading, but there can be no doubt as to the rapid increase in the traffic over the desert route. While I cannot discuss in detail all the figures given by the Chamber of Commerce, I would wish to point out one obvious mistake. The number of cars registered in Syria

and the Lebanon combined is only about 4,000 and not 14,000. On the other hand, it may be of interest if I give some statistics obtained from French sources for the following figures:-

Passengers carried—	1927	1928
From Bagdad	5,829	10,000
To Bagdad	3,000	5,000
Goods carried—		
From Bagdad	1,000	2,000
To Bagdad	1,000	2,000
Postal matter carried		
From Bagdad	1,404	1,506
To Bagdad	3,021	3,073
Postal parcels—		
From Iraq	686	1,000
To Persia	503	1,000
Total	11,800	20,000

(not including parcels routed via Haifa-Damascus)

Number of Vehicles Crossing Desert

	1927	1928
From Bagdad	1,100 cars	1,100 cars
From Beirut	695 "	1,074 "
From Bagdad	97 lorries	103 lorries
From Beirut	192 "	420 "
Total	2,184	4,728

Even if allowance is made for some possible exaggerations born of enthusiasm, these figures are striking. In addition to the various "companies" so-called which operate the route, there are numerous individually owned cars which ply on it.

4. The French authorities long since realised that the creation of artificial boundaries resulting from territorial readjustments arising out of the great war was likely to do much harm to Syria, and especially to Beirut and Aleppo, which in Turkish times served districts now cut off from them. They therefore set about remedying the harm so far as was possible. It would take too long to describe the various measures adopted, but one of them was to foster so far as possible the transit trade with Iraq and Persia. They realised that the opening of the desert route would help them in this matter. They therefore, when the practicability of the route had been proved, gave all possible encouragement to those working it who seemed most likely of success. The Chamber of Commerce has correctly described the chief methods used to that end. The Customs transit agreement with Iraq, which was felt by both that country and by Syria to be to their mutual advantage, was originally made in 1925. In 1926 the routes available to goods in transit were extended so as to bring in Mosul, and when circumstances permit it seems likely that further routes which will enable the Nairn railway to be utilised for transit goods will be brought under the agreement. When that is done it is probable that the D.H.P. Railway Company will be ready to agree to the best of my belief no such special rate as yet exists.

5. I am not at all sure that any subsidies are being paid to the Nairn Company. I know that subsidies have been promised in the past, but I have not been able yet to ascertain from Mr. Nairn what has actually been done in fulfilment of these promises. On the other hand, it is certain that certain fiscal advantages have been granted to the Nairn and certain other concerns. Exemption from customs duty on cars, tyres, motor

taxes, petrol, oil and spare parts was granted to three companies, of which one, Kawady Tawil and Co. is no more, by decree 1,807. Of this a copy was sent by me to the Foreign Office in my despatch No. 181 of the 21st November, 1927, and a copy of that despatch was sent to Jerusalem. Recently, by the Lebanese Law of the 11th March, 1929, motor transport companies working between the Lebanon, Iraq and Persia, but not their employees, were exempted from the payment of the tax known as

the *taxe de transport*. I have always understood that one of the main reasons why the trans-desert route from Beirut has so developed is that the country behind Damascus is such as to give easy access to the desert. Interposed between the two cities are, of course, the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon with the intervening Hekas plain, but the road across the mountains is good as things go here, and should, when the asphaltting programme of the present year is carried out, be really excellent, so that the journey to Damascus should be an easy two and a half hours' run. In winter the road is sometimes blocked by snow for short periods, but it is unusual for it to be blocked for weeks as it was this year. Even so a longer and less good route round Mount Hermon and thence via Ruzeiza is available. From what I have heard the section of track in the lava country beyond Ainman is a very real hindrance to the "all-red" route of which the establishment is so desirable from every point of view. The Atman route has, so far as I know, only been used for trans-desert transport work in unusual circumstances such as during the Druze rebellion or the recent dispute between Iraq and Syria over the mail transport question. I have always heard it described as being extremely hard both on vehicles and their drivers. I have never met anyone who considered that it had been used with even some measure of success. The use of it was considered by the Nairn Company, at any rate, as a deplorable necessity. If a good road or track could be made through the lava belt that would be a real help to the development of the route.

7. In conclusion, I would state that it has never been the practice here to consider the protecting and policing of the desert route as intended to serve the interest of the mails alone. All cars, whatever they carry, are entitled and expected to make use of such protection as can be afforded.

I have, &c
(In the absence of the consul-general),
R. ELIDON ELLISON.

CHAPTER IV.—IRAQ.

N 6085 94 '66,

No

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleurbaey

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, January 12 1929

IN your Excellency's note of the 13th December last you renewed the representations which you had already made orally on the 1st December last in regard to the negotiations between the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Iraqi Government. While explaining that the French Government did not regard my note of the 26th November last on this subject as fully answering their previous enquiries, you requested, in particular, that the company should be dispensed from giving priority to the survey of a *tracé* from Bagdad to Haifa for the proposed railway and pipe line from Iraq to the Mediterranean.

2. This suggestion appears to imply that His Majesty's Government should now intervene with the Iraqi Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company, with a view to securing the cancellation of the draft letter to the Iraqi Government, the terms of which have now been agreed upon with the representatives of the company. His Majesty's Government regret that it is not possible for them to meet the wish of the French Government in this matter.

3. As you were informed in my note of the 26th November last the Turkish Petroleum Company, in the shape of the extension for five years of the period for the selection of its plots. The Iraqi Government were prepared to consider the extension of that period for two years on obtaining from the company, *inter alia*, an undertaking to survey the Bagdad-Haifa route during those two years with a view to the construction of a railway and a pipe-line.

4. The resolution respecting the terms on which this extension might be granted for the full period of five years. One of the principal conditions then laid down was that the company should, as part of the consideration for the grant of the final three years of the proposed extension, construct, or ensure the construction of, a railway line, not less than 1 metre in width, from Bagdad to Haifa, simultaneously with the construction of a pipe-line. All subsequent discussion regarding the terms of the extension has therefore proceeded on the assumption that these conditions must be fulfilled, and the Iraqi Government moreover, have never indicated their willingness to contemplate any other alignment for the proposed railway.

5. At the end of October the company, after further discussion of the question by its board, proposed that its undertaking to survey the Bagdad-Haifa route should be embodied, not in the formal agreement between the company and the Iraqi Government, but in a separate letter to be addressed to the Iraqi Government by the company. The original draft of the proposed letter, which gave no priority to the survey of the Bagdad-Haifa alignment over that of any other route, did not sufficiently guarantee that the Iraqi Government would, in fact, secure, in return for the grant of the two years' extension, the fulfilment of the condition on which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, they were prepared to consider accepting it. The Iraqi Government were clearly entitled, if they so wished, to obtain the guarantee for this particular survey as a condition of granting the two years' extension, and His Majesty's Government would not have been justified in urging them to accept a form of undertaking which did not comply with their requirements. The revised draft of the letter, of the terms of which you are aware, was put forward in order to meet this difficulty.

6. His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the San Remo Agreement imposes on them any obligation whatever to resist the requirements of the Iraqi Government. It falls solely within the competence of the Turkish Petroleum Company to decide whether the value of the two years' extension is sufficient to justify the expense demanded or whether it is financially desirable to construct a railway or indeed to construct any of the alternative railways, the construction of which appears to have been contemplated at the time when the San Remo Agreement was concluded, and it is consequently not for His Majesty's Government either to approve or disapprove the action of the Turkish Petroleum Company in the matter. But this fact does not in any way affect the right of the Iraqi Government

6. In conclusion, I take leave to invite your attention to the fact that there is nothing in the draft agreement between the Iraqi Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company, or in the draft letter from the company to the Iraqi Government which restricts the company in its right to select its plots to any particular point on the Mediterranean coast. The effect of the agreement is simply that, if the company decides not to exercise its option to construct the railway between Haifa and Bagdad, it will not be entitled to the further three years' extension of the time limit within which it may select its plots. The decision whether the further three years' extension of that time limit is of sufficient value to justify the expense of the construction of the railway will again be a matter for the Turkish Petroleum Company itself to decide.

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POLITICAL SURVEY OF IRAQ

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

During that period much has happened in Iraq. It has been a time of con-
siderable internal development. The Treaty of Commerce which regulates
our present relations with the Government of Iraq was accepted by the Iraqi
Parliament and the Government of the United States and became effective. The
long frontier dispute with Turkey, which at one time seemed likely to lead to open
conflict, was satisfactorily settled by the Treaty of Angora, and relations between
the two countries were established upon a friendly basis. The agreements concluded
with the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd for the preservation of peace on the desert
frontier have been less successful, but, with this exception, public security is
complete throughout Iraq.

There is, of course, a reverse side to the picture. Such rapid development could scarcely have been attained without temporary setbacks and occasional friction. Indeed, at the present moment Iraq is suffering from one of the recurrent periods of political tension. Our policy of ruling without governing in Iraq, of exercising control through an ostensibly independent native Government, is in the nature of an experiment. Iraq is still more than a geographical expression. The different races which inhabit the country have not yet been welded into a single Iraqi nation. A Kurd is still primarily a Kurd and only secondarily (if at all to his own mind) an Iraqi. The tribal confederations of the Euphrates admit no natural unity. The Arab hates and fears the Muslim, and the Shi'ah distrusts the Sunni, and until these traditional antagonisms have been subordinated to a spirit of patriotism the British Representative in Iraq must, as Sir H. Dobbs explains in this despatch, hold the scales even, and to do so must intervene in matters which

might otherwise properly be left to the discretion of the native government. In a
experience, such intervention is apt to be resented and to cause political friction.
This is unfortunate but meritable and I am satisfied that in order to maintain the
present rate of progress, and indeed to ensure the success of our experiment, some
measure of British supervision and control—thriftfully exercised and not unnecessarily
paraded—will remain necessary for some years to come.

L S A

February 7 1920

Enclosure in No. 148.

✓ r H Hobbs to W. A. Meru

The Stevedores

Baghdad, December 4, 1928

(Secret A)

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AS I shall before long leave Iraq it may be useful that I should place on record some account of the principles which have guided me in my attitude towards the measures and proposals of the Iraq Government, in so far as these principles have involved an apparent departure from or a development of the principles laid down for my guidance in the Duke of Devonshire's despatch, Confidential B, dated the 20th September 1923.

2. In paragraph 4 of his despatch, the Duke of Devonshire stated that the four most important principles were

- (1) That the interests of foreigners should be adequately protected
- (2) That the financial interests of His Britannic Majesty's Government should be guarded.
- (3) That the best use should be made of the resources of the country.
- (4) That the Administration should conform generally to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government

In view of the employment by Iraq of a number of British officials, His Britannic Majesty's Government were prepared to leave the fulfilment of the third and fourth of these principles to the Iraq Administration and they declared that they did not propose to criticise in detail or to endeavour to influence in detail the financial or administrative arrangements of the Iraq Government, provided that the Treaty and its subsidiary Agreements were duly observed. At the same time they stated (paragraph 6) that they had no desire to hamper or restrict the exercise of a reasonable discretion by the High Commissioner.

3. Other duties laid upon the High Commissioner were that he should report to His Britannic Majesty's Government all political and constitutional developments in Iraq, so that they might form an opinion of the extent to which she was fit herself for full membership of the League of Nations, that he should advise the Secretary of State on the Commission's views on the proposed constitution of the Government, and that he should advise the Secretary of State on the Commission's views on the proposed constitution of the Government, and that he should advise the Secretary of State on the Commission's views on the proposed constitution of the Government.

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received and enquired (from the Ministries concerned) into petitions regard-
alleged administrative injustice or judicial obliquity and have closely watched and
guided the treatment by the Iraq Government of tribal feuds and quarrels. I have,
in spite of Section 4 of the Administrative Inspectorate Regulations, opposed the
transfer of the headquarters of Administrative Inspectors to Baghdad and insisted
that they shall be allotted to and reside in specific districts. I have further as His
Britannic Majesty's Government know, aroused considerable resentment by
expressing dissent from the plans of the Iraq Government for conscription. These
actions have contributed to cause an impression among many of the Iraqi politicians,
and perhaps in other quarters, that I have attempted to keep Iraq too much in
leading strings.

5 The apparent deviations from the principles laid down for my guidance can
be explained in the one word "security." I have constantly brought to the notice
of His Britannic Majesty's Government that the influential politicians of Iraq are
imbued with the ideas of the townsmen, between whom and the countrymen a great
gulf is fixed. Even the present Prime Minister, Abdul Muhsin Beg, though of tribal
origin, has become by education in Constantinople infected with the townsmen's
ideas and nothing is more abhorrent to him than the authority of the Shariks or
the yielding to tribal. . . . of the representative system done much to restore the balance . . .
pressure has resulted in the election of townee representatives even in purely tribal
districts. As giving an example of this tendency I may recall my despatch Secret B,
dated the 16th June, 1924 with which I forwarded a report by the Administrative
Inspector of Kut to the effect that the "carpet-bagger" delegate of that district
was diametrically opposed to his constituents in his advocacy of conscription.

6 In most countries such an opposition between town and country though
resulting in an unwarrantable over-representation of the towns, might not be
seriously dangerous. It might indeed have beneficial aspects, since the ideas of the
town are more civilised than those of the country. Nor is it wise to underestimate the
influence which the educated townsman can exert upon the countryman who, however
not to be . . . But Iraq is peculiar in three respects. First the countrymen including the
inhabitants of the villages, are almost all tribal unlike the cultivators of Egypt
or India or even of Persia with its mass of non tribal peasants in the centre and a
fairly broad tribal fringe. In this respect I doubt whether the conditions of any
other country in the world even of Afghanistan resemble those of Iraq. Moreover,
as a result of the war and the quantity of rifles and ammunition dispersed during
and immediately after it, the country districts are crisscrossed with arms which have
hitherto been only slightly controlled. Secondly the countrymen throughout the
southern half of Iraq are Shi'as and divided by sectarian differences from the ruling
Sunni Arab clique in Baghdad while in the northern half a large proportion are
similarly divided from the ruling Arab clique by racial differences, being Kurds,
Turcoman or Yezidis. Thus to the natural alienation of the tribal countryman from the
townee is added the special alienation either of religion or of race. Thirdly, the prestige

opposition from the tribes, without the help of the British forces and of British
moral backing. In Persia the name of the Shah even when borne by a usurper
spreads traditional terror. In Turkey and Nejd the rulers rule by their own
personality and strength of conquest. The King of Afghanistan has both tradition
and strength on his side. But King Faisal is a foreigner imported by the British
and has had no time to strike roots. The Iraq Army has seen only a few trifling
hill skirmishes and has no reputation in the country. There is little affection for or
awe of the Crown no national consciousness outside the schools of Baghdad and
Mosul and no respect for the courtiers or for the politicians. The strength of the
Administration rests almost solely on the knowledge of British support and control
and on the fear inspired by British aeroplanes and armoured cars in the plains and
by the Assyrian Levies helped by British aeroplanes in the Kurdish hills. The
Police force is indeed efficient and feared, because British control over it has never
really been relaxed. If the Royal Air Force were to be withdrawn, but the British
alliance and British powers of inspection and remonstrance remained, the Iraq
administration (though badly crippled) might survive, because the people would
expect the re-entry of British forces on emergency. If both disappeared, the Govern-
ment of Iraq would I believe, in a few months, either vanish altogether or remain
clinging desperately to a strip of territory along the Tigris between Samarra and
Kut the whole of the rest of the country falling away.

7 Thus, although the existing state of security is complete and unprecedented,
it rests on a precarious base and quite as much on British reputation and British
reserve power outside the country as on the British forces actually present. If the
already suspicious Shi'ah or Kurdish tribesmen were to feel that British policy
towards them was being dragged at the heels of the anti-tribal Baghdad politicians
and that there was no power in the land inclined to notice their complaints, scattered
and spasmodic risings would soon begin which, unless quickly suppressed, would
result in general disorder. It is unlikely that the Iraq forces, whether military or
police, would be mobile enough to deal with such risings, and the Royal Air Force
would have to take action to prevent the whole administration collapsing. In the
end, British public opinion would be shocked by the sight of British aeroplanes
bombing the tribesmen of the Euphrates or Kurdistan to enforce tyrannical or
mistaken decrees hatched amid the intrigues of the Baghdad coffee shops or conceived
by citizen pedants.

8 Against such a misfortune His Britannic Majesty's Government have some
guarantee in the last sentence of Article VIII of the Military Agreement, which reads
as follows:—

"The Iraq Government shall not be entitled to the assistance of any forces
maintained or controlled by His Britannic Majesty's Government against or for
the suppression of any external aggression or any civil disturbance or armed
rising which shall, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, have been provoked
or occasioned by action taken or policy pursued by the Iraq Government, or
to the advice or express wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government."

Upon this provision I have based my policy of supervision in administrative, and
matters the theoretically admirable policy of allowing a child to learn by its mistakes,
since the mistakes would involve not only the well being of thousands of human
beings, but also the reputation of the British Government. Nor is it possible merely
to utter mild generalities, axioms and warnings, to watch them being disregarded
and in the end to say, when a rising occurs, "I told you so. Now you must get out
of the difficulty without my help." For the rising might destroy the whole land. I
have, therefore, frequently found myself forced to intervene in details and to nip
the beginnings of policies or even of isolated plans of action which I thought likely to
create active discontent.

9 After this explanation I may perhaps be permitted to dwell upon what I
believe to be the most vital points. These are the retention of British Administrative
Inspectorate in Baghdad, the retention of British Administrative Inspectors in the
districts, the retention of British Administrative Inspectors in the districts, the retention
of the special régime in the Kurdish districts, for which the Council of the League of
Nations stipulated when awarding to Iraq the Province of Mosul. The dominant
Iraqis dislike all four of these policies.

10 The Administrative Inspectorate Regulations had been settled before I
"Headquarters of Administrative Inspectors will be Baghdad. They will be detailed
fit." To me it is evident, that a British officer living and working in Baghdad and
sent out intermittently on roving missions of inspection, now to one district and now
to another, could neither intervene early enough to prevent mistakes and injustice,
nor have sufficient knowledge of local events and feelings to enable him to report, for
the High Commissioner's information, whether the use of British forces were
justified for the suppression of disturbance. The result of the centralization of
Administrative Inspectors in Baghdad would be either that the High Commissioner
would, when a question of employing British forces arose, have to depend on
information derived from the British Special Service or Intelligence Officers working
under Air Headquarters, who are imperfectly acquainted with administrative
details, or that he would have to refuse to take action before an Administrative
Inspector had gone to the spot, made an elaborate enquiry and satisfied himself that
officials. It would be out of the question to allow local Mutasarrifs or Qaimmaqams
to invoke the swift and terrible help of the Royal Air Force at their pleasure. It is
even now notorious that minor Iraqi officials sometimes, without authority and
contrary to orders, threaten the tribesmen with air action and so enforce their orders.

But if it were known that Mutasarrifs could, without giving an opportunity to locally-experienced British officials to intervene, first get themselves into difficulty by unjust acts and then suppress the difficulty by British bombs, the tyrannv would be complete and justified odium would fall upon the British name.

11 On the Tribal Disputes Regulation I have often written. To its operations I ascribe in very large measure the security now reigning in the Provinces. In Turkish times, when the regular judicial courts tried all offences and took no notice of tribal custom, tribesmen who had committed themselves

themselves to the law of the land were not punished. The Regulation imposes

themselves to the law of the land. The Regulation imposes. But the politicians and lawyers detest this Regulation, which they consider uncivilised, and had it not been for my opposition, it would long ago have been abolished, with, I believe, results fatal to internal peace.

12 As to conscription, the attitude of His Britannic Majesty's Government and myself has, in spite of all discussion which has taken place, been constantly misunderstood. I have never denied that Iraq could by conscription obtain the armv which many of her politicians desire more cheaply (by about £150,000 per annum, than under the voluntary system. But I have maintained that in the present state of tribal feeling the enforcement of conscription would cause such widespread risings and require such large forces that it would cost far more than the savings which it might theoretically make possible. It is idle to point to Turkey, where the Anatolian peasant is utterly submissive and accustomed to conscription, or to Persia, where

beginning of conscription has just been made in the towns and has caused no resentment, but as yet no rebellion. Iraq as I have already insisted is unique in the predominance of her tribes. The Turks when in Iraq could never enforce conscription except in a few towns and settled villages, and against the Turks the Kurds held no such feelings as they hold against the Arabs. The only results of conscription in Iraq would be its effective application to a few towns and some tracts along the Tigris, the flight of the able bodied men from those tracts into the tribal districts and unrest among the tribes, such as was recently caused even in the Basra district by the operations of the Census Law, which were looked on as a prelude to

Government that they are at liberty to introduce conscription if they can put it into effect by their own forces, but that they must not count on the help of British forces.

the politicians, who accuse Great Britain of trying to keep the Iraq Army weak and of inciting the tribes to resist conscription. No other course was, however, open to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

13. The question of the maintenance of a special régime in the Kurdish districts needs no long discussion. It is a clear obligation towards the League of Nations on the part of both the British and Iraq Governments, and no other régime would abate the traditional dislike of the Kurd for the Arab and secure the retention of the Kurdish tracts in Iraq. Even Turkey and Persia, which had at first hoped to suppress the Kurdish spirit by force, have now been compelled to adopt much the same policy as has been followed in Iraq. If the Kurdish tracts were to get out of hand the Kurds of the foothills would harry all the northern plains and the main line of communications through Kirkuk and Arbil to Mosul would become untenable. The Arab politicians, however, believe that they could hold the Kurdish hills by their own force, and they have greatly disliked my insistence on the rule that officials in the Kurdish districts shall, where possible, be Kurds. I fear that, if Arab concert were ever given its head, South Kurdistan would be lost to them for ever, and a grave blow would be struck at the security and prosperity of Iraq. The oil industry, with all its promise, would certainly become impracticable.

14. Intervention on the lines sketched above has, of course, its disadvantages. The Iraqi nationalists and extremists are inclined to allege that the policy of the High Commissioner has been to divide and rule, and that he has himself fostered communalism and accentuated the differences between Sunni and Shi'ah, citizen and tribesman, Arab and Kurd. A similar accusation against the British with regard to Hindu Moslem differences is a commonplace Indian political argument, and is

equally without foundation. This spite of truth, however, does reside in the nationalist argument, that the presence in any country of an impartial power, attempting to hold the scales even and to prevent the violent domination of one section of the people by another must *ipso facto* retard the attainment of equilibrium (even if it be the equilibrium of chaos). It has been alleged also that the High Commissioner in upholding the tribal system has been attempting to bolster up a dangerous anachronism. In this the critics are mistaken. I recognise that the tribal system must and should in the end disintegrate and make way for the more civilised individualistic system. But the disintegration, if it is to be safe, must be automatic and gradual, timed to allow the Government to substitute their own for the tribal machinery. In holding back the Bagdad politicians from their assaults upon the

15. Finally, I feel that I must meet the criticism that I should have left the British officials of the Iraq Government to intervene in matters such as I have mentioned, and that I ought to have followed more closely the pronouncement of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, in view of the employment of a number of British officials they did not propose to influence in detail the administrative arrangements of the Iraq Government. To this my reply is that the British advisory system does not produce a predominant partner. Each of the principal advisers is an expert in his own line acknowledging subordination only to his own Minister. Thus if the British Adviser to the Ministry of Justice dislikes the Tribal Disputes Regulation the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior cannot restrain his attacks upon it, nor can the Adviser to the Interior restrain the Adviser to Finance from undermining the tribal tenure of land. The Prime Minister should, of course, hold the balance and come to a decision between the conflicting views of his British experts, but few have been permitted to do so. In the end, when there is a conflict of British expert opinion, it is usually the High Commissioner who has to make the real decision.

16. In conclusion, I must apologise for the length of this despatch which has greatly outgrown the limits which I had intended to set for it.

I have &c

H DOBBS

High Commissioner for Iraq

E 751 245 931

No. 109

Foreign Office to Secretary-General of League of Nations

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 18, 1929

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that he will be grateful if you will cause the following item to be placed on the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations at the session due to begin on the 4th March next —

"Iraq. Proposal by the British representative to move the Council to the 25th March, 1924, and the institution of a uniform system of justice in its place, and to authorise His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prepare, for submission to the Council

2. A memorandum, setting forth the motives and intentions of His Majesty's Government in making this proposal, is enclosed herein for the information of the members of the Council.

I am, &c

MONTAGU R

Memorandum

THE Judicial Agreement of 1922, article 9 of the Annex to the Agreement, provides that the British Government in Iraq shall have the right to appoint judges and officers, either sitting in the courts or acting as arbitrators, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that the British Government shall have the right to appoint judges and officers, either sitting in the courts or acting as arbitrators, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that the British Government shall have the right to appoint judges and officers, either sitting in the courts or acting as arbitrators, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.

The system prescribed by the Judicial Agreement has proved generally satisfactory. It has, however, led to at least one serious anomaly. Under the present arrangements the nationals of certain foreign States receive treatment more favourable than that accorded to the nationals of other foreign States. This discrimination is based on a principle which might justify the distinction, namely, the stage of political development reached by the States in question. Indeed, it might be contended that the criterion adopted, namely, whether or not capitulatory privileges were voluntarily renounced before a given date, was both reasonable and just. The British Government has suggested special judicial privileges in Iraq. German, Czechoslovak, Swiss, Turkish and Persian nationals have not been accorded those privileges.

3. This anomalous state of affairs has given rise to considerable resentment which is not confined to the foreign States which are excluded from the special judicial privileges, but is felt generally by Iraqis who resent the more favourable judicial treatment accorded to certain foreigners and the reflection on the existing area.

4. It is suggested that the British Government should consider the possibility of extending the benefits of the Judicial Agreement to all foreign nationals in Iraq, but this solution is not practicable. Not only would such a course be extremely distasteful to Iraqis, but it would also be anachronous and derogatory, but, owing to the large number of foreign (and in particular Persian) nationals in Iraq, it would be a serious obstacle to the economic development of the country.

5. It might be thought that this difficulty could be overcome by extending the benefits of the Judicial Agreement to all foreign nationals in Iraq, but this solution is not practicable. Not only would such a course be extremely distasteful to Iraqis, but it would also be anachronous and derogatory, but, owing to the large number of foreign (and in particular Persian) nationals in Iraq, it would be a serious obstacle to the economic development of the country.

6. Although the Treaty concluded between Great Britain and Iraq on the 14th December, 1927 contained provision for the maintenance in force of the Judicial Agreement, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have, since that Treaty was signed, been engaged in considering the possibility of the gradual abolition of the Judicial Agreement and of replacing the existing judicial arrangements in Iraq by a system of equal justice for all, Iraqis

and foreigners alike. Such a change would remove the anomalies mentioned above, and by doing so would serve to promote good relations between Iraq and her neighbours.

7. As a result of preliminary investigations, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that it would be possible to introduce such changes in the existing Judicial arrangements in Iraq as would ensure the administration of justice in a manner fully adequate to the needs of all persons in Iraq, whether Iraqis or foreigners, without need for differentiation and without imposing too great a burden upon the financial resources of Iraq. They realise that the Judicial Agreement cannot be abrogated without the prior consent of the Council of the League, and consequently that no useful purpose would be served by entering into detailed discussions with the Iraqi Government in regard to the strengthening of the British Judiciary and the revision of the Municipal Law of Iraq unless it is known that in doing so, they have the approval in principle of the Council. If however the Council are prepared to approve the present proposal in principle His Majesty's Government will at once proceed to elaborate in consultation with the Iraqi Government, the details of the new organisation and arrangements which will be necessary, and will in due course submit the results to the Council for their approval.

8. The Iraqi Government have already intimated that, if the Judicial Agreement is abrogated, they will be willing to increase the number of British judicial officers in Iraq and to employ those officers on long term contracts with a view to ensuring the maintenance of the judicial arrangements in Iraq at a satisfactory standard of efficiency.

9. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have accordingly decided to prepare a proposal to abrogate the Judicial Agreement between Great Britain and Iraq, and to authorise His Majesty's Government to prepare, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, detailed proposals for the establishment of a uniform system of justice to be applied to all persons in Iraq without discrimination on the understanding that such proposals will be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval. It is suggested that the British Government should consider the possibility of extending the benefits of the Judicial Agreement to all foreign nationals in Iraq, but this solution is not practicable.

E 1166 245 93

No. 110

Consul London to Sir R. Lindsay—(Received March 6,

(No 5)

(Telegraphic) P

General, March 5, 1929

MESSAGE for Sir R. Lindsay from Sir Austen Chamberlain—

'Abolition of Capitulations in Iraq.

Owing to difficulties in the negotiations with Signor Scialoja, it will unfortunately be necessary to allow the question to stand over till June session if we are to avoid a definite refusal now which would prejudice our case in future.

The reason for the Italian Government's attitude is that they believe there was a special agreement made between us and them by exchange of notes in 1925. I have no copy of these and cannot recall the circumstances, but I cannot think they were intended to create, or did, in fact, create, any special position for Italy or Italians. I shall therefore be glad to receive the fullest information on this point, though I am afraid that, even so, we shall be unable to put the matter straight during the present session of the Council. I shall also be glad if you will ascertain for me from the Colonial Office the number of cases in each of the years since 1924 in which Italian nationals have been involved.

(Secret)

I desire this information for Signor Scialoja, who is disposed to be helpful."

Transmitted London to Sir R. Lyndray (Received March 11)

By Box

No 20. I.N.

(Telegraphic) Extract

General March 9 1929

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cudogian

Council session ended this morning. Following is brief summary of this morning's proceedings.

3. *Proposed Abolition of Iraq Judicial Agreement.*—Council agreed to report from Finnish representative to the effect that Council saw no reason to refuse the general authorisation asked for but did not lose sight of fact that change of system on lines proposed presupposed that States enjoying privileges would be in the interests of Iraq herself, and that His Majesty's Government, if they advised the Iraqi Government to agree to an extension on suitable terms, would thus not be open to criticism on the part of the Permanent Mandates Commission or of other Governments.

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E 1487 62 93

No 112

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris)

No 786.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 27 1929

IN my despatch No 131 of the 15th January I enclosed a copy of my note of the 12th January to the French Ambassador respecting the representations made by the French Government in connexion with a proposed new contract between the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Iraqi Government. Your Excellency subsequently informed me of the personal representations made to you on this subject by M. Berthelot, and forwarded to me a copy of a memorandum dated the 23rd January which you had received from him, commenting upon that note.

2. Since the receipt of M. Berthelot's memorandum, the whole position has been reviewed, and the complaints of the French Government regarding the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter have been subjected to careful examination. These complaints are in the main as follows:—

- (1.) That the Iraqi Government have never demanded that the terminus of the proposed railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean should be at Haifa.
- (2.) That His Majesty's Government have intervened in order to secure that the grant of the extension of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession should be conditional upon a survey for a railway being made to Haifa in priority to other Mediterranean ports.
- (3.) That whether it be the Iraqi Government or the British Government who have insisted on this condition, it is, in any event, contrary to the San Remo Agreement to impose upon the company expenses which are, in fact, of a political nature.
- (4.) That the company should be permitted to withdraw the draft letter relative to the survey of the route to Haifa, and should be given to understand that it is at liberty to carry on its negotiations on a purely economic basis.

3. The suggestion of the French Government amounts in fact to this:—That His Majesty's Government have made use of the negotiation between the Iraqi Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company in order to induce or compel the company to undertake a survey of a railway line and possibly the construction of a railway of Iraq. When, however, the course of the negotiations for the extension of the Turkish Petroleum Company concession is examined, I believe that it can be

conclusively shown that the French Government are under a misapprehension on this point.

4. The original agreement of 1925 between the Iraqi Government and the company (as later modified) provided that the company must select its twenty-four plots, in effect, to obtain an extension of the period within which the selection of its plots would be in the interests of Iraq herself, and that His Majesty's Government, if they advised the Iraqi Government to agree to an extension on suitable terms, would thus not be open to criticism on the part of the Permanent Mandates Commission or of other Governments.

5. In pursuance of this decision, the High Commissioner for Iraq was authorised to offer to the Turkish Petroleum Company an extension for a period of five years provided that (a) the company should place an order definitely for the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean without waiting until its plots had been finally selected, and to begin the construction of a pipe-line at the earliest date possible.

6. It will be observed that the conditions on which His Majesty's Government were at this time prepared to recommend the extension of the concession contained no reference to the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean.

7. Immediately subsequent to the despatch of these instructions, negotiations took place between Sir A. Ritchie, on behalf of the Turkish Petroleum Company, and the Iraqi Government. An agreement between the parties was reached for the grant of the five years' extension on the conditions indicated above, and on the 1st May, 1928, the Iraqi Council of Ministers passed a resolution approving a draft agreement for that purpose authorising the appropriate Minister to sign, and after signature, to prepare a draft law for the submission of the agreement to Parliament. In the meantime, however, events had occurred which induced King Faisal to withhold his consent from this resolution:—these events were as follows:—

The British Oil Development Company entered the field in search of oil concessions in Iraq, and he as an inducement to the Iraqi Government the prospect of an undertaking to construct, without subsidy or financial guarantee from that Government, a railway from Bagdad to Haifa. It was impossible both to grant the extension asked for by the Turkish Petroleum Company and to satisfy the British Oil Development Company.

The Iraqi Government were therefore faced with two incompatible demands, of which that of the British Oil Development Company seemed to them decidedly the more attractive. The High Commissioner telegraphing on the 28th April, stated that he foresaw that if it became known in Iraq that a second powerful group had entered into competition with the Turkish Petroleum Company and was ready to take up immediately areas outside that company's twenty-four plots, the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Parliament would conclude that it was in their best interests to refuse the extension requested by the Turkish Petroleum Company and all chance of Parliament's accepting it would disappear.

A representative of the British Oil Development Company had received instructions to deliver to King Faisal a letter informing him that Lord Wester Wemyss, on behalf of the group, was leaving for Bagdad at once to lay before the Iraqi Government

of a railway to the Mediterranean. Sir H. Dobbs anticipated that this letter would cause the King to suspend his consent to the resolution passed by the Council of Ministers on the 1st May, and, as mentioned above, the letter had in fact the effect anticipated by the High Commissioner. On the 15th May the High Commissioner reported that the Iraqi Prime Minister had received particulars of the offer of the British Oil Development Company to construct a railway from Bagdad to Haifa in

return for the grant of oil concessions, and that the King was of opinion that, once approval for the revised agreement with the Turkish Petroleum Company. On the following day instructions were telegraphed to Sir H. Dobbs to the effect that His Majesty's Government did not regard the fact that a rival group had a

the question of the extension to be granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company. The High Commissioner was accordingly to press the King to approve of the revised articles providing for the extension being submitted to Parliament for the necessary sanction without delay. Sir H. Dobbs immediately interviewed the King and reported the result in a telegram dated the 17th May. At this interview the King said that he cared little about the oil question in comparison with that of the construction of a railway to Haifa, and Sir H. Dobbs was unable to induce him to change his attitude as regards the submission to Parliament of the proposed agreement with the Turkish Petroleum Company.

9. In the meantime, the Turkish Petroleum Company had learnt from its representative in Bagdad of the change of attitude on the part of the Iraqi Government and of the intervention of the British Oil Development Company, and, no doubt in consequence of these reports, sent Sir A. Ritchie again to Bagdad to ascertain and report on the position. According to a telegram from the High Commissioner dated the 6th July Sir A. Ritchie discussed the matter with the King and the Prime Minister, and as a result informed the company that such strong public feeling in Bagdad about the necessity for the Haifa Railway that he recommended the company to give a definite assurance that if it constructed a pipe-line to the Mediterranean it would by some means or other, simultaneously arrange for the construction of a railway.

10. From the foregoing outline of events it is clear that (a) the association of the question of a railway from Bagdad to Haifa with that of oil development in the country was not the result of the intervention of the British Oil Development Company, or with the Iraqi Government but was the direct result of the intervention of the British Oil Development Company, (b) that even after the intervention of the British Oil Development Company, with its offer of a railway to Haifa, His Majesty's Government continued to press the Iraqi Government to approve the Turkish Petroleum Company's application, although it contained no such offer, and (c) that the suggestion that a somewhat similar offer should be made by the Turkish Petroleum Company originated not with His Majesty's Government, but with the company's own representative, after he had learnt by personal experience in Iraq the strength of local feeling in favour of a railway to Haifa.

11. The position was considered by the Turkish Petroleum Company, and on the 16th July Sir A. Ritchie submitted the company's new proposals to the Iraqi Government. The relevant portion of the company's proposal was reported by the High Commissioner as follows: "To assist with others in securing a guarantee for the construction of a transdesert railway from Bagdad to Haifa free of all cost to the Iraqi Government, but with an option to the Iraqi Government to take up shares. Further, my company will endeavour to do its utmost to promote an arrangement with others which will ensure that the construction of the railway will be undertaken simultaneously with the construction of the pipe line, should the construction of the pipe line be decided."

12. The Iraqi Government definitely rejected the Turkish Petroleum Company's proposals as being too indefinite to secure parliamentary support.

13. As a result of further efforts by Sir Adam Ritchie, the Iraqi Prime Minister promised him on the 26th July that the Iraqi Government would attempt to obtain parliamentary acceptance of the company's offer. On the following day, however, the Prime Minister consulted his party, who refused to endorse this programme. In the meantime a possible compromise had been suggested by the British Adviser to the Ministry of Communications and Works. This proposal was that the Iraqi Government might grant the Turkish Petroleum Company an extension for a year or eighteen months in the first instance, with a proviso that, if the company should produce within that period a binding undertaking that the railway to Haifa would be constructed simultaneously with the pipe line and without any guarantee or assistance from Iraq or His Majesty's Government, then the period would be extended. The Turkish Petroleum Company's offer, fell back upon parliamentary support for the Turkish Petroleum Company's offer, fell back upon the British adviser's proposal. This proposal was reported by Sir Adam

Ritchie to the company, who, on the 1st August, authorised him to inform the Iraqi Government that the Turkish Petroleum Company was prepared—

- (a) To make at once a survey for a pipe-line and railway to the Mediterranean,
- (b) To examine the railway project in all its aspects, including discussion with other Governments interested with a view to a guarantee by the Turkish Petroleum Company, provided that the Iraqi Government—

- (1) Would allow two years for this work, and
- (2) If mutually satisfactory terms could be arranged during the said period of two years, would undertake to grant the railway concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company or its nominees, and
- (3) Would extend the time limit under the existing concession during the said two years' examination, and if agreement on the above lines were reached, thereafter grant the balance of the five years' extension already promised.

14. The High Commissioner for Iraq was instructed on the 2nd August to do his utmost to induce the Iraqi Government to accept this proposal, which was practically identical with that suggested by the adviser to the Minister of Communications and Works. After making this offer to the Iraqi Government, Sir A. Ritchie returned to Bagdad, and the proposal was put in the hands of the company's local representative, Mr. Bull. On the 18th August the Iraqi Cabinet considered Sir A. Ritchie's offer, and passed a resolution approving the grant of the extension, on condition (*inter alia*) that the company undertook to construct, or ensure the construction of, a railway from Bagdad to Haifa. As a result of Mr. Bull's negotiations, a revised draft agreement, embodying the terms of the offer, was approved by the Minister of Communications and Works and by Mr. Bull. It will be seen that it committed the company, in return for the grant of a two-year

extension, to take the construction of the railway simultaneously with the construction of the pipe line, the company would be given a further three year extension.

15. The agreement had been accepted by Mr. Bull on behalf of the Turkish Petroleum Company in a letter dated the 8th September, on the 8th September the Iraqi Council had recently arrived in Iraq as the representative of the Turkish Petroleum Company had been instructed to submit a revised draft. This draft differed in that Haifa was only mentioned in it as one among other possible Mediterranean terminals of the railway and pipe line, and all reference to the question of construction of the railway simultaneously with that of the pipe line was excluded. The High Commissioner added that he did not think there was any prospect of these revised proposals being accepted by the Iraqi Government.

16. The opinion of Sir Henry Dobbs on this point was conveyed to the Turkish Petroleum Company, and on the 26th October a further revised draft was presented by a representative of the company to the Colonial Office. This new draft, although conceding certain of the Iraqi Government's objections on points of comparative unimportance, left the article in regard to the survey of the railway to the Mediterranean as indefinite as in that put forward by Mr. Skirrow. The article in question read as follows:—

Article 2—In consideration of the grant of extensions and permission to exchange plots set out in article 1 *hereof* the company agrees (c) Having already surveyed a route for the pipe-line contemplated in the said article 5, to commence forthwith on the confirmation of this agreement under article 7 below, a survey of the line of a railway of not less than 1 metre gauge from Bagdad to the Mediterranean coast, including Haifa (hereinafter called the Bagdad-Mediterranean Railway)."

17. In the course of the negotiations which had taken place at Bagdad as described above, it was clear that there was little prospect of the Iraqi Government accepting any agreement which did not specifically bind the company to carry out the survey of the route of a railway to Haifa, and subsequently to submit a detailed project for the construction of such a railway. This was pointed out to the repre-

representatives of the company, and it was suggested that a possible solution might be found in so revising article 2 (c) of the revised draft (quoted above) as to make it clear that the question of the route for the pipe-line or pipe-lines did not necessarily depend upon the route to be followed by the trans-desert railway. The following revised draft of the article was suggested for submission to the board of the company —

In addition to the survey of the routes for the pipe-line or pipe-lines from Haifa to the Mediterranean Sea, the survey shall commence forthwith, on the confirmation of this agreement under article 7 below, a survey of the line of a railway of not less than 1 metre gauge from Bagdad to Haifa, hereinafter called the Bagdad Mediterranean Railway.

16. On the 31st October the Turkish Petroleum Company informed the Colonial Office that at the meeting held on the 30th October the board had accepted the proposed extension of the concession to the Haifa route. The board had, however, agreed to the survey of the railway from Bagdad to Haifa, and proposed to submit the results of the survey to the Iraqi Government. This, it was suggested, would have the same practical result as the mention of Haifa in the agreement itself. In reply to this suggestion it was decided that His Majesty's Government would be justified in pressing the Iraqi Government to accept the extension of the concession to the Haifa route, should be contained in a letter, provided that the wording of that letter were so modified as to be not less binding on the Turkish Petroleum Company in the matter of Haifa than the express mention of that port in the text of the agreement would be. The revised draft letter was submitted by Mr Skirrow to the Iraqi Government on the 9th and 10th November, 1928, respectively, but the Government resigned before any decision had been taken on the matter.

17. In order to complete this account of a

Haifa as its western terminal. Almost simultaneously with the presentation of his report, the French group in the Turkish Petroleum Company, who had been shown a copy of the report in draft by a French member of the survey party, presented a report produced by an eminent French hydrographer and designed to throw doubt upon the data upon which Major Holt had based his favourable conclusions. The report contained reduced data which in Major Holt's opinion, based upon the meteorological records in this country and in Palestine, greatly exaggerated the frequency of unfavourable winds at Haifa. Major Holt returned to the charge with a counter-memoirandum throwing doubt upon the figures adduced by the French expert, and showing that both on the ground of prevailing winds and other considerations, Haifa was definitely preferable to Tripoli, which the French expert had recommended as possessing greater advantages as a port. Both these reports, it is understood, were

submitted to the Turkish Petroleum Company to investigate the suitability of the Port of Tripoli as the Mediterranean terminal of the pipe-line. The information contained in this and the preceding paragraph was furnished to His Majesty's Government in confidence, and should therefore not be mentioned to the French Government.

18. From this summary of the course of the negotiations, and from the copies of the correspondence annexed* to this despatch, it will I think be clear to your Excellency that the French Government are labouring under a misunderstanding in their belief that political pressure has been exerted by His Majesty's Government on the Iraqi Government in order to induce them to insist on the Haifa alignment for the pipe-line and railway as one of the conditions of the extension of the Turkish

Petroleum Company's concession. The facts show that no such condition was suggested by any of the parties concerned when the extension of the concession was first discussed, and had it not been for the intervention of the British Oil Development Company there can be little doubt that the two questions would never have been connected. The result of that intervention was, however, to induce the Iraqi Government spontaneously to impose the survey of the Haifa route and the eventual construction of a railway as the conditions on which they were prepared to extend the company's concession for the two periods of two and three years respectively. His Majesty's Government consider that the Iraqi Government are within their rights in imposing these conditions.

19. As regards the argument that the proposed arrangement between the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Iraqi Government is contrary to the spirit of the San Remo Agreement, I gather that the French Government do not desire to contend that that instrument necessitates the construction of the pipe line and trans-desert railway (if built) to a Syrian port. Such a contention would indeed be contrary to the clear stipulations of the agreement, which simply provides that, in

Government in certain oil supplies, that Government shall give facilities, if desired, for the construction of railways and pipe-lines through French spheres of influence to the Mediterranean. While this interpretation of the agreement cannot I think,

be maintained, it is not the basis of the proposed arrangement in regard to the survey of a railway line to Haifa, and the possible future construction of a railway to that port by the Turkish Petroleum Company as contrary to the spirit of the San Remo Agreement, in that the company would, in effect, be obliged for political reasons, to incur an unwarrantable and unnecessary

The reply to this objection appears to be clear. As indicated above the French Government were at first disposed to grant the extension desired by the Turkish Petroleum Company on terms which contained no reference to any railway surveys or

proposals made by the representatives of that company led the Iraqi Government to revise their views of the value of the concession which they were proposing to grant, and also led, as already described, to the inter-connection of the oil and railway questions. It is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, for the Turkish Petroleum Company to decide whether the consideration now asked by the Iraqi Government in return for the extension of the concession is excessive.

20. I now turn to the definite request made by the French Government, i.e., the withdrawal of the company's revised letter to the Iraqi Government the draft of which was communicated officially to the latter on the 10th November, 1928. The circumstances in which this revised draft was produced have already been discussed and I do not propose to enter at length into this aspect of the matter. His Majesty's Government, while not admitting the validity of the criticism which the French Government have directed against their action, are, nevertheless, fully prepared to acquiesce in the view that it is for the Iraqi Government to decide whether they insist upon the letter containing the assurance in regard to the survey of the Haifa route being drawn up in the terms of the revised draft or otherwise. Your Excellency should therefore make it clear to M. Berthelot that the company is perfectly free to withdraw the letter and that His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to this course. It should, however, be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government

do not think it *quid pro quo* as that Government may think desirable in their own interest. His Majesty's Government will, that is to say, put no pressure on the Iraqi Government either to maintain or to withdraw the particular condition in regard to the survey of the Haifa route to which exception has been taken, and can give no guarantee whatever as to the attitude of that Government if the Turkish Petroleum Company decides to withdraw the draft letter. In making this communication to M. Berthelot,

it is perfectly frankly that they desire to see the proposed Bagdad Haifa Railway

on their side desire to see a railway and pipe line directed to a port in Syria, you should also inform M. Berthelot that His Majesty's Government reserve their full right to promote the construction of a railway to Haifa on any conditions which may be practicable, by such means, for instance, as complete or partial Government construction, by a guarantee of interest by the grant of a subsidy to the railway or by any similar method.

21 I trust that the material furnished in this despatch will enable you to convince M. Berthelot, to whom you are liberty to show any or all of the enclosed documents, that the suspicions of the French Government in regard to this question of the oil negotiations are unfounded. I hope also that the assurance that the company is, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, free to maintain or withdraw its letter, will provide a satisfactory solution of the difference of opinion which has arisen.

22 If M. Berthelot accepts this basis for a solution of the present controversy, your Excellency is authorised to say that His Majesty's Government will be glad to follow up the suggestion which he has made to you and to consider as a whole the various problems which are involved in the question of the Haifa-Haifa Enai. His Majesty's Government desiring in this sphere, as elsewhere, to preserve those friendly relations with France which they have consistently cultivated. I leave it to your Excellency's discretion to decide whether to mention at once this suggestion for a general settlement of Middle Eastern questions or to reserve it until after M. Berthelot has accepted the position as stated above in regard to the question of the proposed Haifa Bagdad Railway. If your Excellency's discussion indicates that an endeavour to reach such a settlement might advantageously be made, you should invite the French Government to put forward their proposals as to the questions to be dealt with.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 1781/3/91]

No 113

Sir G. Clayton to Mr. Amery—(Communicated by the Colonial Office, April 2.)

(Secret A.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 16, 1929

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your information the enclosed brief summary* of the activities of Akhwan raiding parties in the neighbourhood of the Iraq frontier during the past three months, and to invite your attention to the following considerations, which are suggested by this summary:—

- (i) The most striking feature of the summary is the number of occasions on which raids have been threatened or attempted by Akhwan tribesmen, but have failed to materialise. On one occasion only has an Akhwan raiding party penetrated into Iraq territory—I refer to the attempted raid by Ibn Ashwan near Jumaimah, on the 20th December—and on that occasion the raiders were immediately located and bombed by machines of the Royal Air Force. Where Iraq tribes have been successfully raided in Kuwait or Nejd territory, those tribes had, contrary to, or in ignorance of, Captain Glubb's orders, strayed in search of grazing beyond the zones of safety afforded by the desert posts and by the mobile forces allotted for tribal protection.
- (ii) The failure of so many attempted raids must be attributed mainly to the defensive measures taken in the southern desert area. These measures comprise, first, the collection and rapid communication to headquarters of intelligence regarding the movements and intentions of Akhwan raiding parties, secondly the withdrawal of scattered tribes from threatened districts, and their concentration in areas where they can be, to some extent, controlled and protected (a task which has been greatly complicated by the lack of water and grazing in the southern desert), and thirdly the maintenance of a close watch on threatened points and the prompt location and engagement of raiding parties.
- (iii) In connexion with the desert posts, which play an important part in these defence measures, both as administrative and intelligence centres, and also as advanced bases for air and ground forces, you will observe that, whereas the Akhwan leaders have at various times expressed their intention of destroying them, the raiders have in point of fact been careful to keep at a respectful distance and have concentrated on areas, such as Northern Kuwait, where no such posts exist.

(iv.) At the same time, although many attempted raids have been frustrated, the raiders are not entirely deterred thereby from renewing their attempts. I believe this to be largely due to the fact that it has not so far been possible to strike a decisive blow at the raiders, who have on more than one occasion been able to escape across the frontier with their loot.

2 I have thought it advisable to bring these points to your notice because it seems possible that the fact that threatened raids have so often failed to materialise may give the erroneous impression that the threats never existed. King Ibn Saud has indeed protested recently against the circulation of alarmist rumours of impending raids, which he claims to be unfounded. Actually, as you will observe from the enclosed summary,* these so-called rumours have usually been fully substantiated. King Ibn Saud has also contended, as reported in telegram No. 28, dated the 10th March, 1929, from His Majesty's agent and consul, Jeddah, to the Foreign Office, that the raiding propensities of certain of his tribesmen are due to military measures and concentrations on the Iraq side of the frontier. As I have shown, the necessary and justifiable defence measures taken on the Iraq side of the frontier have, in fact, been instrumental in averting a number of raids with their attendant loss of life and property. That the raiding propensities of the Akhwan have not been more efficiently discouraged seems due rather to the fact that the military measures taken on the Iraq side of the frontier have been purely defensive, and that, out of regard to the existing agreements, the frontier has at all times been scrupulously respected.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, and to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,
Acting High Commissioner for Iraq

[E 2217/63 93]

No. 114

Mr. Henderson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 648.)

Sir,

Paris, May 1, 1929.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your despatch No. 708 of the 27th March, to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter and memorandum which I handed to M. Berthelot yesterday in regard to the scheme for the proposed pipeline and railway from Iraq to Haifa.

2. While testifying to the friendly dispositions of His Majesty's Government in agreement to put no pressure on the Iraqi Government in respect of the withdrawal of the condition of prior survey for the Haifa route, the memorandum emphasises the desire and right of His Majesty's Government to promote the construction of a pipeline and railway to Haifa in any conditions which may be practicable.

3. In handing the enclosed communication to M. Berthelot, I explained that His Majesty's Government had been willing to make this concession to French objections regarding the prior survey of the Haifa route in the hope that, if the French Government accepted it in the spirit in which it was made, the way would then be clear for the discussion of the other questions outstanding between our two Governments in those regions.

4. M. Berthelot expressed his gratification at the consideration which had been given to the French proposals, but excused himself from expressing any definite opinion until he had had time to study the memorandum more carefully.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

Mr. Henderson to M. Berthelot.

Mon cher Ambassadeur et Ami,

April 29, 1929.

YOU will remember the personal and confidential letter which you addressed to Sir William Tyrrell on the 24th January respecting the Turkish Petroleum Company's relations with the Iraqi Government. Sir William, who is still on leave in London, now asks me to tell you that he at once sent copies of this letter and its enclosures to Sir Austen Chamberlain with an expression of his assurance that Sir Austen would consider the documents in the spirit in which you had compiled them.

2. Sir Austen's observations have just reached me, and are embodied in the accompanying memorandum. He asks me to tell you that, impressed with the necessity of the establishment in the Middle East of the same satisfactory relations between our two Governments as exist elsewhere, he and, indeed, the whole Cabinet have given this question their personal and most careful attention. Sir Austen feels sure that his explanations will give you and the French Government the most complete satisfaction.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 114.

Memorandum.

THE last paragraph of the *enfa-memoire* enclosed in M. Berthelot's letter to Sir William Tyrrell of the 24th January asks His Majesty's Government to notify the Turkish Petroleum Company of the "complete freedom which it enjoys" in the negotiations which it is now pursuing with the Iraqi Government, "notably in regard to the eventual withdrawal of the modified draft of the letter of the 30th October 1928." In reply to this request, Sir Austen Chamberlain feels that he must repeat the statement contained in paragraph 5 of his note to M. de Fleurbaey of the 28th November, 1928, and again in paragraph 2 of his note of the 12th January 1929 to the effect that it is for the Iraqi Government to decide whether they insist upon the letter containing the assurance in regard to the survey of the Haifa route being drawn up in the terms of the revised draft or otherwise. The company is perfectly free to withdraw that draft, and His Majesty's Embassy is instructed by Sir Austen Chamberlain to assure the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to this course.

2. In reply to this request, Sir Austen Chamberlain feels that he must repeat the statement contained in paragraph 5 of his note to M. de Fleurbaey of the 28th November, 1928, and again in paragraph 2 of his note of the 12th January 1929 to the effect that it is for the Iraqi Government to decide whether they insist upon the letter containing the assurance in regard to the survey of the Haifa route being drawn up in the terms of the revised draft or otherwise. The company is perfectly free to withdraw that draft, and His Majesty's Embassy is instructed by Sir Austen Chamberlain to assure the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to this course.

3. It will be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government cannot oblige the Government to extend the company's concession without such equivalent as that Government may think desirable in their own interest, and that His Majesty's Government can give no guarantee whatever as to the attitude of the Iraqi Government if the company decides to withdraw the revised draft. His Majesty's Government will, however, put no pressure on the Iraqi Government either to maintain or to withdraw the particular condition in regard to the survey of the Haifa route to which exception has been taken.

4. At the same time, Sir Austen Chamberlain thinks it proper that the French Government should clearly understand that His Majesty's Government desire to see the proposed Bagdad-Haifa Railway constructed and a pipeline debouching on that route, and that they reserve their full right to promote the construction of a railway to Haifa in any conditions which may be practicable, by such means, for instance, as complete or partial Government construction, by a guarantee of interest, or by the grant of a subsidy to the railway or by any similar method.

5. Sir Austen Chamberlain does not understand from M. Berthelot's letter of the 24th January, or from any of its enclosures, that the French Government consider this desire contrary to the spirit of the San Remo agreement or that that agreement necessitates the construction of the pipeline and trans-desert railway (if built) to a Syrian port. Such a contention would, in Sir Austen's opinion, be contrary to the fact that the French Government, in certain oil supplies, that Government shall give facilities, if desired, for the construction

of railways and pipelines through French spheres of influence to the Mediterranean. All that Sir Austen Chamberlain understands the French Government to contest is the placing upon the company for political reasons of an obligation to incur an unwarrantable and unnecessary expense. He feels sure that the French Government will agree that this possibility is finally discounted by the explanations given above.

April 29, 1929.

[E 2844/62, 93]

No. 115.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 805.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a letter from M. Berthelot respecting the proposed pipe-line and railway from Iraq to Haifa.

Paris, June 4, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 115.

M. Berthelot to Sir W. Tyrrell.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 31 mai 1929.

J'ai pris connaissance, avec le plus grand intérêt, du memorandum que m'a fait parvenir, le 29 avril dernier, Mr. Neville Henderson et où sont consignées les observations qu'a appelées, de la part de Sir Austen Chamberlain, l'aide-mémoire du Département des Affaires étrangères en date du 12 janvier 1929.

Les observations de Sir Austen Chamberlain ont été lues avec la plus grande attention et ont été l'objet de la plus sérieuse réflexion de la part du Gouvernement français.

Il paraît évident que la position prise par le Gouvernement français est en parfaite harmonie avec la position prise par le Gouvernement de l'Irak.

Le Gouvernement français ne peut pas se permettre de se laisser influencer par les observations de Sir Austen Chamberlain. Il est certain que le Gouvernement français ne peut pas se permettre de se laisser influencer par les observations de Sir Austen Chamberlain.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

M. Berthelot.

Enclosure 2 in No. 115.

Memorandum.

Le memorandum en date du 29 avril 1929, adressé par M. Berthelot à Sir William Tyrrell, au sujet de la Turkish Petroleum Company.

2. Rappelant l'origine des droits que la Compagnie française des Pétroles, déléguée du Gouvernement français, possède dans la Turkish Petroleum Company et la pression qui avait pu être exercée sur elle, le Département des Affaires étrangères avait demandé que la Turkish Petroleum Company fût informée de la position du Gouvernement français à cet égard, notamment en ce qui concerne le retrait éventuel de la lettre prévoyant une priorité pour l'étude d'un tracé sur Haifa, en vue de la construction d'une ligne pour gérer ses intérêts, en ne s'inspirant que de considérations purement économiques, dans le cadre des accords internationaux en vigueur.

3. Après avoir souligné que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté considère la question du retrait de la lettre du 30 octobre 1928 comme relevant exclusivement de la compagnie et du Gouvernement irakien, et qu'il ne saurait se porter garant de l'attitude de l'Irak,

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au cas où la compagnie retirerait le projet révisé, Sir Austen Chamberlain veut bien déclarer au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'élèvera éventuellement aucune objection contre ce retrait et qu'il n'exercera aucune pression sur la décision du Gouvernement irakien, soit pour retenir, soit pour retirer cette lettre.

4. Le Gouvernement français a pris connaissance avec un intérêt particulier des assurances qui lui sont données à ce sujet, et dont il remercie le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. M. Briand n'a, d'ailleurs, jamais douté que l'appel qu'il avait adressé à Sir Austen Chamberlain pour l'exécution loyale des accords en vigueur ne fût entendu.

5. Le Gouvernement français conçoit que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne veuille exercer aucune pression sur le Gouvernement de l'Irak à l'occasion de ses tractations actuelles avec la compagnie. S'il a cru devoir insister sur la question de la lettre du 30 octobre 1928, c'est parce que les conditions dans lesquelles ce document avait été révisé permettaient d'en attribuer la modification à une initiative anglaise. Ce qu'il considère comme essentiel, c'est que la Turkish Petroleum Company soit laissée entièrement libre de gérer ses affaires au mieux de ses intérêts propres. Il se tient à cet égard pour satisfait de l'attitude d'impartialité qu'entend observer le Gouvernement britannique; il ne doute pas que cette ligne de conduite n'ait été clairement portée à la connaissance tant du Gouvernement irakien que des représentants des intérêts anglais dans la compagnie; et il est convaincu que le développement normal de la compagnie, dégagé de toute influence politique, s'en trouvera grandement facilité.

6. Sir Austen Chamberlain veut bien à cette occasion faire connaître au Département des Affaires étrangères que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté désire voir construire le chemin de fer de Bagdad à Haïfa, avec un pipe-line débouchant dans ce port et qu'il réserve tous ses droits à favoriser la construction de ce chemin de fer par tous moyens pratiques.

7. M. Briand estime que l'esprit de cordiale et mutuelle confiance qui préside aux rapports des deux pays exige que chacun d'eux tienne l'autre informé de ceux de ses projets qui peuvent l'intéresser; aussi est-il reconnaissant à Sir Austen Chamberlain de lui avoir fait part des intentions du Gouvernement britannique touchant le chemin de fer Bagdad-Haïfa. C'est avec le même souci de franchise qu'il doit, de son côté, porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique le désir du Gouvernement de la République de voir construire en territoire syrien un chemin de fer ayant Tripoli pour terminus avec un pipe-line aboutissant dans ce port. Le Gouvernement français se réserve le droit de favoriser par tous moyens appropriés la construction de ce chemin de fer, qui pourra utilement contribuer à la mise en valeur du territoire syrien dont il a assumé le mandat.

8. Sir Austen Chamberlain se préoccupe à ce sujet de savoir si le Gouvernement français ne juge pas contraire à l'Accord de San-Remo la construction d'un chemin de fer avec pipe-line allant de l'Irak à Haïfa. M. Briand reconnaît volontiers qu'un tel projet ne serait pas contraire à la lettre, tout au moins, de l'accord. Il ne peut cependant pas ne pas observer qu'en stipulant, pour le territoire syrien seulement, les facilités à donner au passage du chemin de fer et du pipe-line en direction de la Méditerranée et en prévoyant ainsi l'acheminement de l'un et de l'autre vers un port syrien, les négociateurs et les Gouvernements signataires des Accords de San-Remo ont marqué une intention qui, si elle ne lie pas le Gouvernement britannique, doit cependant être prise en considération.

9. Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement français estime que la question du chemin de fer et celle du pipe-line ne sauraient être confondues: la construction d'une voie ferrée transdésertique est essentiellement affaire de Gouvernement, alors que l'établissement d'un pipe-line intéresse au premier chef les actionnaires de la Turkish Petroleum Company, et, à ce titre, doit être envisagée par celle-ci du seul point de vue économique.

10. Les charges supplémentaires qui résulteraient pour elle de l'adoption d'un tracé de pipe-line motivé par des raisons politiques, seraient injustifiables au même titre que celles qui pourraient résulter de sa participation à la construction d'une voie ferrée d'intérêt politique.

11. M. Briand se félicite à cet égard d'enregistrer l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour exclure toute éventualité de cette nature, et pour laisser ainsi à la compagnie toute latitude d'établir dans les meilleures conditions de pipe-line nécessaire à l'exploitation des pétroles de Mésopotamie.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 313/313/89]

No. 116.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople).

(No. 54.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 21, 1929.

THE Turkish Ambassador on the 18th January informed me that a statement had appeared in the press to the effect that your Excellency was proceeding to Angora to offer British arbitration in the dispute now pending between Turkey and France as to the line of the Turco-Syrian frontier. Ferid Bey enquired whether there could be any truth in this statement.

2. I replied that this was impossible. His Majesty's Government had no desire to thrust themselves into this discussion, and would not think of interposing except in the unlikely event of both parties seeking their good offices.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 426/92/44]

No. 117.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Angora, January 9, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that as usual on my return from leave I have come to Angora to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. The only matter of immediate importance I had to discuss with him was the question of the entry of the Turkish military mission into Afghanistan, since, in reply to our refusal to incur the responsibility of allowing the ladies of the mission to accompany it across the border, I had received at Constantinople a telegram from Tewfik Rushdi repeating his request that their entry should be allowed. I accordingly took the first train to Angora with the intention of explaining to his Excellency that, until His Majesty's Minister at Katul considered that it was safe to do this, I would certainly not back his Excellency's request, but, just before I started for Angora, I received the news that the officers of the mission had gone to Kandahar, leaving their ladies behind. The question had accordingly solved itself, but Tewfik Rushdi took the opportunity to deliver his views on the Afghan situation at some length.

3. There is no doubt that events in Afghanistan have been unpalatable to the Turkish Government. The revolt is an unpleasant rebuff to Turkey as a guide of less enlightened States along the path of Westernisation, and her position as the champion of the East has, so the Turks feel, been considerably shaken. Tewfik Rushdi said that progress in Afghanistan had been set back for twenty or thirty years by the ill-advised haste with which Amanullah had started to imitate the Ghazi, and his Excellency observed that even the Ghazi and the Government of Ismet Pasha, all-powerful though the combination was, had never ventured to insist on Turkish women accepting their reforms. It had been left to the natural development of public opinion to persuade the Turkish ladies that the veil and the barem were anachronisms.

4. I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had found, rather as I expected, a tendency, which was reflected in the Turkish press, to ascribe events in Afghanistan to our malign influence. I said that I was quite prepared to find any malevolent design attributed to us, but I should have thought that even the most suspicious would have given us credit for not acting deliberately against our own interests. The one thing we did not want was trouble and civil war in Afghanistan, for obviously that might lead to Russia and ourselves becoming directly involved. Tewfik Rushdi abounded in the same sense, for he said it was also to the interest of Turkey that Great Britain and Russia should not clash, and the only task of the Turkish military mission, the despatch of which had been a very heavy sacrifice for Turkey, for it included some of her very best officers, was to help to establish order in Afghanistan.

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5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then launched forth on the question of Syria. He said that it was impossible that the Turkish Government, in the face of Turkish public opinion, should cede territory which was held to be Turkish and of which the Turks were in actual occupation. On the other hand, France maintained that she could not go back upon an international decision which she had formally accepted. But both sides were prepared to make modifications. Tewfik Rushdi was prepared to retract the loop south of the Jezire-Nisibin line at present occupied by Turkish posts, and M. de Chamberlain was ready to recommend to his Government to deflect the frontier line laid down by General Ernst so as to include one or two villages to the south of it in Turkey. But there remained a strip of territory, insignificant in itself, between the two proposals as to which neither side was at present prepared to yield. Tewfik Rushdi said that in practice it was more or less a matter of indifference to Turkey, for the Turkish dispositions were made, and the question could remain as it was for another twenty years, but he wanted it settled, as it constituted a small but open sore in Franco-Turkish relations, and the poison might spread further. He, however, added that, if the question was not settled fairly soon, he was thinking of asking for our good offices with France, just as he had asked for French good offices over Mosul. I said nothing to encourage his Excellency to think that such a step would be either welcome or successful, but I did not think it wise at this juncture to make any direct effort to deter him from what was probably a thought arising on the spur of the moment, which a little reflection will show him to be impracticable. Perhaps I might observe that his Excellency's statement that cession of Turkish territory was impossible in the face of Turkish public opinion really meant that his position was not strong enough to risk a second Mosul.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs next touched on the Turco-Greek difficulties, but beyond an optimistic statement that the discussions were progressing favourably and that he hoped to reach a definite settlement in a month or so, said nothing very enlightening.

7. The remainder of our conversation was taken up by Tewfik Rushdi's comments on the so-called plots in Constantinople and Brusa, with which I am dealing in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 918/722/93]

No. 118.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 68.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 15, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that Sir Gilbert Clayton, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, arrived here on the 10th instant, his train having been held up for eight days in Thrace by snow.

2. I went with Sir G. Clayton to Angora the next evening, and on the following day we lunched with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The High Commissioner also had an interview with the President of the Council.

3. I enclose a note by Sir G. Clayton of his conversations with Tefvik Rushdi Bey and Ismet Pasha, both of whom were most friendly in every way, and manifestly gratified at the High Commissioner having, at considerable personal inconvenience, paid this visit to the Turkish capital. They expressed themselves as highly satisfied with the relations between Turkey and Iraq, which they attributed in great measure to Sir Henry Dobbs, of whom they spoke in the highest terms, and as confident that these relations would be maintained and developed still further by Sir G. Clayton.

4. I am convinced that the High Commissioner's visit has been well worth while and that the excellent impression made by Sir G. Clayton will greatly facilitate the growth of good relations and the solution of controversial questions between the two countries.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Memorandum.

ON the evening of the 11th February I accompanied His Majesty's Ambassador on a visit to Angora, and on the following day I had the opportunity, after a luncheon given to the Ambassador and myself by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of having a long conversation with my host. He spoke at great length and on many subjects, embracing the political situation throughout the Middle and Far East, but for the most part in very general terms and without making any pronouncements of particular importance. He more than once, however, emphasised the friendly relations existing at present between Great Britain and Turkey and the necessity of the two Powers working in harmony in a sphere where both had great, but not necessarily conflicting, interests. He expressed the friendly sentiments of his Government towards the Government of Iraq and their desire not to obstruct in any way the progress of that country under British guidance. In particular, he assured me that relations on the frontier were becoming more and more satisfactory, and that his Government were appreciative of the attitude of the local Iraqi officials and of their Government in sparing no efforts to eliminate all possible causes of friction; in this connexion he paid a warm tribute to Sabih Bey Nashat, the Iraqi representative at Angora.

At this point I intervened to assure his Excellency that I should always do my utmost to promote cordial relations and mutual understanding, most especially in that region where the division of the Kurdish tribes between Turkey, Persia and Iraq afforded a tempting opportunity for mischief-makers to try and foment suspicion and misunderstanding between the Governments concerned. I made this allusion purposely, as I had been informed that the Turkish Government were anxious regarding their Kurdish situation and that some of the newspapers had already hinted at British intrigue instigating trouble among the Turkish Kurds.

His Excellency seemed pleased at my assurance, and proceeded to speak of the relations between Iraq and Persia. At this stage he made a suggestion which was of specific interest and one to which he evidently attached considerable importance. He began by expressing the opinion that good relations and full understanding between Iraq and Persia were desirable in the interests of all parties and that a satisfactory agreement between the two countries would be a great factor in ensuring peace in that part of the world. No agreement would be possible, however, which did not settle the judicial question in a manner satisfactory to Persia, who could never accept anything less than most-favoured-nation treatment. He understood that the various agreements between Great Britain and Iraq were now under discussion—and, indeed, a cause of friction and difficulty. Why could not opportunity be taken to settle the judicial question in a way which would remove the obstacle to friendly agreement with Persia? Surely an assurance that British judges would continue for a considerable period—say, fifteen or twenty years—to serve on Iraqi courts should be sufficient guarantee to all concerned that justice would continue to be administered with the integrity and impartiality for which British courts were justly renowned?

His Excellency expressed these views with such emphasis that I could not help thinking that he was perhaps speaking as much on behalf of his own Government as on that of Persia, and my impression was proved to be correct when he added that Turkey also could never accept any arrangement which might appear to place her in an inferior position in comparison with other Powers.

His Excellency concluded by suggesting that, once this obstacle was removed, it should be possible to conclude a treaty of friendship between Persia and Iraq which might, if necessary, be guaranteed by both Great Britain and Turkey on lines similar to those of the Locarno treaties.

I did not think it opportune to express any views on these suggestions beyond expressing gratitude for so frank a statement of his Excellency's views, and adding that there were probably difficulties in the way of adopting such a course as he proposed.

His Excellency then spoke on more general topics, and the conversation came to an end in what struck me as an atmosphere of genuine cordiality and friendship.

During the same afternoon I had nearly an hour of conversation with the Prime Minister, Ismet Pasha. He spoke with apparent frankness on various questions of general interest and expressed very friendly sentiments towards Great Britain.

and Iraq, but he did not enter into any detail, nor did he touch on the particular suggestion on which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had laid such stress.

On the whole, I gained the impression that my journey to Angora was not without value. Both the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke frankly and in a most friendly—not to say cordial—spirit, and appeared to regard my visit as a mark of friendship and courtesy. I was particularly appreciative of their tact and consideration in making no attempt to force my hand at a time when I was obviously not in a position to express any definite opinions.

I would observe, in conclusion, that I had the opportunity of a long conversation with Sabih Bey, the Iraqi representative, of whom I formed a very favourable opinion. He is, I believe, working loyally with Great Britain in the interests of Iraq, and is undoubtedly also *persona grata* with the Turks. It would be unfortunate if he were moved from a post where he is evidently doing valuable work.

GILBERT CLAYTON.

Constantinople, February 14, 1929.

[E 1618/313/89]

No. 119.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 132.)

Sir,

Angora, March 21, 1929.

WITH further reference to your despatch No. 54 of the 21st January last, I have the honour to inform you that the French Ambassador, who has just returned from leave, was good enough to make a special point of telling me on the 21st instant the present position of the Turco-Syrian frontier question. M. de Chambrun said that he had reopened negotiations with Tewfik Rushdi Bey yesterday. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had talked about most things under the sun without saying very much to the point. The Ambassador, for his part, had taken the line that, although he was prepared to make concessions to the Turkish Government as concerned the details ("modalités d'application") of the demarcation, he must insist on the frontier running from Nisibin to Jezire and following a course which could reasonably be described as "the old road." He owed it to Syria, to the League, to Denmark (who had appointed General Ernst), and to his own country to maintain this latter principle. He hoped that the villages which he was prepared to leave on the northern side of the line would help to satisfy Turkish aspirations.

2. A new factor which had entered into the situation was the purchase by the Turkish Government of the Mersina-Adana railway (see Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 52 of the 4th ultimo). It was true that under the Franklin-Bouillon convention the concession for the line was made over to France, but by a subsidiary agreement that privilege was, unfortunately, subjected to the somewhat indefinite proviso that Turkish rights should not be affected. The Ambassador's hope was to bring about a general settlement both of this question and of the frontier dispute. He added that he would let this Embassy know not only when, but before, any decisive step was taken.

3. It does not appear, then, that the standpoint of the French Government is very different from what it was in November last (see Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 497 of the 20th November, 1928), except that it has been complicated by the Mersina-Adana railway question. What the real object of the Turkish Government is remains doubtful. At the end of last January Tewfik Rushdi Bey told Mr. Roberts that the point was that the disputed area in the "duck's beak" was occupied by Kurds. At present, Turkey, Iraq and Persia were concerned with the Kurds, and that was quite enough without France wishing to take a hand in the game. He had been able, he said, to satisfy himself of the absolute loyalty of Great Britain and Iraq in the Kurdish question, but he had no such confidence where France was concerned, nor would France ever be able to convince him of her good faith in this matter. The Turkish Government is certainly exercised by the presence of Turkish reactionaries in Syria and is, no doubt, anxious to do anything it can to stop them from communicating with the disaffected Kurdish districts of Turkey. Hajjo's twenty villages to which Tewfik Rushdi Bey was referring might be useful to agents passing between Syria and Kurdistan. But there are other routes by which the Turkish reactionaries in Syria could maintain touch with the Kurds of Turkey, and it hardly seems as if these twenty villages were important enough to explain the stubbornness shown by the Turkish Government in the present negotiations.

4. Actual conditions on the frontier seem to be bad. His Majesty's consul at Mersina reported at the end of the year that smuggling was being practised on a glaring scale and that there were some cases of banditry. The Turkish press, although it has been less hostile to the French of late, chronicles such incidents from time to time with comments on the inefficiency and unfriendliness of the French administration in Syria.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 2410/313/89]

No. 120.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 203.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 4, 1929.

WITH reference to Mr. Edmonds's despatch No. 132 of the 21st March last, I have the honour to report that there is now a general feeling of optimism about the Turco-Syrian frontier negotiations.

2. I have not yet seen my French colleague, who is at Angora, but both his staff and officials at the Turkish Foreign Ministry seem to be hopeful, and Tewfik Rushdi Bey is reported to have told the Italian press that a basis of agreement had been found. It may be that this optimism is a little premature, for I believe that M. de Chambrun expects to receive fresh instructions in a few days' time. By the Iraq Minister and another of my colleagues I am told that the frontier is to be drawn as Sabih Bey heard previously (paragraph 6 of Mr. Edmonds's despatch No. 524 of the 4th December, 1928). My other colleague adds that Turkey is to have an area extending 2½ kilom. south of Jezireh so as to give her the "fort" of Jezireh. According to Sabih Bey's information, the French are to keep the Mersina-Adana Railway.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner for Iraq at Baghdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 2531/313/89]

No. 121.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 217.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 14, 1929.

IN my despatch No. 212 of the 10th instant I had the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador seemed fairly confident that they were on the verge of an agreement in regard both to the Turco-Syrian frontier and to the Mersina-Adana Railway, and were, moreover, both of them seemingly satisfied with the terms on which an understanding had been reached.

2. M. de Chambrun was good enough to give me a more detailed account of the main points of the agreement.

3. As regards the frontier, the accompanying sketch map* shows roughly the line which both parties have provisionally accepted. It leaves the Turks with the two most important of the fourteen positions in their occupation south of the Ernst line, and also a certain number of Kurdish villages which they were anxious to have under their control, while at the same time it can, in M. de Chambrun's opinion, be reasonably described as merely a "modalité," thus keeping intact the principle of respect for the decision of an International Commission. To the eastward, the line ends at Jezire, or possibly a little to the south of it, as indicated in my despatch No. 203 of the 4th instant, but in any case practically the whole of the "Duck's Beak" runs in French territory. M. de Chambrun concentrated on getting the Turks to abandon their claim to Muhile, for once that was given up the area to the east would have no value for the Turks, and he is to be congratulated on his success.

4. As regards the Mersina-Adana Railway, M. de Chambrun told me that the position was hopelessly confused under the various arrangements that had been made by M. Franklin-Bouillon and others, but that the arrangement now come to in principle

* Not reproduced.

was that the French company (see my despatch No. 52 of the 4th February last) would continue to exploit the line from Mersin to Adana, paying to the Anatolian Railway Company a "droit de péage" for running over the section Yenije-Adana, which is a single line and part of the Bagdad Railway. On the other hand, the French abandon their claim to control the line from Yenije to Bozanti.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 2790/313/69]

No. 122.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 243. Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 29, 1923.

I HAD the honour to report in my despatch No. 217 of the 14th instant that both the French Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were confident of being on the point of concluding a satisfactory agreement with regard to the Turco-Syrian frontier.

2. On the 24th instant the semi-official "Milliet" reported that the negotiations were held up for the reason, apparently, that the French Government refused to implement M. de Chambrun's undertaking to cede three or four villages to Turkey. Other Turkish papers represented M. de Chambrun as saying that if he could not persuade his Government to agree to his suggestion he would resign.

3. These reports having rather flustered our diplomatic dovescote, I tried to ascertain what was the real situation, and my French colleague has been good enough to send me this morning a message from Angora that his negotiations are going on smoothly and should soon end in an agreement on the lines foreshadowed in my despatch referred to above.

4. M. de Chambrun begged that this information should not be communicated to my colleagues or to the press, but as the "Times" correspondent has just telephoned to me that the Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphed last night in the same sense to the director of the press, who was presiding at a dinner to the Congress of Associated Telegraphic Agencies, I imagine that the Ambassador's hope for secrecy is vain.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 230/230/65]

No. 123.

Mr. Chilton to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*British Legation to the Holy See,
Rome, January 9, 1923.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 136 of the 23rd July, 1922, enclosing despatch No. 337 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, I have the honour to report that the Armenian Patriarch, Mgr. Pietro Paolo XIII Terzian, has just left Italy for Azemm, near Beirut, where his Beatitude will take up his official residence. As was stated by His Majesty's Ambassador, the headquarters of the Armenians who are in communion with Rome are thus transferred from Constantinople. This was the decision of the Armenian Synod which met in Rome last year, the members of which may well have considered it absurd to maintain the centre of their rite in a city under Turkish rule, which, apart from persecution, had so much aggravated the difficulties of the Patriarch as to make it impossible for him to remain. Azemm was the patriarchal seat of the Catholic Armenians in earlier centuries, and it is from there that the Patriarch, who is accompanied by his patriarchal vicar, Mgr. Naslian, and Mgr. Nesmian, Bishop-elect of Mardin, will attempt to restore the Armenian Church, ruined and dispersed by war and massacre, to order and unity.

I have, &c.

H. G. CHILTON.